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To my parents and my girlfriend.

Nothing in life is to be feared, it is only to be understood.
— Marie Curie —
Malware is definitely not an exception.
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Abstract
Smart devices equipped with powerful sensing, computing and networking capa-bilities have proliferated lately, ranging from popular smartphones and tablets
to Internet appliances, smart TVs, and others that will soon appear (e.g., watches,
glasses, and clothes). One key feature of such devices is their ability to incorporate
third-party apps from a variety of markets. This poses strong security and privacy is-
sues to users and infrastructure operators, particularly through software of malicious
(or dubious) nature that can easily get access to the services provided by the device
and collect sensory data and personal information.
Malware in current smart devices—mostly smartphones and tablets—has rock-
eted in the last few years, supported by sophisticated techniques (e.g., advanced
obfuscation and targeted infection and activation engines) purposely designed to
overcome security architectures currently in use by such devices. This phenomenon
is known as the proliferation of smart malware. Even though important advances
have been made on malware analysis and detection in traditional personal computers
during the last decades, adopting and adapting those techniques to smart devices
is a challenging problem. For example, power consumption is one major constraint
that makes unaffordable to run traditional detection engines on the device, while
externalized (i.e., cloud-based) techniques raise many privacy concerns.
This Thesis examines the problem of smart malware in such devices, aiming at
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designing and developing new approaches to assist security analysts and end users in
the analysis of the security nature of apps. We first present a comprehensive analysis
on how malware has evolved over the last years, as well as recent progress made to
analyze and detect malware. Additionally, we compile a suit of the most cutting-edge
open source tools, and we design a versatile and multipurpose research laboratory for
smart malware analysis and detection.
Second, we propose a number of methods and techniques aiming at better an-
alyzing smart malware in scenarios with a constant and large stream of apps that
require security inspection. More precisely, we introduce Dendroid, an effective sys-
tem based on text mining and information retrieval techniques. Dendroid uses static
analysis to measures the similarity between malware samples, which is then used to
automatically classify them into families with remarkably accuracy. Then, we present
Alterdroid, a novel dynamic analysis technique for automatically detecting hidden or
obfuscated malware functionality. Alterdroid introduces the notion of differential fault
analysis for effectively mining obfuscated malware components distributed as parts
of an app package.
Next, we present an evaluation of the power-consumption trade-offs among differ-
ent strategies for off-loading, or not, certain security tasks to the cloud. We develop
a system for testing several functional tasks and metering their power consumption
called Meterdroid. Based on the results obtained in this analysis, we then propose a
cloud-based system, called Targetdroid, that addresses the problem of detecting tar-
geted malware by relying on stochastic models of usage and context events derived
from real user traces. Based on these models, we build an efficient automatic testing
system capable of triggering targeted malware.
Finally, based on the conclusions extracted from this Thesis, we propose a number
of open research problems and future directions where there is room for research.

Resumen
Los dispositivos inteligentes se han posicionado en pocos años como aparatosaltamente populares con grandes capacidades de cómputo, comunicación y
sensorización. Entre ellos se encuentran dispositivos como los teléfonos móviles in-
teligentes (o smartphones), las televisiones inteligentes, o más recientemente, los
relojes, las gafas y la ropa inteligente. Una característica clave de este tipo de dis-
positivos es su capacidad para incorporar aplicaciones de terceros desde una gran
variedad de mercados. Esto plantea fuertes problemas de seguridad y privacidad para
sus usuarios y para los operadores de infraestructuras, sobre todo a través de softwa-
re de naturaleza maliciosa (o malware), el cual es capaz de acceder fácilmente a los
servicios proporcionados por el dispositivo y recoger datos sensibles de los sensores
e información personal.
En los últimos años se ha observado un incremento radical del malware atacando
a estos dispositivos inteligentes—principalmente a smartphones—y apoyado por so-
fisticadas técnicas diseñadas para vencer los sistemas de seguridad implantados por
los dispositivos. Este fenómeno ha dado pie a la proliferación de malware inteligente.
Algunos ejemplos de estas técnicas inteligentes son el uso de métodos de ofuscación,
de estrategias de infección dirigidas y de motores de activación basados en el con-
texto. A pesar de que en las últimos décadas se han realizado avances importantes
en el análisis y la detección de malware en los ordenadores personales, adaptar y
portar estas técnicas a los dispositivos inteligentes es un problema difícil de resolver.
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En concreto, el consumo de energía es una de las principales limitaciones a las que
están expuestos estos dispositivos. Dicha limitación hace inasequible el uso de mo-
tores tradicionales de detección. Por el contrario, el uso de estrategias de detección
externalizadas (es decir, basadas en la nube) suponen una gran amenaza para la
privacidad de sus usuarios.
Esta tesis analiza el problema del malware inteligente que adolece a estos disposi-
tivos, con el objetivo de diseñar y desarrollar nuevos enfoques que permitan ayudar a
los analistas de seguridad y los usuarios finales en la tarea de analizar aplicaciones. En
primer lugar, se presenta un análisis exhaustivo sobre la evolución que el malware ha
seguido en los últimos años, así como los avances más recientes enfocados a analizar
apps y detectar malware. Además, integramos y extendemos las herramientas de có-
digo abierto más avanzadas utilizadas por la comunidad, y diseñamos un laboratorio
que permite analizar malware inteligente de forma versátil y polivalente.
En segundo lugar, se proponen una serie de técnicas dirigida a mejorar el análisis
de malware inteligente en escenarios dónde se requiere analizar importantes cantidad
de muestras. En concreto, se propone Dendroid, un sistema basado en minería de
textos que permite analizar conjuntos de apps de forma eficaz. Dendroid hace uso
de análisis estático de código para extraer una medida de la similitud entre distintas
las muestras de malware. Dicha distancia permitirá posteriormente clasificar cada
muestra en su correspondiente familia de malware de forma automática y con gran
precisión. Por otro lado, se propone una técnica de análisis dinámico de código,
llamada Alterdroid, que permite detectar automáticamente funcionalidad oculta y/o
ofuscada. Alterdroid introduce la un nuevo método de análisis basado en la inyección
de fallos y el análisis diferencial del comportamiento asociado.
Por último, presentamos una evaluación del consumo energético asociado a dife-
rentes estrategias de externalización usadas para trasladar a la nube determinadas
tareas de seguridad. Para ello, desarrollamos un sistema llamado Meterdroid que per-
mite probar distintas funcionalidades y medir su consumo. Basados en los resultados
de este análisis, proponemos un sistema llamado Targetdroid que hace uso de la nube
para abordar el problema de la detección de malware dirigido o especializado. Dicho
sistema hace uso de modelos estocásticos para modelar el comportamiento del usua-
rio así como el contexto que les rodea. De esta forma, Targetdroid permite, además,
detectar de forma automática malware dirigido por medio de estos modelos.
Para finalizar, a partir de las conclusiones extraídas en esta Tesis, identificamos
una serie de líneas de investigación abiertas y trabajos futuros basados.
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1
Introduction
Smart devices are rapidly emerging as popular appliances with increasingly pow-erful computing, networking, and sensing capabilities. Perhaps the most suc-
cessful examples of such devices so far are smartphones and tablets, which in their
current generation are far more powerful than early personal computers (PCs). One
of the key differences between such “smart” devices and traditional “non-smart” ap-
pliances is that they offer the possibility to easily incorporate third-party applications
through online markets (Figure 1.1 depicts such differences).1
The popularity of smart devices—intimately related to the rise of cloud-computing
paradigms giving complementary storage and computing services—is backed by re-
cent commercial surveys, showing that they will very soon outsell the number of PCs
worldwide [Dediu, 2012, 2013]. For example, the number of smartphone users has
rapidly increased over the past few years. In 2011, global mobile handset shipments
reached 1.6 billion units [Juniper, 2012] and the total smartphone sales reached 472
million units (58% of all mobile devices sales in 2010) [Goasduff and Pettey, 2014].
1Although some early feature phones—such as Java ME—allowed the installation of third-party
software, their functionality and the support given to both users and third-party developers is relatively
limited in comparison to smartphones and other smart devices.
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Figure 1.1: Appliances evolution towards smart devices.
In 2012 the smartphone users penetration increased 68.8% and at the end of 2013
reached 1.43 billion units [eMarketer, 2014]. In fact, the number of Android OS and,
iOS users is also increasing profusely [Nielsen, 2012]. Specifically, the global mobile
OS market share shows that Android OS reached 69.7% at the end of 2012, racing
past Symbian OS, BlackBerry OS and iOS as depicted in Figure 1.2. Furthermore,
the number of worldwide smartphone sales is expected to keep increasing at least
until 2017 [Dediu, 2014b], the average number of applications per device increased
from 32 to 41 and the proportion of time spent by users on smartphone applications
almost equals the time spent on the Web (73% vs. 81%) [Nielsen, 2012].
New smart devices are appearing at a steady pace, including TVs [Samsung, 2014],
watches [Sony, 2014], glasses [Google, 2014b], clothes [CuteCircuit, 2014] and cars
[Newcomb, 2014]. This is not only playing a key role in bringing to reality much-
3Figure 1.2: Main smartphone platforms by market share from 2007 to 2012 [Dediu et al., 2014].
discussed paradigms such as wearable computing or the Internet of Things (IoT),
but also finding innovative and very attractive applications in critical domains such
as, for example, healthcare. Both medical staff and patients are increasingly taking
advantage of such devices, from regular tablets and smartphones [Larner, 2012] to
smart pillboxes [IIH-uBox, 2014], and the new generation of smart wearable systems
(SWS) for health monitoring (HM) or implantable medical devices (IMDs) [Chan
et al., 2012], among others.
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1.1 Smart Malware and Smart Devices
In many respects, smart devices present greater security and privacy issues to users
than traditional PCs [Chin et al., 2012]. For instance, most of such devices incorpo-
rate numerous sensors that could leak highly sensitive information about users loca-
tion, gestures, moves and other physical activities, as well as recording audio, pictures
and video from their surroundings. Furthermore, users are increasingly embedding
authentication credentials into their devices, as well as making use of on-platform mi-
cropayment technologies such as Near Field Communication (NFC) [Fenske, 2012].
One major source of security and privacy problems is precisely the ability to in-
corporate third-party applications, primarily from available online markets but also by
other means. There are currently two established models of smart devices according
to how users can access such markets [Husted et al., 2011]. In the open-market
model, users are free to install applications from any online market, whereas the so-
called walled-garden market model restricts the market from which users can install
applications.2 Many market operators carry out a revision process over submitted
apps, which presumably also involves some form of security testing to detect if the
app includes malicious code. So far such revisions have proven clearly insufficient for
several reasons:
• First, market operators do no give details about how (security) revisions are
done. However, the ceaseless presence of malware in official markets reveals
that operators cannot afford to perform an exhaustive analysis over each sub-
mitted app.
2In spite of this, users have found ways of circumventing such restrictions by modifying the device
so that other markets will be accessible too.
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• Second, determining which applications are malicious and which are not is still
a formidable challenge. This is further complicated by a recent rise in the so-
called grayware [Felt et al., 2011c], namely apps that are not fully malicious
but that entail security and/or privacy risks of which the user is not aware.
• Finally, a significant fraction of users rely on alternative markets to get access
for free to paid apps in official markets. Such unofficial and/or illegal markets
have repeatedly proven to be fertile ground for malware, particularly in the form
of popular apps modified (repackaged) to include malicious code.
The reality is that the rapid growth of smartphone technologies and its widespread
user-acceptance have come hand in hand with a similar increase in the number and
sophistication of malicious software targeting popular platforms. Malware developed
for early mobile devices such as Palm platforms and feature mobile phones was iden-
tified prior to 2004. The proliferation of mobile devices in the subsequent years
translated into an exponential growth in the presence of malware specifically devel-
oped for them (mostly Symbian OS), with more than 400 cases between 2004 and
2007 [Dunham, 2008; Shih et al., 2008]. Later on that year, iPhone and Android
OS were released and shortly became predominant platforms. This gave rise to an
alarming escalation in the number and sophistication of malicious software target-
ing these platforms, particularly Android OS. For example, according to the mobile
threat report published by Juniper Networks in 2012, the number of unique malware
variants for Android OS has increased by 3325.5% during 2011 [Juniper, 2012]. A
similar report by F-Secure reveals that the number of malicious Android OS apps
received during the first quarter of 2012 increased from 139 to 3063 when compared
to the first quarter of 2011 [F-Secure, 2012], and by the end of 2012 it already
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Figure 1.3: Cumulative Android Malware Samples from November 2010 to January 2014 [Sophos,
2014c].
represents 97% of the total mobile malware according to McAfee [McAfee, 2013].
More recently, Sophos Mobile Security Threat Report [Sophos, 2014c] showed that
the cumulative Android OS malware samples almost reach 700 thousands reported
units by 2014 as depicted in Figure 1.3.
The main factors driving the development of malware have swiftly changed from
research, amusement and the search for notoriety to purely economical—and politi-
cal, to a lesser extent. The current malware industry already generates substantial
revenues [Schipka, 2009], and emergent paradigms such as Malware-as-a-Service
(MAAS) paint a gloomy forecast for the years to come. This admits a simple ex-
planation from an economic point of view: all in all, attackers seek to minimize the
cost required to achieve their goals and, therefore, aim at obtaining the maximum
revenues with minimal efforts. For example, the inequality
Cost(Attack)< Potential Revenue (1.1)
is used in [Guido and Arpaia, 2012] to give a cost-benefit analysis of mobile attacks.
This fits perfectly the case of smart devices such as smartphones, where malware is
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Figure 1.4: Correlation between the number of malware cases and platform market share during
a) 2009-2010 [McAfee, 2011], b) 2010 [Juniper, 2012], and c) 2011 [Juniper, 2012].
rather profitable due to (i) the existence of a high number of potential targets and/or
high value targets; and (ii) the availability of reuse-oriented development methodolo-
gies for malware that make exceedingly easy to produce new specimens. Both points
are true for the case of Android OS and explain, together with the open nature of
this platform and some technical particularities, why it has become such an attractive
target to attackers—see for example Figure 1.4, where the correlation between the
market share and the number of unique malware cases reported is straightforward.
Correlations—if not causations—such as those discussed above are paramount
to understand future tendencies and threats, not only in the case of smartphones
or tablets but also in other devices that soon will likely proliferate. For instance,
it has been recently reported that medical devices are plagued with malware [Clark
et al., 2013; Vockley, 2012]. Furthermore, it has been shown that RFID-based
systems, such as the ones used in several medical devices, are a great infection
vector [Rieback et al., 2006]. In the near future, it is quite plausible that similar risks
will affect vulnerable IMDs [Burleson et al., 2012], leaving users and patients exposed
to exfiltration of highly-sensitive medical information or even malicious manipulation
[Halperin et al., 2008a].
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Thwarting malware attacks in smart devices is a thriving research area with a
substantial amount of still unsolved problems. In the case of smartphones, one
primary line of defense is given by the security architecture of the device, one of
whose foremost features is a permission system that restricts apps privileges. This
has proven patently insufficient so far. For example, in the case of Android OS apps
request permissions in a non-negotiable fashion, in such a way that users are left
with the choice of either granting the app everything it asks for at installation time
or it will not be possible to use it. Most users simply do not pay attention to such
requests; or do not fully understand what each permission means; or, even if they do,
it is hard to figure out all possible consequences of granting a given set of privileges.
For example, applications requesting permission to access the accelerometer of a
smartphone or a tablet are rather common. However, it has been demonstrated
that it is possible to infer the keys pressed by the user on a touchscreen from just
vibrations and motion data [Cai and Chen, 2011]. Thus, using such a permission in
conjunction with Internet access—another rather common privilege—could lead to a
serious risk of data exfiltration. On top of that, the problem aggravates in platforms
where apps can interact with each other and share information, as one needs to
consider the privileges acquired by potential collusions.
1.2 Motivation and Objectives
This Dissertation deals with the problem of analyzing smart malware for smart devices,
providing specific methods for improving their identification. The Dissertation is
strongly biased towards smartphones, since they currently are the most extended
class of smart devices and the platform of choice for malware developers and security
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researchers. However, our discussion and conclusions apply to other devices as well,
and can help to better understand the problem and to improve upon current defense
techniques.
We next describe the main motivation and objectives of this work. Firstly, we
state that current methods aiming at analyzing smart malware are ineffective and
we question the role that security analysts play during the study of large amounts
of complex software. Secondly, we establish the need of systematic approaches and
automated tools for analyzing smart malware.
1.2.1 Motivation
This Dissertation identifies two fundamental open issues where research is needed:
There is more malware than ever before, and it is increasingly sophisticated.
P1: Sustained growth in the number of malicious apps targeting smart de-
vices.
As discussed before, malware has become a rather profitable business due to the
existence of a large number of potential targets and the availability of reuse-oriented
malware development methodologies that make exceedingly easy to produce new
samples. The impressive growth both in malware and benign apps is making increas-
ingly unaffordable any human-driven analysis of potentially dangerous apps. This
is especially critical as current trends in malware engineering suggest that malicious
software will continue to grow both in number and sophistication. As a result, market
operators and malware analysts are overwhelmed by the amount of newly discovered
samples that must be analyzed. This is further complicated by the fact that determin-
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ing which applications are malicious and which are not is still a formidable challenge,
particularly for grayware.
This has motivated the need for automated analysis techniques and instruments
to alleviate the workload of performing intelligent security analysis of software. For
instance, when confronted with a continuously growing stream of incoming malware
samples, it would be extremely helpful to differentiate between those that are minor
variants of a known specimen and those that correspond to novel, previously unseen
samples. Grouping samples into families, establishing the relationships among them,
and studying the evolution of the various known “species” is also a much sought after
application.
P2: Increase in the sophistication of malicious apps and the rise of a new
generation of smart malware.
Malware for current smartphone platforms is becoming increasingly sophisticated and
developers are progressively using advanced techniques to defeat malware detection
tools. On one hand, smartphone malware is becoming more and more stealthy
and recent specimens are relying on advanced code obfuscation techniques to evade
detection. These techniques create an additional obstacle to malware analysts, who
see their task further complicated and have to ultimately rely on carefully controlled
dynamic analysis techniques to detect the presence of potentially dangerous pieces
of code. On the other hand, the presence of advanced networking and sensing
functions in the device is giving rise to a new generation of smarter malware. These
malware instances are characterized by a more complex situational awareness, in
which decisions are made on the basis of factors such as the location, the user
profile, or the presence of other apps.
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This state of affairs has consolidated the need for smart analysis techniques to aid
malware analysts in their daily functions. This challenge has to be tackled by novel
methods to efficiently support market operators and security analysts. In some cases,
this problem cannot be solved by market operators alone or by enhanced security
models, as they really depend on each user’s privacy preferences. For example, a
leakage of data such as one’s location or the list of contacts might well constitute a
serious privacy issue for many users, but others will simply not care about it.
The situation described above inevitably leads to the need for more sophisticated
analysis techniques. This, however, poses an important challenge: many devices
suffer from strong limitations in terms of power consumption, so certain security tasks
executed on the platform may be simply unaffordable. External analysis performed
on the cloud in near real time can constitute an alternative. Such a strategy seeks
to save battery life by exchanging computation and communication costs, but it still
remains unclear whether this is optimal or not in all circumstances. Furthermore, the
rise of targeted—user-specific—malware poses one additional challenge: conducting
particularized analysis for specific user and execution context.
1.2.2 Objectives
The main goal of this Thesis is to study methods, tools and techniques to assist
security analysts and end users in the analysis of untrusted apps for smart
devices and automate the identification of smart malware.
To achieve this goal, we will focus in the following three general objectives:
• Study the evolution and current state of malware for smart devices, as well as
recent progress made to analyze and detect it.
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• Develop techniques aiming at better analyzing malware in large scale software
markets, with particular emphasis on intelligent instruments to automate parts
of the analysis process.
• Facilitate the analysis of complex smart malware in scenarios with a constant
and large stream of apps on target. Examples of such sophistication include
malware targeting user-specific actions, malware hindering detection with ad-
vance obfuscation techniques, or malware exploiting the battery limitations of
current devices, to name a few.
1.3 Contributions and Organization
This Thesis provides several contributions in the field of smart malware detection
for smart devices aligned with the goals discussed in the objectives above. These
contributions are grouped into four related areas, which corresponds to the four
central parts of this document: (i) Foundations & Tools, (ii) Static-based Analysis,
(iii) Dynamic-based Analysis, and (v) Cloud-based Analysis.
Foundations and tools. Part I presents the current state of malware analysis and
provides a framework for investigating different analysis and detection strategies for
untrusted or malicious code. The following two contributions are presented:
1. A comprehensive analysis of the evolution of untrusted code for smart
devices and current detection strategies. Chapter 2 provides a characteriza-
tion of current malware’s main features together with an in-depth analysis of
both malware and grayware evolution. We identify exhibited behaviors, pursued
1.3. Contributions and Organization 13
goals, infection and distribution strategies, etc. and provide numerous exam-
ples through case studies of the most relevant specimens. This chapter also
includes a careful review of current detection techniques and presents a taxon-
omy that provides a comprehensive analysis of their strengths and weaknesses.
The comprehensive study described in in this chapter suggest the need of a
versatile and multipurpose research laboratory for smart malware analysis and
detection. Thus, Chapter 3 presents a new generation lab and describes the
three building-blocks of its architecture: (i) static-, dynamic-, and cloud-based
analysis system. Each system is built on a number of open source tools that
facilitate the extraction of security features from apps—static features from
the apps’ components and also dynamic characteristics obtained from their
execution. The lab incorporates both physical and virtual devices. These de-
vices are instrumented with cutting-edge tools for monitoring a great number
of features: ranging from (i) hardware-based signals, such as the battery con-
sumption, to (ii) kernel-based features such as the system calls. The lab also
includes a dataset composed of a sizable number of apps crawled both from
legitimate online markets and malicious public and private repositories. This
new generation lab is shown to be paramount for the evaluation of all contri-
butions presented in this Thesis, and extremely useful for automating malware
analysis for smart detection.
Static-based Analysis: Part II exploits the use of static features to assist the
security analyst in the large scale analysis of malware families:
2. A text mining approach for analyzing and classifying malware families.
Chapter 4 analyzes several statistical and semantic features to facilitate the
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identification of malicious code components and their similarity to other apps.
This Chapter shows how static analysis can be used to classify malware with
a technique named Dendroid. Dendroid a system based on text mining and
information retrieval techniques used for automating parts of the malware anal-
ysis process. This approach is motivated by a statistical analysis of the code
structures found in a dataset of Android OS malware families, which reveals
some parallels with classical problems in information retrieval domains. To
this end, we adapt the standard Vector Space Model [Salton et al., 1975] and
reformulate the modeling process followed in text mining applications. This
enables us to measure similarity between malware samples, which is then used
to automatically classify them into families. We also investigate the application
of hierarchical clustering over the feature vectors obtained for each malware
family. The resulting dendrograms resemble the so-called phylogenetic trees
for biological species, allowing us to conjecture about evolutionary relation-
ships among families. In fact, this contribution reveals that current malware
families abuse from a reuse-oriented development methodology, which boosts
static-based detection strategies.
Dynamic-based Analysis. Part III compiles efforts based on the dynamic execution
of untrusted code and the analysis of its resulting behavior. The following fundamen-
tal contribution is tackled:
3. Differential fault analysis of obfuscated malware behavior. Obfuscated
malware provides attackers with the ability to evade static analysis. Chapter
5 introduces a dynamic-based detection technique called Alterdroid for identi-
fying obfuscated malware on large-scale analysis scenarios. Alterdroid provides
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security analysts with a framework capable of automating the identification of
obfuscated components distributed as parts of an app. The key idea in Al-
terdroid consists of analyzing the behavioral differences between the original
app and a number of automatically generated versions of it where a number of
modifications (faults) have been carefully injected. Observable differences in
terms of activities that appear or vanish in the modified app are recorded, and
this signature is finally analyzed through a pattern-matching process driven by
rules that relate different types of hidden functionalities with patterns found in
the differential signature.
Cloud-based Analysis. Part IV contains two contributions related to the use of the
cloud to offload detection strategies from devices. The first contribution explores
the question of offloading—or not—general anomaly-based detection strategies. The
second contribution stands over the conclusions extracted from the first one, and
approaches the detection of targeted malware using a cloud-based strategy. We next
summarize each one:
4. Power-aware anomaly detection in smartphones. Many recent works simply
assume that on-platform detection is prohibitive and suggest using offloaded
(i.e., cloud-based) engines. Chapter 6 studies different security tasks involved
in the detection of malware in built-in detection systems. Specifically, it focuses
on machine learning based anomaly detection systems, as they are widely used
to build both static and dynamic detection techniques. This chapter studies
the power-consumption trade-offs among different strategies for off-loading, or
not, those security tasks. It also shows that outsourced detection strategies
are clearly the best option in terms of power consumption when compared to
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on-platform detection. This contribution also points out noticeable differences
among different machine learning algorithms, and provides separate consump-
tion models for functional blocks (data preprocessing, training, test, and com-
munications) that can be used to obtain power consumption estimates and
compare detectors.
5. A stochastic behavioral-triggering model for targeted malware detection.
Targeted malware challenges current dynamic-based detection strategies as an-
alysts must reproduce very specific activation conditions to trigger malicious
payloads. Furthermore, the consumption model presented in Chapter 6 shows
that the use of detection techniques built in the device is unaffordable. Chapter
7 proposes a cloud-based system, called Targetdroid, to facilitate the detection
of this type of malware. The contribution presented in this chapter relies on au-
tomatically learned stochastic models of usage and context events derived from
real users. This chapter reveals several interesting particularities of apps usage
patterns that allow for an efficient generation of testing patterns. This contri-
bution shows that testing patterns automatically is feasible, specially when this
is done in conjunction with a cloud infrastructure.
Finally, Part V presents the main conclusions, analyzes the contributions of this
Thesis and the published results, and discusses open research problems and future
work. This part also comprises the references and appendices.
I
Foundations and Tools

2
Evolution, Detection and Analysis of
Malware for Smart Devices
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a comprehensive study of the evolution and current state of
malware for smart devices and techniques proposed to thwart malware attacks. We
first describe current smartphone security architectures and discuss a number of
research works that have recently proposed enhanced models to provide protection
against malicious applications (see Section 2.2). We then provide in Section 2.3 a
characterization of the various categories of malware developed for smart devices by
identifying possible attack goals, distribution and infection strategies, and exhibited
behavior. Other authors (e.g.,[Felt et al., 2011c; Zhou and Jiang, 2012]) have
previously discussed similar issues for smartphone malware, but not to the extent
covered by this work. Furthermore, our taxonomy is used to analyze the evolution
of malware using a representative sample of specimens that have gained notoriety
over the last few years. Finally, Section 2.4 analyzes and discusses malware detection
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approaches specifically developed for smart devices. Again, we first identify a number
of features according to which each technique can be classified and use them to
provide a systematic review of the most relevant works proposed so far. Among our
contributions, we identify an extensive number of indicators that can be monitored to
detect the presence of malware and that apply to any kind of smart device—not only
smartphones or tablets. Additionally, we correlate these features with our malware
characterization, pointing out how each class of malicious behavior manifests in terms
of observable indicators.
2.2 Security Models in Current Smart Devices
In this section we provide an overview of the security models and protection measures
incorporated in current smart devices, with particular emphasis on smartphones. The
two major mobile platforms—iOS and Android OS—are built upon traditional desk-
top Operating Systems (OS) and inherit some security features from them. However,
they also employ more elaborated security models designed to better fit the architec-
ture and usage of these devices.
2.2.1 Security Features
A number of recent works (e.g., [Asokan et al., 2013; Enck, 2011; Kostiainen et al.,
2011; Li and Clark, 2013]) have provided detailed account of the major security fea-
tures incorporated in smartphones. In what follows we restrict ourselves to highlight
the fundamentals about:
1. security measures implemented at the market level;
2.2. Security Models in Current Smart Devices 21
2. security features incorporated in the platform; and
3. an overview of recently proposed security mechanisms
with particular emphasis on the protection against malware that they provide.
2.2.1.1 Market Protection
A primary line of defense against malicious software consists of preventing it from
entering available distribution markets. To this end, two basic security measures are
applied at the market level:
• Application review. Some official markets analyze submitted apps before
making them available for download and install. Operators do not give details
about the particularities of such reviews, but it is generally understood that
some form of security testing is carried out. Furthermore, in walled-garden
models devices can only access some markets, which presumably only distribute
reviewed apps.
• Application signing. Most markets force authors to sign their apps. This
allows authors to claim authorship and also has some technical consequences
in certain platforms (e.g., apps signed with the same certificate can share
resources). Thus, a device can be sure about the integrity of an app by verifying
the associated signature against the corresponding certificate authority.
Both measures have proven so far insufficient to combat malware. Manually
reviewing applications is a a difficult and time-consuming task, impossible to per-
form in full extent due to the massive number of applications being submitted every
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day. Automated approaches have been recently explored as an affordable alternative
[Batyuk et al., 2011; Gilbert et al., 2011; Lockheimer, 2014; Zhou et al., 2012b].
For instance, in 2012 Google announced an application approval tool named Google
Bouncer [Lockheimer, 2014] for Android OS. Also in this line, Zhou et al. proposes
DroidRanger for detecting smartphone malware in Android markets [Zhou et al.,
2012a,b]. Their analysis shows that the infection rate in alternative marketplaces
is one order of magnitude higher than the official marketplace. Additionally, they
found that about 0.1% of the 204.040 analyzed applications are malicious. We how-
ever believe that such a fraction is much higher for two reasons. On the one hand,
samples were taken during a two-month period in the first and third quarter of 2011.
However, according to McAfee Threat Report [McAfee, 2012], the number of An-
droid OS malicious samples experimented an exponential growth of 400% during the
fourth quarter of that year. On the other hand, the detection heuristics used by
authors present a high false negative rate, ranging from 5.04% to 23.52%.
Even if application review processes were perfect, many devices install applications
through unofficial markets in which there are no guarantees whatsoever about the
trustworthiness of such apps. Application signing can give users some assurance
about the integrity of software downloaded from a questionable source, particularly
when such software claims to be an unmodified copy of the same available in official
markets. But most of the time users do not perform such verifications, nor it is
possible to do so in many cases as signatures are stripped off.
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2.2.1.2 Platform Protection
Current platforms incorporate a number of mechanisms to confine and limit the
actuation of malicious apps once installed in the device:
• Permissions. Most platforms provide a permission-based system aimed at
restricting the actions that an app can execute on the device, including access
to stored data and available services (e.g., networking, sensors, etc.). Au et
al. [Au et al., 2011] examine the permission system of several smartphone OS,
focusing on:
1. The amount of control users have over app permissions. Depending on
the granularity offered by the OS, users can grant privileges using precise
or coarse permissions. Additionally, such permissions cannot always be
individually enabled or disabled.
2. The information they convey to the user. Several platforms offer the users
specific information about how applications are using resources. While
some OS only inform of what resources the application may use, others
track the actual use of permissions throughout execution.
3. The interactivity of the system. Some permission systems require a heavy
intervention of the user. Typically, fine-grained permissions require more
interaction than coarse-grained. Furthermore, permissions can either be
requested only once (assuming they will remain the same) or they can be
requested periodically.
A summary of their analysis is shown in Table 2.1. These results will be further
discussed later on Section 2.2.2 when discussing the security features of the
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Platform #Perm. Control Information Interactivity
Android OS 75 Medium High Low
Windows Mobile 15 Medium Medium Low
iOS 1 Low Low Low
BlackBerry OS 24 High High High
Table 2.1: Permission models in the main Smartphone platforms [Au et al., 2011].
most important platforms. A recent study by Felt et al. [Felt et al., 2011b,d,
2012] on the effectiveness of app permission systems concludes that they are
rather effective at protecting users. However, in the case of Android OS it
points out that many apps request a significant amount of permissions identi-
fied as potentially dangerous and that frequent exposure to warnings drastically
reduces effectiveness. Furthermore, authors also conclude in [Felt et al., 2011b]
that apps are often over-privileged due to a lack of documentation and develop-
ment bad practices. In this regard, Barrera et al. [Barrera et al., 2010] propose
a methodology for analyzing permission-based security models and suggest to
increase the expressiveness without maintaining the total number of permis-
sions.
• Sandboxing. Sandboxing is a security mechanism used by some platform ar-
chitectures to isolate running applications based on mandatory access control
policies. Sandboxing can provide protection against malicious applications to
a certain extent, but are ineffective if users overlook the permissions entitled
to installed apps [Felt et al., 2012]. Furthermore, sandboxing do not prevent
apps from exploiting system or kernel vulnerabilities and, besides, can also be
bypassed in some cases [Davi et al., 2011a]. In this regard, several works [An-
drus et al., 2011; Gudeth et al., 2011; Husted et al., 2011; Lange et al., 2011;
Wu et al., 2014] propose the use of hypervisors that run directly on the hard-
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ware. Other authors (e.g., [Russello et al., 2012]) have focused on optimizing
the virtual machine manager, as virtualization introduces a trade-off between
security and performance [Xu et al., 2010].
• Interactions between apps. Some platforms provide the developer with a rich
inter-application communication system to facilitate component reuse. Such
Inter Component Communication (ICC) systems introduce several security is-
sues. For example, in a compromised device messages exchanged between
two components could be intercepted, stopped, and/or replaced by others, as
they generally are not encrypted or authenticated. Additionally, two or more
malicious applications can collude to violate app security policies, such as for
example in the so-called re-delegation attacks [Felt et al., 2011a]. Chin et al.
[Chin et al., 2011] have recently identified a number of security risks derived
from the app interaction system in Android OS. Their reported results show
that 97% of the analyzed applications are exposed to activity hijacking; 57% to
activity launch; 56% to broadcast injection; 44% to broadcast theft; 19% to
service hijacking; 14% to service launch; and 13% to system broadcast without
action check.
• Remote management. Some market and network operators, as well as plat-
form manufacturers, are empowered with the ability to remotely remove apps
from the device and even repair damages caused by malware. This can be seen
as an extension of other functionalities already present, such as for example
updating the OS or applying patches. However convenient, this feature can be
seen by many users as too intrusive and is not exempt from risks, both privacy-
wise but also in case of compromise of the remote management function.
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2.2.1.3 Other Proposals
Over the last few years there has been an explosion of proposals suggesting enhanced
security models and alternative policy languages to improve upon the limitations
discussed above. The interested reader can find a summary in recent surveys, such
as for example [Enck, 2011]. The majority of them fall in one or more of the next
categories:
1. Rule driven policy approaches [Bugiel et al., 2011a; Conti et al., 2011; Enck
et al., 2009a; Ongtang et al., 2009; Titze et al., 2013] propose richer languages
based on rules, aiming at palliating insufficient policy expressibility on current
protection systems.
2. High-level policy protection techniques focus on enforcing information flow
throughout the system. Several approaches focus on applying different labeling
systems [Mulliner et al., 2006], while others enforce full isolation based on
distinct security profiles [Russello et al., 2012] or policies [Russello et al., 2013]
within a single device.
3. Platform hardening aims at simplifying underlying platform layers, i.e., boot-
loader and kernel, to mitigate the risk of unpatched vulnerabilities [Husted et al.,
2011]. SELinux-based systems [Shabtai et al., 2010a] and remote attestation
[Nauman et al., 2010] approaches can be applied to improve trusted computing
base protection.
4. Multiple-users protection assumes scenarios where different users share the
same device. Several approaches focus on applying different access control
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mechanisms such as DifUser [Ni et al., 2009] or RBACA [Rohrer et al., 2012]
(a Role Based Access Control for Android).
Most of these proposals would certainly provide enhanced protection against ma-
licious apps. However, in many cases they ultimately rely on richer—and more
complex—policies that users must specify. But users generally lack security exper-
tise [Kraemer and Carayon, 2007], and developing complete and consistent security
policies is far from being an easy task even for experts with the appropriate back-
ground. It can be argued that devices could use policies created by others, but it is
unclear to what extent “one size fits all.” Furthermore, there is an incipient interest
on intentionally bypassing the platform protection mechanisms to gain full control of
the device and, for example, install apps otherwise forbidden.
2.2.2 Security Features in Dominant Platforms
When compared with traditional PCs, smartphone platforms have taken an innovative
approach to securing the device and the distribution of software. We next provide an
overview of some of the security features present in the five platforms that currently
dominate the market.
2.2.2.1 Symbian
Symbian OS security model is based on a basic permission system. Phone resources
are controlled by the OS using a set of permissions called “capabilites”. Furthermore,
applications run in user space, while the OS run in kernel space. Those applications
requiring access to protected resources must be signed by Symbian or the device
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manufacturer, while all others can be self-signed [Kostiainen et al., 2011]. There is
very little information about protection at the market level.
2.2.2.2 BlackBerry
BlackBerry security model is based on a coarse-grained permission protection model.
Applications have very limited access to the device resources and, as in the case of
BlackBerry OS, they must be signed by the manufacturer (RIM) to be able to access
resources such as, for example, the user’s personal information. Additionally, applica-
tions must get user authorization to access resources such as the network. However,
once the user grants access to an application to use the network, the application can
both send SMSs and connect to Internet [O’Connor, 2006]. Although applications
are not executed in a sandbox, some basic process and memory protection is offered.
For instance, a process cannot kill other processes nor access memory outside the
app bounds.
2.2.2.3 Android
Google’s Android OS security model relies on platform protection mechanism rather
than on market protection, as users are free to download applications from any
market. Applications declare the permissions they request at installation time through
the so-called manifest. If the user accepts them, the operating system will be in
charge of enforcing them at running time.
Many researchers have pointed out that Android OS’s permissions are overly
broad and have proposed alternatives and extensions [Fang et al., 2014]. For exam-
ple, Ongtang et al. propose a fine-grained permission model called Saint to limit the
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granularity at which resources are accessed [Ongtang et al., 2009]. Similarly, Jeon
et al. [Jeon et al., 2011] propose a framework that enhances Android OS’s security
policies and extends permission enforcement both an installation time and during
runtime. Schreckling et al. introduced in [Schreckling et al., 2012] Constroid, a
framework to define data-centric security policies for access management. Security
policies are here defined for each individual resource, instead of specifying permis-
sions for each app. Furthermore, such definition can be done at a fine-grained level,
allowing users to, for example, grant an app access to a part of the address book
only. A major consequence is that security policies are therefore defined by the user,
not by the developer. However, this approach can easily overwhelm users as they are
held responsible of specifying security and privacy policies.
Additionally, Android OS uses sandboxing technique and Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) to protect applications from malicious interference of others
apps. Although Android OS isolates each running process, apps can still communi-
cate with each other using ICC, a rich functionality that, however, introduces risks
such as those discussed before. Bugiel et al. introduce a security framework called
TrustDroid [Bugiel et al., 2011b] to separate trusted an untrusted applications into
domains, firewalling ICCs among these domains. Similarly, Dietz et al. propose Quire
[Dietz et al., 2011], a signature scheme that allow developers to specify local (ICC)
and remote (RPC) communication restrictions. Other proposals such as TaintDroid
[Enck et al., 2010], AppFence [Hornyack et al., 2011] or XManDroid [Bugiel et al.,
2011a] closely monitors apps to enforce given security policies. The first two uses
dynamic taint analysis to prevent data leakage and protect user’s privacy, while the
last one extends Android OS’s security architecture to prevent privilege escalation
attacks at runtime. The main difference between TaintDroid and AppFence is that
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the latter tries to covertly anonymize private information prior to blocking leakages.
Furthermore, all Android OS applications must be signed with a certificate to
identify the developer. However, the certificate can be self-signed, in which case no
certificate authority verifies the identity of the developer.
Several articles discuss Android OS security model [Enck et al., 2009b; Shabtai
et al., 2010b], providing a deep understanding of android architecture. Enck et al.
[Enck et al., 2011] also present a study of Android security by analyzing 1100 free
applications. We refer the reader to these works for further details.
2.2.2.4 iOS
Apple’s iOS security model [Apple, 2012] relies on market protection mechanisms
rather than enforcing complex permission polices on the device at installation time.
Apple’s App Store is a walled-garden market with a rigorous review process. Those
processes are essential for preventing malware from entering the device, as runtime
security mechanisms are limited to sandboxing and user supervision. iOS isolates
each third-party application in a sandbox. However, most of the device’s resources
are accessible1 and misuse of a few of them—such as GPS, SMS, and phone calls—
can only be detected by the user after installation.
Specific details on Apple’s App Store application review are unknown. In July
2009 Apple revealed that at least two different reviewers study each application
[Apple, 2014]. However, it is probable that Apple uses also static and dynamic
analyses.
1In iOS version 5, although Apple is likely to introduce some modifications in iOS version 6.
Specifically, the new version will restrict access to most of the device’s resources [Chubb, 2014].
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Applications distributed on Apple’s App Store must be signed by a valid certificate
issued by Apple. Developer certificates are issued to individuals and/or companies
after obtaining a verified Apple credential. iOS dynamically verifies that the applica-
tion is signed, and therefore it is trusted, before executing it. Nevertheless, iOS can
be tampered with (jailbroken) to install applications from alternative markets. This
practice violates Apple policies, causes the device to lose its warranty, and allows the
distribution of piggyback malware repackaged together with the original app.
Latest versions of iOS provide a number of features to protect user data based
on master encryption keys and protected by a passcode. The entire file system is
encrypted using block-based encryption and can only be decrypted when the phone
is unlocked. Additionally, iOS supports ASLR and Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
to prevent the execution of arbitrary code at runtime.
2.2.2.5 Windows Mobile
Microsoft’s market protection model for Windows Mobile systems is based on appli-
cation review. Developers are also validated prior to application’s approval. Platform
protection in Windows Mobile is similar to Android OS. It uses a trusted boot com-
ponent and code signing to protect the integrity of the operating system. It also
provides signed drivers and applications through the Windows Phone Store online
market.
Latest versions of Microsoft’s smartphone OS (Windows Phone 7 and 8) incorpo-
rate isolation among different sandboxes [Microsoft, 2012], and each app is executed
in its own sandbox, named “chamber”. Chambers are defined and implemented us-
ing system policies, which restrict the access to other chambers. While chambers
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are defined and implemented using a number of system policies, each security policy
defines what permissions are given to an app, known as capabilities. In this regard,
users are informed of the capabilities of an application prior to install.
2.3 Malware in Smart Devices: Evolution, Character-
ization and Examples
Malicious applications for smart devices—notably smartphones—have rocketed over
the last few years, evolving from relatively simple apps causing annoyance to complex
and sophisticated pieces of code designed for profit, sabotage or espionage. In this
Section we first provide a brief overview of such evolution from early mobile platforms
to current devices. We subsequently propose a number of features that can be used
to classify, characterize and better understand malware for smart devices.
2.3.1 Evolution
As in the case of traditional PCs, where malware evolution was intimately connected
to the increase in computing resources and the advent of the Internet, the complex-
ity and hostility of malicious software has intensified from early mobile handsets to
the current generation of smart devices. In the early 2000s, Palm platforms were
affected by malicious software that mimicked strategies well-known in PC malware.
For example, Symb/Liberty, Symb/Vapor and Symb/Skuller were popular Trojans
at the time, i.e., applications that perform some useful function while simultaneously
conducting malicious activities. Others such as Symb/Phage employed classical virus
propagation strategies to infect additional programs present in the handset. Their
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malicious payload varied, but in all cases it was sought to inflict damage over user
information or corrupt system files in order to cause a device failure.
The rise of feature mobile phones brought about a variety of distinctive infection
vectors when compared to traditional PCs, primarily through the communication
and networking functions offered by 3G, Wi-Fi, EDGE, Bluetooth, the SMS/MMS
messaging system, and NFC [Fleizach et al., 2007; Verdult and Kooman, 2011]. For
instance, Symb/Cabir was one of the first Symbian OS worms using Bluetooth to
infect other devices. Additionally, when handsets were given Internet connectivity and
the possibility to easily install third-party applications, more sophisticated infection
strategies appeared. One early example was Symb/Yxes, which used the SMS channel
and support from remote servers to propagate and configure itself.
The availability of mobile networking and pay-per-use services contributed to
a rapid escalation of the malware phenomenon, both in feature phones and smart-
phones. Examples such as Android/YZHCSMS.A andWinCE/Fakemini send premium-
rate SMSs without the user’s knowledge, which results in very significant revenues
for the owner of the registered number. Others such as Android/Smspacem have
been also driven by economic incentives: sending spam through SMSs.
In recent years, the proliferation of smartphones with improved sensing and net-
working capabilities has translated into more sophisticated threats. For example,
Android/DroidKungFu and iPhone/FindAndCall steal a variety of personal informa-
tion stored in the device and exfiltrate it through the network to a remote server.
Other pieces of malware such as Android/Spybubble, Android/Nickispy and FinSpy
Mobile2 have evolved into fully fledged spy instruments with the ability to monitor,
2FinSpy is a surveillance component part of a commercial surveillance toolkit called FinFisher,
designed to spy over a wide range of mobile platforms. The mobile version is capable to monitor apps,
emails, text messages, etc. on Android, iOS, BackBerry, Symbian, etc.
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record and exfiltrate the device’s current location, ongoing and past phone calls and
SMS logs to name a few. Although more illustrative examples are provided later on
this section, readers interested in a more in-depth study are referred to the recent
work of Zhou and Jiang [Jiang and Zhou, 2013; Zhou and Jiang, 2012], where a
study of more than 1200 malware samples is presented.
It is plausible to believe that similar threats will soon affect other smart devices
such as smart TVs or IMDs. For example, Auriemma [Auriemma, 2014] has recently
shown that several versions of Samsung’s Smart TV [Samsung, 2014] are vulnera-
ble to buffer-overflow attacks that could allow an attacker to remotely control the
device. Many security vendors are already releasing security frameworks for smart
TVs, including antimalware products [Sophos, 2014a]. The situation may become
similar for medical devices too, particularly for those designed to remotely monitor
a patient’s condition and/or control body functions. We are only aware of a few
cases of malware reported so far that affects existing IMDs or other medical smart
devices [Clark et al., 2013], although researchers believe that malicious programs will
certainly rock soon [Clark et al., 2013; Halperin et al., 2008b; Vockley, 2012].
2.3.2 Malware Characterization
Current malware for PCs have evolved into complex and reuse-oriented pieces of
software. Traditional classifications have focused on factors such as the propagation
strategy (e.g., viruses vs. worms) or the malicious activity carried out (trojan horses,
spyware, adware, rootkits, etc.), among others [F-Secure, 2014; Felt et al., 2011c;
Symantec, 2014; Zhou and Jiang, 2012]. However, these categories are rather im-
precise and do not contribute to a better understanding in terms of detecting the
2.3. Malware in Smart Devices: Evolution, Characterization and Examples 35
presence of malware, particularly in current times where most malware present mul-
tiple and constantly changing features.
We next identify several criteria according to which malware in smart devices can
be described and classified. Each provided criterion will be subsequently associated
with some observable behavior in one or more features of the device. Thus, our
classification will serve both to better understand the functionality of malware, but
also to point out where to look for detecting malicious activities. We believe this
can be of help to improve upon current detection strategies.
We classify malware for smart devices in terms of the following three features (a
graphical summary is provided in Figure 2.1):
• Attack goals and behavior: Identifying malware’s motivation on smart devices
is paramount to have a better understanding of its behavior and can be used to
develop targeted detection strategies. Such goals range from fraud and service
misuse driven by economic incentives, to spamming, espionage, data theft and
sabotage.
• Distribution and Infection: Malware creators can use a variety of techniques
to distribute malicious applications and infect devices, from self-propagation
mechanisms based on vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, to simply tricking
the user into installing it by means of social-engineering techniques.
• Privilege acquisition: Once the malicious code is installed on the device, it
often needs to acquire enough privileges to carry out its goals. This is automatic
in many cases, as the user might already have granted them to the app, whereas
in other cases technical vulnerabilities and/or misconfigurations are exploited.
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Figure 2.1: Malware characterization for smart devices.
In the remaining of this section we describe each criterion in detail and discuss
some illustrative examples.
2.3.3 Attack Goals and Behavior
Felt et al. [Felt et al., 2011c] analyze the main incentives behind iOS, Android OS,
and Symbian OS malware using a dataset containing 46 specimens found between
2009 and 2011. According to their analysis, the most common malicious activities
are related to the exfiltration of personal information and user credentials (44%),
followed by premium-rate SMSs (33%) and, to a lesser extent, research, novelty,
or amusement purposes. It is also pointed out that the majority of the analyzed
pieces exhibited behaviors related to more than one incentive, and that they often
incorporate secondary goals such as SMS advertisement, spamming, search engine
optimization and, in a few cases, ransom. About the 33% of the studied malware
changed their behavior based on commands received from a Command and Control
(C&C) server.
More recently, new pieces of malware such as Android/NotCompatible [Look-
out, 2014] are demonstrating that attackers’ interests are not only limited to the
scope of a smartphone and its user, but to large private networks. By turning an
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infected device into a TCP relay/proxy—capable of forwarding network traffic—,
smartphones can be used to support many infection vectors. For instance, an at-
tacker could establish an encrypted point-to-point session via HTTP with a device
located behind the firewall. Using such tunnel, the attacker might be able to probe
the private network and run exploits against assets within the corporation. Thus,
malware such as Android/NotCompatible opens new opportunities for penetrating
corporate networks.
Understanding the motivations behind malware can lead to a better identification
of its behavior. Figure 2.2 presents the relation between most common incentives
and the behavior associated with them. Common behaviors can be classified in
monitoring (eavesdropping, profiling, etc.), service misuse (SMS, call, email, other
services used for spamming, etc.), sabotage (draining the battery, deleting critical
files, etc.), data exfiltration, and fraud. Note that some behaviors could affect two
or more categories. For example, the unauthorized use of SMSs for spamming might
well be both a service misuse and a fraud.
2.3.3.1 Example: Smartphone-based Botnets
A botnet is a collection of compromised devices that can be remotely controlled
by an attacker (i.e., the bot master). As the number of smartphones is rapidly
approaching the number of PCs, botnets for such platforms have gained momentum
using a variety of distribution strategies to harvest as many devices as possible.
Traynor et al. [Traynor et al., 2009] were among the first to study the poten-
tial theoretical impact of mobile-phone botnets in cellular networks. As far as we
are aware, the first mobile botnet—named SymbOS/Yxes—appeared in 2009 and
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Figure 2.2: Main attack goals, associated incentives, and exhibited behavior for malware in smart
devices.
targeted Symbian OS platforms, using a rudimentary HTTP-based command and
control (C&C) channel. iPhone/Ikee appeared later on that same year, infecting
around 21000 iPhones within two weeks. One remarkable feature of Ikee was that it
showed how easy it can be to hijack a smartphone platform when root exploits are
available. Specifically, it exploited iPhones that were left with the SSH port open
and a default password after having been jailbroken. Such simple but very effective
attack vectors can enable an attacker to control thousands of devices through an
easy-to-implement C&C mechanism, as Ikee.B did [Porras et al., 2010].
C&C resilience is essential for a botnet to survive. In this regard, smartphones are
very attractive devices, as they offer multiple communication alternatives that can be
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leveraged to implement a C&C channel, including rather non-standard means such
as SMSs [Mulliner and Seifert, 2010]. Mulliner et al. implemented and evaluated
an iPhone-based mobile botnet named iBot and demonstrated that thwarting them
is more challenging than in computer networks, in particular because of employing
multiple C&C channels (HTTP, SMS, etc.) in a peer-to-peer (P2P) fashion.
Android/Andbot [Xiang et al., 2011] introduced a new energy-aware C&C strat-
egy named URL Flux for Android OS botnets. Android/Andbot uses URL Flux
to eliminate the single point of failure problem present in Ikee.B and also reduces
the SMS fees incurred by iBot. URL Flux is a domain name conversion used by
Confiker—a Windows worm that infected millions of computers between 2009 and
2011—based on a domain generation algorithm seeded with a public key. Recently,
more advanced iOS rootkit-like malware such as iSAM [Damopoulos et al., 2011]
integrates multi-functional tools also capable of self-propagating to other iPhone
devices in ways similar to Ikee’s.
Obfuscation is becoming popular in botnets, both by encrypting communications
exchanged over the C&C channel and also local resources that might facilitate detec-
tion through static analysis, such as server names and URLs, keywords, file names,
etc. AnserverBot makes extensive use of some of these techniques, and also relies
on posts made on public blogs to retrieve code updates and communicate with other
members of the botnet.
2.3.3.2 Example: Grayware
The so-called grayware apps gather potentially sensitive user and/or device infor-
mation, sometimes without user knowledge, and use it for dubious purposes or in
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contexts that the user might well not approve. For example, Aurora Feint is an app
that sends the whole address book to an unknown destination and was quickly de-
listed from Apple’s market in July 2008. Similarly, the author of Storm8—a popular
game—was sued for collecting users’ phone numbers, and Twitter has been widely
criticized for sending the phone’s contact list without informing the user.
Most grayware apps claim to retrieve such information for legitimate purposes
and that it is crucial to improve the quality of the service offered to users. This,
however, has recently become a major privacy threat for users’ privacy, as apps
collect excessive amounts of personal information and it remains unclear whether
the service provider will use that data for legitimate purposes or not. Some platform
manufacturers are increasingly deploying measures to prevent this. For example, in
iPhone a strict control is carried out to guarantee that personal information is not
sent to the cloud unless really needed.
2.3.4 Distribution and Infection Strategies
Malicious programs employ a number of distinctive techniques to distribute them-
selves. We next discuss the most relevant and propose a taxonomy to classify
them according to the channel used to enter the device. Distribution techniques
are primarily influenced by malware in desktop computers, although the emergence
of app markets have opened new possibilities. Two main approaches exist: (i) self-
propagation and (ii) social engineering. A self-propagating piece of malware can use
different strategies to automatically install the payload into a device, whereas social
engineering-based distribution strategies exploit the security unawareness of users to
trick them into manually installing the application (e.g., Andr/Opfake-C by Sophos
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[Sophos, 2014b], which spreads via Facebook and, once installed, allows the attacker
to perform premium-rate calls).
We have identified six different distribution vectors that can be used to infect
devices:
• Market to Device (M2D): This propagation strategy is based on market-borne
attacks. An attacker uploads a malicious application to a market, sometimes
using a stolen identity. Users can only get infected if markets accept such ma-
licious apps and users install them. Open markets, in particular those perform-
ing little or no security revisions, are particularly vulnerable to this distribution
method. For instance, malware using devious exploits (e.g.: Android/Droid-
KungFu3), might compromise the device by these means.
• Application to Device (A2D): This propagation strategy is based on application-
borne attacks. An attacker might rely on a specific, vulnerable application to
spread itself. For instance, instances such as Andr/Opfake-C can use Face-
book to post links with a copy of the malicious code. The main difference with
M2D is that attackers assume the presence of other installed applications (pre-
sumably “goodware”) to achieve infection. In this regard, even walled-garden
models can be vulnerable to this type of infection vector.
• Web-browser to Device (W2D): W2D uses web-borne attacks to propagate
the malware in way similar to A2D. In this regard, we can consider W2D an
specific type of A2D. The difference is that A2D strategies are limited by the
possibilities offered by the application, whereas in W2D malware can exploit
3Android/DroidKungFu uses an exploit called ‘Rage Against The Cage” [Kramer, 2010] for privi-
lege escalation
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general drive-by-download strategies. This attack vector has recently gained
popularity due the widespread use of vulnerable multi-platform components
such as WebView [Luo et al., 2011].
• SMS to Device (S2D): This strategy is used by malware that propagates via
SMS or MMS or attacks that distribute a malicious payload by these means.
• Network to Device (N2D): This propagation strategy is based on exploiting
vulnerabilities or misconfigurations in the device. We distinguish between:
– Device to Device (D2D): When distribution is driven by another device
in a P2P-fashion, and
– Cloud to Device (C2D): When distribution is done by a powerful com-
puter such as a workstation or a server.
• USB to Device (U2D): This strategy is used by malware that enters the device
through a port (typically a cable) when connected to an infected PC.
2.3.4.1 Example: Repackaging
One of the most common distribution strategy for smartphone malware consists of
repackaging popular applications and distributing them through alternative markets
(M2D) with additional malicious code attached. Repackaging is not a phenomenon
exclusive of the current generation of smartphones, although the proliferation of these
platforms and the impressive growth in available apps have certainly contributed to
make it a popular infection strategy. As far as we know, M2D repackaging started
with Symbian OS Trojans such as SymbOS/Skuller and SymbOS/Dampig, which
replaced system applications and antivirus files with modified ones. The focus has
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recently shifted towards Android OS apps, particularly by repackaging popular games
and tools [NakedSecurity, 2014], including banking apps. For example, Android/-
FakeToken trojan implements a man-in-the middle attack to forward SMS messages
with mTANs (Mobile Transaction Numbers).
Zhou et al. present in [Zhou et al., 2012a] a systematic study of six popular
third-party marketplaces for Android OS. Their report concludes that between 5%
and 13% of all available apps online are malware using repackaging, and the most
common incentive is fraud in the form of replaced in-application advertisements to
re-route revenues. The study also identifies a few cases with planted backdoors and
other malicious payloads.
2.3.4.2 Example: Malicious Code Transference via Network
In some cases, malware creators do not repackage an app with the full malicious code.
Instead, the modified app only encloses a short piece of code that downloads and
install the malicious payload once the app is installed on the device. One example
of this variant—sometimes known as update attacks [Zhou and Jiang, 2012]—is
Android/DroidKungFuUpdate. Remarkably enough, repackaged apps can enter the
device without the user being aware of it. By exploiting some technical vulnerabilities
and misconfigurations, some malware samples have even been able to replace another
installed app by a repackaged version of the same one.
Repackaged apps often rely on obfuscation techniques to avoid detection and
to make static analysis harder [Apvrille, 2011]. For example, in the case of update
attacks the transferred payload is often encrypted. In other cases, encryption is
applied to malicious components that are distributed together with the repackaged
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app, usually as if they were class files, images or other raw resources. For instance,
Android/RootSmart and Android/Fjcon use AES to hide domain names and URLs;
Android/Geinimi conceals URLs by encrypting them with DES; and Android/OpFake
simply makes an XOR with a predefined key.
2.3.5 Privilege Acquisition
Exploitation strategies comprise a variety of techniques used by malware to gain the
privileges required to achieve its goals. We distinguish two broad classes:
• User Manipulation: In many cases, privileges are directly granted by users
who are not aware of the potential repercussions of doing so. These strategies,
which rarely involve any technical sophistication, can be surprisingly effective
and very damaging. Common forms of user manipulation include:
– Social engineering.
– Malware and/or grayware installed by novice users who do not understand—
or do not pay attention to—the permission model.
– Repackaged applications found in alternative markets.
As in other similar security problems in computing, these methods can be pre-
vented by raising awareness about the dangers of malicious apps.
• Technical Exploitation: In other cases the malicious app can escalate by
exploiting technical vulnerabilities or misconfigurations of the platform. Even
though the particular technical means greatly depend on each platform, the
most common current attacks include [Chin et al., 2011; Davi et al., 2011a]:
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– API vulnerabilities.
– Buffer overflows.
– Code injection attacks.
– ICC vulnerabilities.
– Return-oriented Programming (ROP) and ROP without return flaws
– System vulnerabilities.
– Networking protocol flaws.
– Bootloader vulnerabilities.
– Rooted device-based vulnerabilities.
2.3.5.1 Example: Rootkits
Current smartphone platforms are becoming increasingly complex, including not only
the operating system itself but also dozens of libraries that give support to the services
offered by the device. Kernel-level rootkits similar to those known for traditional
PCs have recently appeared with identical purposes, namely to hide the existence
of malicious software from the operating system. Most rootkits infect devices via
N2D vectors, but app markets—official or not—are increasingly playing a key role.
For example, it is pointed out in [Zhou and Jiang, 2012] that repackaged apps that
implement technical exploits to gain root access once installed in the device do exist.
Such exploits are often distributed with the repackaged app or acquired from a remote
server as they become available. Contrarily, other exploits involve user manipulation
to acquire privilege escalation. For example, iPhone/Mobileconfigs [Skycure, 2014]
allows an attacker to remotely hijack the device by installing malicious system-level
settings into the device through social engineering.
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Root exploits in iPhone are often quickly patched by Apple and it is difficult
to find malware samples exploiting these vulnerabilities [Seriot, 2010]. The first
exploit known for iOS was identified as early as 2007 and exploited a buffer over-
flow in the libtiff library. Other known exploits affected the SMS service—SMS
fuzzing, presented at Black Hat USA 2009 by Miller and Mulliner—and PDF-related
functionalitites—as the one used by iPhone/JailbreakMe to root iOS 4.3.3 and ear-
lier versions via a web browser. Later in 2011, Miller submitted iPhone/InstaStock
[Goodin, 2014], which, after being approved, disclosed a hidden payload endowing
InstaStock with remotely controlled root capabilities.
Hypervisors are a common strategy to counteract rootkits. Although there are
some approaches to incorporate them on smartphones, such architectures are heavy-
weight and not widely available yet. Bickford et al. [Bickford et al., 2010] imple-
mented three proof-of-concept rootkits for Android. Firstly, they rootkit the GSM
Linux Kernel Module (LKM) in a way that a remote attacker can listen to the vic-
tim’s conversations. Secondly, they rootkit the GPS LKM so that the attacker
compromises the victim’s location privacy. And thirdly, they exploit a number of
power-intense services so that the battery is drained in two hours. They conclude
that there is currently no effective nor efficient technique to detect infection by
rootkits.
2.3.6 Discussion
Table 2.2 (see page 47) shows a representative set of smartphone malware and
provides, for each one of them, sought attack goals and the distribution and privilege
acquisition strategies implemented. Various conclusions can be drawn:
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Attack Goals Distribution / Infection P.A.
PPPPPPPPPApp
Charact.
Theft Misuse Sabotage SPAM Fraud M2D A2D W2D N2D U2D S2D User Exploit
FinSpy Mobile •   – – – • • • • • • •
Symb/Cabir ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ – – – • – – • –
Symb/Skuller   •   • – – – – – • –
Symb/Yxes • – • – – • – – – • • –
Sym/ZeusMitmo •     • – – – – – • •
BB/FlexiSpy • – – – – • – – – – – • –
BB/BBproxy – • – – – • – – – – – • –
BB/ZeusMitmo •     • – – – – – • •
And/YZHCSMS • – – – • • – – – – – • –
And/SpyBubble • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/SimChecker • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/BaseBridge • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/GinMaster • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/DroidKungFu • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/AutoSPSubs – – – – • • – – – – – • –
And/Nickispy • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/Smspacem – • – • – • – – – – – • –
And/Crusewind • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/Zsone – • – – – • – – – – – • –
And/GGTracker • • – • – • – – – – – • –
And/AdSMS • • – – – – – • – – – – •
And/Fakeplayer – • – – – • – – – – – • –
And/Bgserv • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/Lightdd • – – – – • – – – – – • –
And/Rootcager • – – – – • – – – – – • •
And/Opfake – • – – – • • – – – – • –
And/OneClickFraud – – – – • • – – – – – • –
And/FakeToken – – – – • • – – – – – • –
iP/MogoRoad – – – – • – – • – – – – •
iP/JailbreakMe – ♦ – – – – – • – – – – •
iP/InstaStock ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ • – – – – – – •
iP/FindAndCall • – – • – • – – – – – • –
iP/Mobileconfigs      – – • – • – • –
iPJ/iKee.A ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ – – – • – – – •
iPJ/iKee.B      – – – • – – – •
iPJ/Dutch 5e – – – – • – – – • – – – •
iPJ/Privacy.A • – – – – – – – • – – – •
WinCE/Duts.A ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ • – – – – – • –
WinCE/Fakemini – • – – – • – – – – – • –
WinCE/Pmcryptic – • – – – – – – – • – • –
WinCE/Terred – • – – – • – – – – – • –
WinCE/ZeusMit. •     • – – – – – • •
Legend:
Symb: Symbian iPJ: Jailbroken iPhone iP: iPhone
And : Android WinCE : Windows Mobile BB: BlackBerry
•: The referred characteristics are applied to the application.
♦: Proof-of-concept for demonstration, novelty or amusement purposes.
: Multi-purpose malware having multiple goals.
Table 2.2: Samples of smartphone malware for the main OS and their most relevant charac-
teristics. Malware having multiple goals might exhibit selected characteristics depending on the
specimen.
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• M2D strategies clearly dominate other distribution and infection strategies.
This conforms the study conducted in [Zhou and Jiang, 2012] over 1200 sam-
ples of Android OS malware, which points out that 86% of them use repack-
aging techniques.
• Privileges are mostly acquired by simple user manipulation, i.e., by simply asking
the user to grant them to the app. This is certainly worrisome and motivates
many recent works dealing with enhanced permission models and novel ways
of communicating requested privileges to users. Even though repackaging is
nowadays the primary entry point for malware, it is pointed out in [Zhou and
Jiang, 2012] that 36.7% of studied specimes attempt to leverage technical
exploits to obtain root privileges.
• In terms of behavior, malware with just one goal is rare. Most samples spy
on users and steal personal data, but also attempt to commit fraud or misuse
services. A possible explanation for this is the reconfigurable nature of most
malware specimens through updates, as in the case of botnets. Thus, attackers
basically seek to plant a basic bot engine in the device, and then to provide
it with instructions and further code to perform specific tasks. Again, this
conforms similar studies carried out recently. For example, in [Zhou and Jiang,
2012] it is pointed out that 90% of the samples turn the compromised device
into a bot; almost half of them (45.3%) try to misuse SMS or call services to
obtain financial profit; and 51.1% harvest user information. Finally, sabotage
is quite unusual, with only a few examples that drain the device’s battery or
remove selected files.
• There are remarkable differences between Android OS and iPhone malware in
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the three criteria of our taxonomy
– First, most Android OS malware is distributed by markets, notably in
the form of repackaged applications. iPhone barely suffers from such
infection vectors, and the majority of malware enters via web and network
exploits. In part, this is a consequence of the walled-garden model of
Apple’s market.
– The differences in their respective permission models and the way of grant-
ing privileges also show up: while a significant fraction of Android OS
malware is entitled with sufficient privileges by the user—even if it later
escalates by other means—, in iPhone most specimens depend on techni-
cal exploits.
– Finally, in contrast with Android OS malware, most iPhone specimens
discovered so far have been created for demonstration or amusement pur-
poses.
A word of caution is appropriate, though: because of its openness, Android OS
is the de facto platform-of-choice for security research in smartphones, which
may have also negatively contributed to the malware phenomenon; and, fur-
thermore, Apple follows a less communicative strategy about iPhone malware.
2.4 Malware Detection and Analysis
As detailed in the previous section, current malware pose severe threats to security
models in smart devices. In this section we classify and describe the most significant
advances in malware detection systems for such devices [Shahzad et al., 2012]. More
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Figure 2.3: Taxonomy of malware detection techniques for smart devices.
precisely, we show how such systems build their foundations based on a variety of
detection techniques. These techniques aim at identifying where and how malware
manifests by constantly monitoring various device-based features. We also show how
detection systems are driven by these features, as they represent the key elements for
malware identification. We believe that this comprehensive study is paramount for
researchers and practitioners in order to facilitate the construction of new detection
systems.
2.4.1 A Taxonomy of Detection Techniques
Malware detection is a complex process pulling together monitoring, analysis and
identification tasks. In order to organize and better understand current detection
systems, we next propose a taxonomy based on the following seven characteristics
(see Figure 2.3 for a graphical summary):
• Type of Detection (ToD) There are two common types of malware detection
techniques according to how code is analyzed:
– Static analysis: this type of technique attempts to identify malicious code
by unpacking and disassembling (or decompiling) the application. This
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technique is a relatively fast approach and it has been widely used in
preliminary analysis to search for suspicious strings or blocks of code.
– Dynamic analysis techniques seek to identify malicious behaviors after de-
ploying and executing the application on an emulator or a controlled device.
These techniques require some human or automated interaction with the
app, as malicious behavior is sometimes triggered only after certain events
occur.
Static analysis techniques are well known in traditional malware detection and
have recently gained popularity as efficient mechanisms for market protection.
As a major drawback, these techniques fail to identify malicious behavior when
it is obfuscated or distributed separately from the app. Contrarily, dynamic
analysis are arguably more powerful in these cases. In fact, the only way of
learning what the app is really doing necessarily requires to run the code and
observe its actions. However, the inputs generated by most dynamic analysis
tools are generally produced by using random streams of user events, which
might not trigger the execution of the malicious payload, resulting in malicious
apps that avoid being detected. This particular shortcoming can be tackled by
modeling users’ behavior and providing human-like inputs. Dynamic analysis
can be used both in the cloud for market protection or directly in the device,
although resource consumption is certainly a issue (see later discussion on this
in Chapter 6).
• Type of Monitoring (ToM) Malware can be detected by analyzing various
features that serve to tell apart benign from malicious activities. A monitoring
system can collect user-level, kernel-level, or hypervisor-level activity, depending
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on the type of features that will be extracted. Monitoring approaches include
the collection of: (i) system calls (SYS); (ii) network activity (NET); (iii)
event logs (EL); (iv) user activity; (v) instructions (I); (vi) permissions (P); or
(vii) program traces (PT); to name a few. Each type of monitoring activity
requires the deployment of different instruments to intercept and format the
corresponding events. For instance, SYS requires the use of a system trap
technique with root privileges, while NET requires capturing all packets from
the network interface. Additionally, monitoring any of these features when the
app is run in an hypervisor requires the introspection of a virtual environment.
Monitoring can be potentially expensive in terms of resource consumption, par-
ticularly if a large number of events is collected directly over the platform being
monitored. As far as we are aware, no power consumption analysis has been
carried out yet, but practical experience suggests that intensive monitoring is
prohibitive for current smart devices.
• Granularity of Detection (GoD) A point related to the ToM discussed above is
how collected data is filtered in order to select the detection scope. Monitoring
can be carried out at different levels:
– Per App: features related to a specific application are monitored and an-
alyzed independently from other apps in the system. This type of feature
classification presents good performance when malware is a stand-alone
application.
– Per group of apps: in this case, data from a collection of applications is
gathered and analyzed. This is potentially useful when malware’s goals
are achieved in a distributed way by several collaborating apps.
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– Per device: detecting certain types of malware, such as for example rootk-
its, requires a more general detection approach focused on monitoring the
device itself rather than particular apps executed on it.
• Type of Analysis (ToA) The monitored information is subsequently analyzed
to extract evidence on the presence of malware. Such analysis can be carried
out by a human expert (E), although this possibility is becoming increasingly
unaffordable, at least without the support of automated analysis tools. There
are several types of techniques for analyzing data obtained after monitoring,
including: Clustering (CL), Support Vector Machines (SVM), Self-Organizing
Maps (SOM), other general Machine Learning (ML) algorithms, Control Flow
Graphs (CFG), Data Flow Graphs (DFG), Program Dependency Graphs (PDG),
etc.
• Type of Identification (ToI) Depending on the type of identification carried
out, detection systems can be classified as either anomaly -based (A), misuse-
based (M), or specification-based (SPEC) system. This feature refers to the
principle guiding the identification of malicious activities and follows the same
ideas explored in Intrusion Detection Systems [Estévez-Tapiador et al., 2004;
Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009].
– Anomaly-based identification attempt to model the “normal” behavior of
the monitored system, classifying as anomalous any other behavior re-
ported. Anomaly detection techniques have the potential to detect pre-
viously unseen malware. However, they generally present a high rate of
false positives, i.e., they are prone to detect rare legitimate behaviors as
malicious.
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– Misuse-based identification—also known as signature-based—aims at iden-
tifying known malicious activity by means of predefined patterns of signa-
tures. Thus, only “malicious” behaviors are modeled here. The main
benefit of misuse detection lies in its accuracy detecting well-known at-
tacks. Generally, for each known malicious behavior, misuse systems are
equipped with one or more signatures. In this regard, maintaining an
up-to-date database with a massive amount of signatures poses a major
challenge. Furthermore, resource-constrained devices are not capable of
processing big amount of signatures.
– Specification-based identification works on the basis of predefined autho-
rized behaviors (specifications) and assumes that any activity deviating
from them violates the system policy and, therefore, is malicious.
• Place of Monitoring and Identification (PoMI) Monitoring, analysis, and
identification techniques are generally resource-intensive tasks that cannot be
afforded in battery-constrained devices. As a consequence, in recent years it
has been proposed to externalize many of such tasks to more powerful plat-
forms, even though some processing still needs to be taking place in the device.
We distinguish three main classes of detection schemes according to where
monitoring and identification takes place:
– In the device: both monitoring and identification are placed locally in the
device. This requires very lightweight approaches and their scope may be
quite limited. There are two types of local monitoring or identification
techniques according to where the monitoring is taking place:
∗ Local out-line (L): this type of technique aims at monitoring the de-
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vice by installing itself in one of the lower layers of the device’s archi-
tecture, and generally require root privileges.
∗ Local in-line, also known as Inline Reference Monitor (IRM): this type
of technique rewrites untrusted applications so that the monitoring
code is embedded into the app, and does not require root privileges.
– Distributed (D) among other devices. Performs any monitoring, analysis
or identification task in a cooperative way among different trusted devices.
– In the cloud (C). Uses virtual environments for running several devices on
a single server machine without reducing the battery life.
∗ Sandbox (SB): uses a tightly controlled set of resources for running
dynamic analysis over target apps.
∗ Replica in the cloud (RC): uses remote security servers for hosting
exact replicas of the device. Monitoring and identification techniques
that are placed on the replicas require complex synchronization sys-
tems to ensure that the replica is at all times identical to the actual
device, as well as collaboration with the service provider (e.g., the
internet provider for general purpose devices or phone provider for
smartphones).
• Place of Analysis (PoA) Finally, depending on where the analysis component
is placed—i.e., locally or in the cloud—the approach used poses different chal-
lenges. On one hand, cloud-based approaches require local preprocessing of
the monitored traces, transmitting them to the cloud, and waiting for the re-
sults. Finally, results may be included for further identification of malware. On
the other hand, local approaches might accelerate the delay in obtaining the
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response, especially when traces are too big and/or the connection is very slow.
2.4.2 Monitorable Features in Smart Devices
According to the monitoring approaches discussed above, we next identify and classify
a number of device-based features that can provide evidence of malware activities.
We subsequently explore how the behavior of some representative classes of mali-
cious activities manifest in subsets of these features. Specifically, we analyze those
features against: (i) botnets–like malware, (ii) Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, (iii)
technical exploitations, i.e., SMS–of–death, (iv) user manipulation such as Phishing
or Pharming, (v) information theft via monitoring, and (vi) service misuse such as
SMS or (Quick Response) QR codes. A summary of this taxonomy—excluding the
full list of features for each class—is given in Figure 2.4.
• Hardware: this kind of features identify the state of the hardware (HW) com-
ponents of the device. We group HW features in three subclasses: (i) battery,
(ii) input/output HW, and (iii) device info. Table 2.3 provides a detailed list of
features for each subclass. The state of the battery or the access to the unique
device identifier can be used to detect a specific type of malware. For instance,
some botnets check first that the battery is charging before performing heavy
operations. Another example of the use of HW-based features for malicious
purposes is access to the IMEI of a smartphone with the goal of exfiltrating it.
• Communications: communications represent an essential infection vector in
smartphones. They include the following features: (i) phone and internet calls,
(ii) phone and internet messaging, and (iii) network usage (data other than
calls and messaging), as identified in Table 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: Taxonomy of monitorable features for smart devices.
• Sensors: on-platform sensors allow the device to interpret the physical con-
text of a user [Knappmeyer et al., 2013]. Currently the most common sensors
are: (i) accelerometer, (ii) GPS, (iii) compass, (vi) gyroscope, (v) microphone,
(vi) touch sensors, (vii) speakers, and (viii) camera, as illustrated in Table 2.5.
Access to sensors can be monitored to identify malicious use. For instance, pro-
filing malware will typically access the user’s current location. Thus, if an ap-
plication is constantly accessing the GPS and sending this information through
the network, it could be an indication of malicious—or, at least, potentially
dangerous—usage.
• System: access to system resources can be used to identify malicious behaviors
58 2. Evolution, Detection and Analysis of Malware for Smart Devices
XXXXXXXXXXXXFeatures
Attacks
B
ot
ne
t
D
oS
&
D
D
oS
SM
S–
of
–d
ea
th
P
hi
sh
in
g
P
ha
rm
in
g
M
on
it
or
in
g
M
is
us
e
SM
S
se
rv
ic
e
M
al
ic
io
us
Q
R
C
od
e
Battery
Charging_Enabled • – – – – – – –
Battery_Voltage • • – – – – – –
Battery_Current • • – – – – – –
Battery_Temp • • – – – – – –
Battery_Level_Change • • – – – – – –
I/O
LED – – – – – – – –
USB_Connection – – – – – – – –
Coverage_Range – – – – – – – –
Press_Key – – – – – • • –
Device Info.
IMEI – – – – – • – –
Device_Id – – – – – • – –
SIM_Card – – – – – • – –
Phone_State – – – – – • – –
UID_Access – – – – – • – –
UID_Removal – – – – – • – –
Table 2.3: Monitorable HARDWARE features and examples of attacks that could affect them.
by monitoring: (i) processes, (ii) storage, (iii) memory, (iv) package manage-
ment, and (v) scheduler, as identified in Table 2.6.
• User: there are a number of features that generally involve user interaction and
that could also provide evidence of malicious behavior. We identify (i) user-
permissions frequency requests (applications can be classified into categories
by monitoring the frequency at which they request permissions [Rassameeroj
and Tanahashi, 2011]), (ii) third-party apps, (iii) built-in apps, and (iv) other
actions, as detailed in Table 2.7.
2.4.2.1 Discussion
Malicious apps—as any other app—rely on the device’s system and sensors to achieve
their goals. Different components of the device are therefore interrogated by the mal-
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Calls
Phone
Phone_Outgoing – • – – – • – –
Phone_Incoming – • – – – • – –
Phone_Missed – • – – – • – –
Phone_Privileged – • – – – • – –
Internet
SIP_Incoming – • – – – – – –
SIP_Outgoing – • – – – • – –
Msg.
Phone
SMS_Incoming • • • – – • – –
SMS_Outgoing • • – – – • – –
SMS_Read • • – • – • – –
SMS_Privileged – • – – – • • –
MMS_Incoming • • • – – • – –
MMS_Outgoing • • – – – • – –
MMS_Read • • – • – • – –
MMS_Privilege – • – – – • • –
Internet
XMPP_Incoming • – – – – • – –
XMPP_Outgoing • • – – – • – –
Net.
Byte
WiFi_TX_Bytes • – – – • • – –
Phone_TX_Bytes • • – – – • – –
Bluetooth_TX_Bytes • • – – – • – –
WiFi_RX_Bytes • • – • – • – –
Phone_RX_Bytes • • – – – • – –
Bluetooth_RX_Bytes • • – – – • – –
Packets
WiFi_TX_Pckts • • – – • • – –
Phone_TX_Pckts • • – – – • – –
Bluetooth_TX_Pckts • • – – – • – –
WiFi_RX_Pckts • • – • – • – –
Phone_RX_Pckts • • – – – • – –
Bluetooth_RX_Pckts • • – – – • – –
Connections
WiFi_CX • • – • • • – –
Phone_CX • • – • • • – –
Bluetooth_CX • • – • • • – –
DNS_Resoluc. • • – • • • – –
Table 2.4: Monitorable COMMUNICATIONS features and examples of attacks that could affect
them.
ware to operate. For instance, the behavior of botnets is deeply related to almost any
kind of communication feature as all bots rely on a C&C back-end. Additionally, they
could also require some system interactions in order to store and update themselves.
However, they are not likely to access any sensor—unless the master commands it
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Accelerometer
Access_Accelerometer – – – – – • – –
Current_Roll_Pitch_Yaw – – – – – • – –
Orientation_Changing – – – – – • – –
GPS
Access_Location – – – – – • – –
Current_Location – – – – – • – –
Location_Changing – – – – – • – –
Compass
Access_Compass – – – – – • – –
Current_Cardinal_Orientation – – – – – • – –
Cardinal_Orientation_Changing – – – – – • – –
Gyroscope
Access_Gyroscope – – – – – • – –
Current_Angular_Moment – – – – – • – –
Angular_Moment_Changing – – – – – • – –
Microphone
Record_Audio – – – – – • – –
Access_Audio – – – – – • – –
Touch
Touch_Screen_Preasure – – – – – • – –
Touch_Screen_Area – – – – – • – –
Speaker
Access_Speakers – – – – – • – –
Play_Audio – – – – – • – –
Camera
Take_Picture – – – – – • – •
Access_Picture – – – – – • – •
Record_Video – – – – – • – –
Access_Video – – – – – • – –
Calculate_Depth (RGDB) – – – – – • – –
Table 2.5: Monitorable SENSORS features and examples of attacks that could affect them.
through a remotely transmitted payload. Another interesting example is given by
fraud attacks such as Phishing or Pharming. In these cases, the malware is likely to
use network connections in order to get to the victim, access to SMS messages to
steal, for example, One Time Passwords (OTPs), or change the DNS resolution of
the device, but it will definitely not access sensors.
Accessing those components in a stealthy manner is still, to the best of our knowl-
edge, a limitation for attackers. Nevertheless, there are some technical exploitation
vectors that allow a malware to root the device, which could thwart detection at
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Processing
CPU_Time – • • – – – – –
Runnable_Entities – • – – – – – –
Context_Switching – – – – – – – –
Wakelocks – – – – – – – –
Processes_Changing – • – – – – – –
Storage
File_Open • – – – – – – –
File_Reads • – – – – – – –
File_Writes • – – – – – – –
File_Read_Bytes • – – – – – – –
File_Write_Bytes • – – – – – – –
Memory
Dirty_Pages – – – – – – – –
Active_Pages – – – – – – – –
Anonymous_Pages – – – – – – – –
Page_Activations – – – – – – – –
Page_Desactivations – – – – – – – –
Page_Faults – – – – – – – –
DMA_Allocations – – – – – – – –
Garbage_Collections – – – – – – – –
Page_Frees – – – – – – – –
Inactive_Pages – – – – – – – –
File_Pages – – – – – – – –
Mapped_Pages – – – – – – – –
Writeback_Pages – – – – – – – –
Pkg Mgmt
App_Load_Time • – – – – – – –
Install_Packages • – – – – – – –
Delete_Packages • – – – – – – –
Change_Package • – – – – – – –
Restart_Package • – – – – – – –
Master_Clear • – – – – – – –
Scheduler
Yield_Calls – – – – – – – –
Schedule_Idle – – – – – – – –
Running_Jiffies – – – – – – – –
Waiting_Jiffies – – – – – – – –
Table 2.6: Monitorable SYSTEM features and examples of attacks that could affect them.
some levels. In those cases, access to hypervisor-level monitoring is paramount to
identifying such cases.
Tables 2.3 through 2.7 present various examples of malicious activities and the
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User–permissions #_requests • • • • • • • •
Third Party Apps
Apps_Installed • – – – – – – –
Apps_Usage • – – – – – – –
Apps_Delete • – – – – – – –
Built–in Apps
Address_Book – – – – – • – –
History – – – – – • – –
Bookmarks – – – – – • – –
Calendar – – – – – • – –
Feeds – – – – – • – –
Email – – – – – • – –
Other Actions
Push_Notifications – – – – – • – –
Unlock • • • • • • • –
Table 2.7: Monitorable USER features and examples of attacks that could affect them.
features that would likely allow a detection system to identify them. The mapping
between the monitorable features and the attacks has been extracted analytically
based on the criterion and the expertise of the authors. Based on this, several
conclusions can be drawn:
• Monitoring can be a very heavy consuming task. Thus, identifying a monitoring
strategy as well as an appropriate type of features is crucial to reduce workload
and improve detection efficacy. For instance, if a user is interested in using
his device in a Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) context, avoiding exfiltration
of sensitive information may be critical, and therefore monitoring only some
specific features would be a good strategy.
• From all eight cases studied, the most relevant group of features affects com-
munications (Table 2.4). In this regard, it is also interesting to identify adaptive
monitoring strategies based on the appropriate amount of features. Thus, if
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a detection system can likely identify the most popular malware by only mon-
itoring, say, 40% of the features, then monitoring the remaining ones can be
eventually switched off, e.g., when the battery is lower than a given threshold.
Finally, we emphasize that the list of detection features presented in Tables 2.3
through 2.7 are only an excerpt of all those that can be used by a detection system.
However, . In general, each type of device will offer a more or less exhaustive list of
available features for each category given above.
2.4.3 Overview of Detection Systems
In the last few years several works have been proposed to detect malware on smart
devices—mostly smartphones and, more specifically, for Android OS platforms. We
have classified the 20 most representative detection systems according to the taxon-
omy provided above. The result, shown in Table 2.10, summarizes current research
directions.
Even though all detection systems are strongly interrelated, some general char-
acteristics are evident. For example, while some techniques are more versatile and,
therefore, are used more often, others are used mainly for certain detection systems.
Thus, both static and dynamic analysis are used for device and market protection.
However, it is more frequent to use dynamic analysis for device-oriented detection
and static analysis for market protection. Despite this, dynamic analysis is becoming
an important technique for market detection as well, as new paradigms based on
Security-as-a-Service, such as Replicas in the Cloud, are gaining popularity.
For the sake of organization, in the remaining of this section we describe current
research proposals grouped into three main categories:
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i) Device monitoring systems.
ii) Automatic app-review systems for market protection.
iii) Attack-specific malware identification systems (both for user and market protec-
tion).
2.4.4 Device-based Monitoring Systems
Device-based malware detection systems have received much attention lately. They
mostly use dynamic analysis techniques, although some combine them with static
analysis to improve the detection strategy. In this regard, both anomaly and misuse
detectors are proposed.
2.4.4.1 Anomaly Detectors
Schmidt et al. [Schmidt, 2011] leverage both static and dynamic analysis for detect-
ing malware in Symbian OS and Android OS devices. On the one hand, function
calls are first extracted, and monitored data is then analyzed using decision trees.
Classifiers are trained to recognize normal and malicious apps. On the other hand,
an anomaly-based malware detection is used for dynamic analysis. Features such as
free RAM memory, CPU usage, SMS count, etc. are monitored for further analyz-
ing behavior. Analysis is done in the cloud using machine learning algorithms such
as Artificial Immune Systems (AIS), Self-Organizing Maps (SOM), Support Vector
Machines (SVM), and Tree Kernels.
A somewhat similar approach is Andromaly [Shabtai et al., 2012], which uses dy-
namic analysis for periodically monitoring a number of features and machine learning
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LEGEND
Platform Type of Monitoring (ToM) Type of Analysis (ToA)
Place of Monitoring and
Identification (PoMI) and
Place of Analysis (PoA)
And: Android SYS: System calls E: Expert L: Local Outline
Win: Windows NET: Network ML: Machine Learning IRM: Local Inline (IRM)
Sym: Symbian EL: Event Log CL: Clustering C: Cloud
I: Instructions DG: Dependency Graphs DB: Distributed
Type of Detection (ToD) P: Permissions ST: Statistical HP: Honeypot
S: Static PT: Program Traces PRO: Probabilistic Models RC: Replica in the Cloud
D: Dynamic PCB: Process Control Block SB: Sandbox
API: API Calls Type of Identification (ToI) H: Hybrid
Other K: Kernel-level A: Anomaly
/0: Unavailable U: User-level M: Misuse
SPEC: Specification
Detection Approach
Plat. ToD ToM ToA ToI PoMI PoA Consump. Features Attack Observations
App
Profiler
(2013)
[Rosen
et al.,
2013]
And
S,
D
API,
PT
E M L
L,
C
Not
available
Permissions,
and API
Calls
Privacy
leakage
API calls are ana-
lyzed statically using
signatures and apps
are traced dynami-
cally through taint-
ing analysis
Apps Play-
ground
(2013)
[Rastogi
et al.,
2013a]
And D
SYS,
PT
/0 /0 C C Not ap-
plicable
Taint trac-
ing, SYS
call, etc.
Any kind
Heuristic-based UI
interaction based
on contextual
exploration
Secloud
(2013)
[Zonouz
et al.,
2013]
And * * * * RC C
Device
con-
sump-
tion not
available
Any kind Any kind
Detection tech-
niques: AV scanning,
file integrity check-
ing, SYS call mon-
itoring, or network
intrusion detection
and response
TStruct
Droid
(2013)
[Shahzad
et al.,
2013]
And D PCB
ST,
ML
A L L
Performance
degrada-
tion of
3.73%
on
average
Frequencies
of 99 pre-
liminary
parame-
ters.
Any kind
Type of analysis:
theoretic analysis,
time–series feature
logging, segmen-
tation and freq.
component analysis
of data, and ML
classifier
Andromaly
(2012)
[Shabtai
et al.,
2012]
And D * ML A L L
≈ 8.8%
RAM,
5.52%
CPU,
and 10%
Battery
(unclear)
Detection
Method:
monitoriza-
tion of a
subset of
88 initial
features
Any kind of
anomaly
Training Method:
Classification with
labelled data. Exper-
imental evaluation
AppGuard
(2012)
[Backes
et al.,
2012]
And D PT /0 M IRM C Not
available
Program
traces and
generated
events
Privacy
leak-
age and
user–level
misuse
Analysis is done off-
line, prior to repack-
aging the app, i.e., in
the cloud
Table 2.8: Malware detection systems (I/III).
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Plat. ToD ToM ToA ToI PoMI PoA Consump. Features Attack Observations
Elish et al.
(2013) [El-
ish et al.,
2013]
And S I DG /0 C C Not ap-
plicable
Data event–
specific control
Component
hijacking
for infor-
mation
leakage
and unau-
thorized
access
Uses DDG to track
the user’s private in-
formation
DroidScope
(2012)
[Yan and
Yin, 2012]
And D * /0 /0 SB C Not ap-
plicable
Any kind Any kind
ToM: Syscalls, etc.
Ad–hoc plugins for
monitoring features
and analyzing data
(authors provide sev-
eral proof of con-
cepts, e.g.: tainting)
MADAM
(2012)
[Dini
et al.,
2012]
And D
K,
U
ML A L L
Overhead
of 3%
memory,
7%
CPU
and 5 %
battery
K: SYS, proc.,
memory, CPU
usage. U:
user–state, key
strokes, called
numbers, SMS,
NET
Any kind of
anomaly
K-NN (with K=1)
for classification. 10
malicious apps and
50 benign. 93% de-
tection rate and 5%
FP
Peng et
al. (2012)
[Peng
et al.,
2012]
And S P PRO
N,
A
C C
Not ap-
plicable
Permissions
Effectiveness
of apps per-
missions
RiskRanker
(2012)
[Grace
et al.,
2012b]
And S
I,
P,
API
DG M C C
Not ap-
plicable
Vulnerability sig-
natures, permis-
sions, API calls:
crypto, dynamic
code, IPC, and
JNI, etc.
Any kind
Checks a pre-defined
set of malicious oper-
ations (e.g.: known
exploits) to rate the
severity of stealthy
applications
SmartDroid
(2012)
[Zheng
et al.,
2012]
And H * * * SB SB Unavailable Any
UI–based
obfusca-
tion
Improved detec-
tion by generating
UI-based trigger
conditions. Any
kind of detection
system might be
plunged, but no
further details are
given
Schmidt
et al.
(2011)
[Schmidt,
2011]
Sym,
And
S,
D
SYS CL A L
C,
DB
Not
available
Free RAM,
User Inactivity,
Process count,
CPU usage,
SMS, etc.
Any kind of
anomaly
Training method:
SVM–light and
user’s statistical
data
Crowdroid
(2011)
[Burguera
et al.,
2011]
And D SYS CL A L C
Not
available
System calls per
application
Any kind of
anomaly
Training Method:
Clustering with k–
means: i) malware,
and ii) goodware.
Evaluation: Exper-
imental and wild
malware
Table 2.9: Malware detection systems (II/III).
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Plat. ToD ToM ToA ToI PoMI PoA Consumption Features Attack Observations
Woodpecker
(2012)
[Grace
et al.,
2012a]
And S
I,
P
DG /0 C C
Time consum-
ing analysis:
1 hour per
phone image
Executing
paths and
13 repre-
sentative
privileged
permissions
Capability
leaks and
confused
deputy
attacks
Uses CFG for detect-
ing explicit capability
leakages and permis-
sions for implicit
CHEX
(2012)
[Lu et al.,
2012]
And S I DG /0 C C Not applica-
ble
User’s data
Component
hijacking for
information
leakage
and unau-
thorized
access
Uses system de-
pendence graphs
to track the user’s
private information
AASandbox
(2010)
[Blasing
et al.,
2010]
And D * CL M SB C
Not appli-
cable
Not avail-
able
Any kind
Training method:
Unspecified type of
clustering. Evalua-
tion: Self–written
malware
Paranoid
Android
(2010)
[Portoka-
lidis et al.,
2010]
And D * * * RC C
Discussed.
Apparently
larger than
expected
Not avail-
able
Any kind
Training method:
Dynamic analysis
and AV Analysis.
Evaluation: Not
performed
TaintDroid
(2010)
[Enck
et al.,
2010]
And D PT E M L L
Uses 14%
CPU and
4.4%
memory
overhead.
Power
consump-
tion not
available
Variables,
methods,
file, and
message
Explicit
informa-
tion flow
leakage
Type of monitoring:
label-based tracking
of variables, meth-
ods, files and IPC
via dynamic taint-
ing, and enforced by
the user. Tainted
variables are propa-
gated according to
data flow rules
Kim et
al. (2008)
[Kim
et al.,
2008]
Win D HW ST M L
L,
C
Not avail-
able
Energy
consump-
tion
Energy-
depletion
attacks
The consumption
is monitored using
physical hardware
(HW) and the analy-
sis is done either at
the phone or at the
server (no perfor-
mance comparison is
provided)
Table 2.10: Malware detection systems (III/III).
anomaly-based detectors for classifying apps as goodware or malware. In Andromaly,
however, classification is done locally in the device. The scheme monitors various
system features such as CPU consumption, number of network packages, number of
running processes and battery level. Redundant features are first eliminated using
three feature selection algorithms: Chi-Square, Fisher Score, and Information Gain.
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Furthermore, collected observations are classified using K-Means, Logistic Regres-
sion, Histograms, Decision Trees, Bayesian Networks and Naive Bayes. Evaluation
was performed testing a small number of self-implemented malware samples, and
results show a detection rate accuracy ranging from 44% to 100%. More precisely,
they show that Fisher Score with 10 top features selected, and using Naive Bayes
and Logistic Regression, perform better than the other classifiers. Although no real
malware is studied, their experiments help to understand which machine learning al-
gorithms are superior as well as their degradation. In fact, their experiments show
a 10% of performance degradation in the worst scenario, i.e., 8 different classifiers
with 30 features. However, it is not clear how this performance has been measured
and whether the consumption exhibited is in the same conditions with the malware
detector or without it.
Similarly to Andromaly [Shabtai et al., 2012], MADAM [Dini et al., 2012] uses
dynamic analysis for periodically monitoring a number of features, and machine learn-
ing anomaly detectors for classifying goodware and malware, locally in the device.
However, MADAM is evaluated using real malware samples, and consequently needs
a higher number of features to model user behavior. Furthermore, collected obser-
vations are classified using K-Nearest Neighbor (K-NN) with K = 1 (1-NN). The
evaluation was carried out with more than 50 goodware applications and 10 malware
samples along with several user behaviors, improving the detection accuracy (93%)
with respect to the same classifier used in Andromaly [Shabtai et al., 2012]. The
results show an average number of number of 5 false positives per day. The reported
performance overhead is 3% of memory consumption, 7% of CPU overhead and 5%
of battery.
More recently, TStructDroid [Shahzad et al., 2013] presents a real-time malware
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detection system for Android OS devices. The proposed system monitors Process
Control Blocks (PCB) and uses theoretical analysis, time-series feature logging, seg-
mentation and frequency component analysis of data, and a learned classifier to
analyze monitored data. Evaluation shows a 98% accuracy and less than 1% false
alarm rate, together with a 3.73% of performance degradation.
Finally, Crowdroid [Burguera et al., 2011] is another anomaly-based malware de-
tection system for Android OS devices. The main difference with Andromaly [Shabtai
et al., 2012] and MADAM [Dini et al., 2012] is that authors analyze the monitored
featured in the cloud, whereas the other two approaches train their classifiers locally
in the device. Collected observations are classified using K-Means. Evaluation was
also carried out using a self-implemented set of malware samples, showing a detection
rate of 100%. Additionally, they also test their system with two malware instances
observed in the wild, showing a detection rate of 85% and 100% respectively. A
key limitation in their study is that they assume that outsourcing the analysis should
present a lower battery degradation than approaches that classify locally. However,
we consider that this assumption has to be formally proven as some detection ap-
proaches are quite lightweight and might consume less than continuously transmitting
all traces through the network.
2.4.4.2 Misuse Detection
AppGuard [Backes et al., 2012] is a malware prevention system for Android OS in
which the monitoring system is placed inline (IRM) with the application. Applica-
tions are manipulated using the repackaging technique, and the monitoring system
is, therefore, inserted inside the applications. Applications can thus trace themselves
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and a number of security policies can be defined to enforce system permissions at
run-time. Evaluation was performed using 13 apps, each of which was inlined with
9 policies. One noteworthy characteristic is that inlined apps incur a negligible incre-
ment in their size.
Reported experiments in [Backes et al., 2012] also compare the execution of three
function calls in both the original and the inlined app (the latter with no policies set),
showing a degradation of 5.0%, 6.2%, and 1.0% of overhead respectively. In this
regard, we consider that the three micro-benchmarks used are not conclusive due to
their simplicity. Additionally, we consider that these results cannot be compared with
Andromaly as they were not tested under the same conditions.
2.4.4.3 Replicas in the Cloud
Approaches such as Paranoid Android [Portokalidis et al., 2010] or Secloud [Zonouz
et al., 2013] have focused on performing malware detection tasks over synchronized
replicas of the device maintained in the cloud. Thus, all security monitoring, analysis
and identification tasks can be done in an environment not subject to battery con-
straints. Additionally, multiple detection techniques can be applied simultaneously,
as several replicas can be run at the same time.
The proposed systems introduce several attack detection mechanisms for dynamic
analysis in the replicas such as AV scanners and tainting analysis. However, Secloud
[Zonouz et al., 2013] extends those mechanisms and deploys a number of response
and prevention techniques, including file removal, process termination, periodic back-
ups, network filtering, and device quarantining.
Experiments on Paranoid Android [Portokalidis et al., 2010] show that synchro-
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nizing the device with the replicas does not introduce more than 2KB/s and 64B/s
of trace data for high-load and idle operation environments, respectively. This per-
formance, however, cannot be compared with Secloud [Zonouz et al., 2013], as for
the latter no information about the consumption of the device being replicated is
provided.
2.4.5 Market Protection
Most of the aforementioned techniques are typically designed to monitor physical
devices, although they can also be used in virtual environments for market protec-
tion. Using specific monitoring techniques for virtual environments can bring about a
number of benefits, such as (i) performing a resource-intensive security analysis, (ii)
enabling virtual machine introspection [Garfinkel et al., 2003] to intercept OS-level
semantics, or (iii) enabling the possibility of hosting exact replicas of the device in
the cloud (e.g.: CloneCloud [Chun et al., 2011], and ThinkAir [Kosta et al., 2012])
as mentioned before.
2.4.5.1 Sandboxing
Several approaches have been proposed for malware detection in the form of sand-
boxes. For example, AASandbox [Blasing et al., 2010] is an Android OS analysis
sandbox for both static and dynamic analysis. AASandbox uses an android emulator,
pre-loaded with a SYS call monitoring service.
DroidScope [Yan and Yin, 2012] is another sandbox for Android OS based on
virtualization. It allows to monitor app features at the three layers of Android OS’s
architecture, i.e., hardware, OS, and Dalvik Virtual Machine. Different types of
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monitoring can be enabled by developing custom plugins over DroidScope. In this
regard, the authors include (i) a collector for native and Dalvik instructions traces,
(ii) a profiler for API-level activity, and (iii) a tracking system for information leakage
using taint analysis.
2.4.5.2 Smart Interaction
Sandbox analysis poses a limitation when interacting with samples in an automated
way, due to the fact that some malicious apps hide their malicious activity through
the User Interface (UI). In this regard, SmartDroid [Zheng et al., 2012] presents an
hybrid static and dynamic detection method to reveal UI-based trigger conditions
in Android OS. While static analysis is used to generate Activity and Function Call
Graphs (ACG and FCG, respectively), dynamic analysis is used to explore such paths.
AppsPlayground [Rastogi et al., 2013a] presents a similar approach combining
detection techniques (ranging from taint tracing to SYS call monitoring) along with
automatic exploration strategies. The proposed framework uses heuristics to guide
the UI inputs, avoiding redundant explorations and using contextual information to
fill editable text boxes.
2.4.5.3 Risk Analysis
Risk analysis techniques are emerging as a mechanism to palliate the ineffective way
in which permissions are used to communicate potential threats to the user [Felt
et al., 2011c]. Here, Grace et al. propose the use of static assessment metrics to
measure dangerous behaviors in Android OS called RiskRanker [Grace et al., 2012b].
Their proposal focuses on conducting a scalable, efficient and accurate proof-of-
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concept rather than leveraging on sophistication. Contrary, Peng et al. [Peng et al.,
2012] propose the use use probabilistic generative models for risk ranking and scoring
schemes. More precisely, they evaluate a range of models starting from simple Basic
Naive Bayes (BNB) to advanced hierarchical mixture models, showing that these
models offer a promising mechanism for risk scoring.
2.4.5.4 Similarity detection
Researchers have explored different ways to detect repackaging in markets by detect-
ing similarity dependencies among population of applications. While early approaches
use syntactic analysis such as string-based matching [Desnos, 2012], recently ap-
proaches elaborate on semantic analysis [Crussell et al., 2012], e.g., PDG, as it is
resilient to code obfuscation. However, semantic analysis is generally more expensive
than syntactic analysis.
A different approach is presented in [Desnos, 2012], where several compression
algorithms are used to compute normalized information distances between two appli-
cations based on Kolmogorov complexity measurement. Their algorithm first identi-
fies which methods are identical and calculates the similarity of the reminder methods
using Normalized Compression Distances (NCD). In order to reduce complexity, the
authors use a representation of each method based on structured control flow signa-
tures [Cesare and Xiang, 2010]. Finally, authors apply Longest Common Subsequence
(LCS) algorithm to identify differences between similar elements.
Zhou et al. [Zhou et al., 2012a] propose a system called DroidMOSS for detecting
repackaged applications based on a fuzzy hashing technique. Distinguishing features
are first extracted in the form of fingerprints, and then compared with those from
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other applications in order to identify similarities. These features are computed by
applying traditional hash functions to pieces of code of variable size. The size of
the pieces is bounded by smaller chunks of fixed size called reset points. A chunk is
considered a reset point when the resulting hash is a prime number. Then, the edit
distance is calculated between two applications by comparing their fingerprints on
identical matching-basis. More recently, authors have extended their work in [Zhou
et al., 2013]. While their former work is designed to detect repackaging in unofficial
markets, the latter is capable of detecting repackaging among apps in the same
market.
Authors in [Hanna et al., 2013] present Juxtapp, a system for detecting app
similarity. They propose an optimization over the representation of the applications
as an alternative to k-grams based on feature hashing and then use hierarchical
clustering to classify similar applications.
Authors in [Crussell et al., 2012] present DNADroid, a system for detecting cloned
applications based on dependency graphs between methods. PDG is used to detect
semantic similarities by comparing graph isomorphism. Prior to similarity detection,
authors group applications based on meta-information retrieved from each applica-
tion, and they use several filters to enhance efficiency. Although their experiments
show better results than similar approaches such as [Desnos, 2012], the scheme is
less efficient in terms of performance. In fact, their experimental testbed is deployed
in a small cluster composed of one server and three desktop computers over Hadoop.
Even there, the analysis rate is 0.7 applications per minute.
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2.4.6 Attack-specific Malware Identification Systems
The majority of the approaches described above focus on general detectors using
either anomaly or misuse detection for both static and dynamic analysis. However,
due to the diversity of malware goals and incentives, other schemes are narrowing the
complexity towards detecting specific classes of malware, such as privileged escalation,
battery-depletion attacks, or money stealing.
2.4.6.1 Privilege Escalation
There are two common types of privilege escalation attacks according to whether
the exploitation strategy focuses on inter-process capability leakage or system vulner-
abilities. Approaches such as XManDroid [Bugiel et al., 2011a], Woodpecker [Grace
et al., 2012a], Elish et al. [Elish et al., 2013] or CHEX [Lu et al., 2012] focus on the
first class, while others such as [Checkoway et al., 2010] concentrate on the latter.
XManDroid [Bugiel et al., 2011a] is a privilege escalation detection tool for An-
droid OS devices. Dynamic analysis is used to identify covert channels using DFG.
Woodpecker [Grace et al., 2012a] is capable of identifying both explicit and implicit
leakage by combining static with dynamic analysis. Static analysis is used to identify
possible execution paths by means of CFG, and inter-procedural data flow analysis is
used to filter out non-dangerous paths. Additionally, app permissions are examined
to broaden leakage search. Similarly, Elish et al. [Elish et al., 2013] use DDG provid-
ing user-interaction dependencies of more than 1000 benign and malign apps, while
CHEX [Lu et al., 2012] employs system dependence graphs over more than 5000
applications from Google Play.
ROPdefender [Davi et al., 2011b] is a generic ROP detection tool for Windows
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and Linux–based OS capable of enforcing a return address check. Although ROPde-
fender is not built for smart devices, the proposed framework can be applied in this
context.
2.4.6.2 Grayware
As discussed early in this chapter, grayware poses a serious challenge to privacy
leakage detection system. Several approaches have focused on detecting such privacy
leakages, such as TaintDroid [Enck et al., 2010] for Android OS devices and PiOS
[Egele et al., 2011] for iOS.
TaintDroid [Enck et al., 2010] uses dynamic taint analysis to track sensitive
information. It monitors variables, methods, files, and messages throughout the
program execution according to data flow rules, and label the variables as they use
the sensitive data. When a piece of sensitive information attempts to leave a taint
sink, e.g., through the network interface, TaintDroid requests user consent to do
so. The authors studied 30 popular applications, showing that at least 20 of them
misused users’ private information. Experiments also show that TaintDroid incurs
14% CPU and 4.4% memory overhead. A major limitation of TaintDroid is its
inability to distinguish between legitimate and non-legitimate exfiltrations, especially
when facing grayware. In fact, their experiments show that 37 out of 105 instances
(35%) were incorrectly classified as false positives. Additionally, techniques such as
tainting can be circumvented through leaks via implicit flows, i.e., using program
control flow to disclose information.
AppProfiler [Rosen et al., 2013] uses dynamic tainting analysis along with static
analysis to extract privacy-related behaviors. The scheme builds a knowledge base
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that maps application behaviors with API calls observed during static analysis, pro-
viding the user with valuable information about their apps.
Finally, PiOS [Egele et al., 2011] is an information leakage detection system for
iOS devices that uses static analysis on apps. PiOS constructs CFG paths from the
sources of sensitive information to data sinks by means of data-flow analysis. So
far, static analysis of iOS apps does not have to face the obfuscation challenge, as
obviously obfuscated apps would not pass the revision process. However, this might
change in the coming years if non-walled-garden models such as Cydia gain popularity.
2.4.6.3 Battery-depletion
Traditional anomaly and misuse detection techniques have not paid much atten-
tion to unknown energy-depletion attacks. In this regard, Kim et al. [Kim et al.,
2008] proposes a power-aware malware detection system for smart devices. It uses
dynamic analysis to monitor power samples and build a consumption model. Power
signatures are generated from monitoring malicious samples in the device, and results
are analyzed in the device or in the cloud using noise filtering and data compression
algorithms. After building the model, malware is identified by using χ2-distance and
comparing the results with a set of signatures.

3
Maldroid Lab: Research Malware Lab
for Smart Malware Analysis and
Detection
3.1 Introduction
The analysis of smart malware is currently constrained by the lack of a versatile
and multipurpose laboratory for testing new research proposals. In this chapter, we
describe the architecture of a framework gathering together the most cutting-edge
tools for analyzing and dissecting Android malware.
This Chapter introduces Maldroid Lab, a framework aiming at providing grounds
for smart malware research. Maldroid Lab gathers together several monitoring, anal-
ysis, and identification systems. On the one hand, it includes a number of open
source static and dynamic tools over a virtual device manager [Android, 2014]. On
the other hand, it also extends current systems and implements new functionalities,
such as a proof-of-concept of a cloud clone system [Chun et al., 2011; Kosta et al.,
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2012; Portokalidis et al., 2010].
Maldroid Lab is implemented using generic Java and Python components and it
has been deployed with a sizeable dataset of both legitimate and malicious real-world
samples. More precisely, the lab currently compiles over 25K apps from legitimate
markets and 25K malicious apps. For the former, Google Play as well as Aptoide
are constantly crawled to retrieve new samples. Similarly, we query Android Malware
Genome Project1, Virus Share2 and Contagio Mobile3 for the latter. Figure 3.1
presents the architecture of our Maldroid Lab. All this together constitutes a research
laboratory for testing new malware analysis techniques and will serve as a building
block for the experimentation tasks of each contribution presented in this Thesis.
The architecture of Maldroid Lab has been designed to have the following fea-
tures:
• Facilitate the tasks of extracting assets, components, and resources from An-
droid apps.
• Automate the process of unpackaging and repackaging Android apps.
• Guarantee the isolation of a fully controlled Android environment for testing
apps via virtualization.
• Allow the dynamic allocation of virtual devices and the installation of apps
automatically.
• Optimize the execution of such virtual devices using parallelization.
1http://www.malgenomeproject.org/
2http://virusshare.com/
3http://contagiominidump.blogspot.com.es/
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Figure 3.1: Maldroid Lab’s architecture in a nutshell.
• Provide the injection of Graphical User Interface (GUI) events, as well as other
contextual information such as GPS locations or text SMS messages.
• Allow the execution of certain security tasks over synchronized replicas main-
tained in the cloud.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 de-
scribe the main static- and dynamic-analysis tools deployed in this research laboratory,
respectively. In Section 3.4 we describe our cloud-based system, which is used for
offloading certain tasks from the device to the cloud. Finally, Section 3.5 describes
several online repositories used to retrieve both legitimate and malicious apps.
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3.2 Static Analysis
Apps are statically analyzed using several techniques aiming at unpackaging and
disassembling apps. In our lab, this process is mainly performed using Androguard
[Desnos, 2014]. For unpackaging and repackaging apps into a modified app, we use
ApkTool [Panxiaobo, 2014] and dex2jar [Alll and Tumbleson, 2014] tools.
Monkey [Android, 2014] and AndroidViewClient [Milano, 2014] are used to gener-
ate a common sequence of events to interact with the apps. These events should be
generated specifically for each test to intelligently drive the GUI exploration [Rastogi
et al., 2013a; Zheng et al., 2012], i.e., to test code implementing different func-
tionalities of the app. In its current implementation, Maldroid Lab uses Monkey and
AndroidViewClient to generate five classes of events: activity launch, service launch,
action buttons, screen touch, and text input. We also use Culebra [Milano, 2014] to
create AndroidViewClient scripts for further automating the analysis.
We then describe in some detail most popular tools deployed in this lab. Further
information about the particularities of each tool can be found in the references given
throughout the document.
3.2.1 Androguard
Androguard [Desnos, 2014] is an interactive-oriented static analysis tool for third-
party Android applications. It allows to disassemble apps and access their components
throughout its API4. Androguard’s API also provides access to each attribute of the
binary code, such as classes, methods, and variables. The main features of its API
are:
4http://doc.androguard.re/html/index.html
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• APK. The Android Application Package (APK) is a file format used to dis-
tribute Android apps from the markets to the devices. This package is an
archive in JAR format containing a number of files and a well-structured di-
rectory hierarchy. Examples of files included in an APK file are: the Android
Manifest file, the executable classes file, and other precompiled binaries and raw
resources. Androguard allows to unpackage all these components and access
them through the APK library.
• DVM. The Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM) is a component of Android OS re-
sponsible of running the apps on the device. Each Android APK packages a
DVM file—known as Dalvik Executable Format (DEX)—containing the com-
piled Android application code. This component of Androguard disassembles
the DEX file and provides access to its components. More precisely, it allows
to retrieve Java Annotations (metadata) about a program, the name and size
of its classes, methods, and variables, among other static features from the
DVM.
• Analysis. This library interprets Dalvik’s code and provides a semantic analysis
of the DVM. It allows to identify where permissions are used in a specific app
and when special libraries (such as crypto or reflection libs) are used. Addition-
ally, it also provides a Control Flow Graph (CFG) representation of the Dalvik
code flow. CFGs provided by Androguard are based on a grammar proposed by
Cesare and Xiang [Cesare and Xiang, 2010] and shown in Figure 3.2.
• Bytecode: The Dalvik code executed by the DVM is a compact and efficient
instruction set (numeric codes, constants, and references) that encodes exe-
cutable programs into a portable language called bytecode. This bytecode is
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translated into native machine code at run time. This facilitates the portability
of the bytecode itself across different hardware-specific platforms. However,
it also makes easier the reverse-engineering analysis of Android apps. This
component of Androguard provides a number of methods that aid bytecode
analysis.
Grammar:
Procedure ::= StatementList
StatementList ::= Statement | Statement StatementList
Statement ::= BasicBlock | Return | Goto | If | Field | Package | String
Return ::= ’R’
Goto ::= ’G’
If ::= ’I’
BasicBlock ::= ’B’
Field ::= ’F’0 | ’F’1
Package ::= ’P’ PackageNew | ’P’ PackageCall
PackageNew ::= ’0’
PackageCall ::= ’1’
PackageName ::= Epsilon | Id
String ::= ’S’ Number | ’S’ Id
Number ::= \d+
Id ::= [a-zA-Z]\w+
Examples:
CC1 B[P0P1]B[I]B[P1R]B[P1P1I]B[P0SP1P1P1]B[P1G]|B[F1P1R]
CC2 B[SSF1F0P1SF0SP1P1I]B[SP1P1F1SP1F1F0I]B[F0P1I]B[F0SP1]B[]
B[P1SP1SP1F1SF0P1I]B[F0I]B[F0P1I]B[F1F0P1P1I]B[F0P1I]B[]B[F0P1]
B[F0I]B[S]B[P1I]B[F0P1]B[I]B[P1F0P1P1F0P1I]B[F0P1P1I]B[F0P1I]
B[]B[F0P1F0P1]B[P0F0P1P1SP1F0P1SP1F0P1SP1F0P1P1F0P1F0P1S]
CC3 B[P1SF1R]
Figure 3.2: CFG grammar used by Androguard to extract code structures.
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3.2.2 ApkTool
ApkTool [Panxiaobo, 2014] is a reverse engineering tool for third-party Android appli-
cations. This tool allows to decode Android apps into Smali code5. It also facilitates
the modification of the app or the injection of new code before repackaging it.
Smali is a DEX code disassembler that transforms bytecode into a syntax similar
to the one used in Jasmin’s6 and dedexer’s7 project. This syntax aims at alleviating
the complexity of exploring Java Virtual Machine binaries. Thus, ApkTool allows to
reconstruct the original resources into a human-friendly format to facilitate reverse
engineering of the code as shown in Figure 3.3. This example shows a code fragment
obtained from an Android malware sample known as DroidKungFu.
We then describe the main functions of ApkTool:
• Decompile. It performs the inverse operation to that of Dalvik’s bytecode
compiler and the APK packaging. The resulting folder contains the manifest
of the app, all Java classes in Smali language, as well as assembled resources,
libraries, and assets.
• Recompile. Transforms Smali source code classes resulting from the previous
step—together with any other resources contained in the app—in an Android
APK file ready to be executed in the device. This new APK may well be
different from the original one, e.g., it can contain piggybacked functionality.
5https://code.google.com/p/smali/
6http://jasmin.sourceforge.net/
7http://dedexer.sourceforge.net/
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.method static constructor <clinit>()V
new-array v0, v0, [B
fill-array-data v0, :array_0
sput-object v0, Lcom/google/ssearch/Utils;->defPassword:[B
.line 40
return-void
.line 228
:array_0
.array-data 0x1
0x46t
0x75t
0x63t
0x6bt
0x5ft
0x73t
0x45t
0x78t
0x79t
0x2dt
0x61t
0x4ct
0x6ct
0x21t
0x50t
0x77t
.end array-data
.end method
Figure 3.3: Excerpt of an Android malware sample called DroidKungFu extracted with ApkTool
and represented in Smali syntax. This piece of code is used by the malware sample to decrypt
an exploit distributed together within the APK assets.
3.2.3 Monkey and Monkeyrunner
Monkey and Monkeyrunner [Android, 2014] are two Android Developer tools for auto-
matically testing Android apps. Monkey generates dummy random events to interact
with the Operating System. These events typically include GUI actions such as touch,
press a button, etc. Monkeyrunner provides the developer with a Python API to in-
teract with the running apps and control the device from the command line. The
main components of Monkeyrunner are:
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• Runner. This component provides a number of utility methods such as com-
municating with the device, creating user interfaces, and displaying built-in
help.
• Device. This component facilitates the installation and removal of Android
packages. It also provides the appropriate interface for starting Android Activ-
ities, sending keyboard or touch events to an app, etc.
• Image. This component provides access to the device for capturing screen-
shots, converting bitmap images to various formats, and comparing two Mon-
keyImage images. This component is very useful for monitoring changes in an
Activity running at a given time instant.
3.2.4 AndroViewClient
AndroViewClient is a Python tool that facilitates the creation of scripts for interacting
with the device. A remarkable feature of AndroViewClient is its ability to retrieve a
tree view of the UI-components displayed on the device at any given moment. For
instance, given an Activity, AndroViewClient allows to retrieve which other clickable
views are nested into this one. Then, it allows the user to interact with those
components by, for instance, clicking them or inserting text into a TextBox.
We instrumented our sandbox with AndroViewClient in order to generate smart
UI-interactions. Figure 3.4 depicts a code fragment snipped from our middleware
using AndroViewClient. This piece of code provides our lab with the capability to
interact with a particular view.
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’ ’ ’
Dump c u r r e n t window and i n t e r a c t w i t h i t s c h i l d r e n
’ ’ ’
def interactDumpWindow ( s e l f , s e r i a l n o , vc , t ime ) :
windows = vc . l i s t ( )
f o r wId i n windows . k e y s ( ) :
v i ew s = vc . dump( window=wId , s l e e p =t ime )
f o r v i ew i n v i ew s :
i f not s e l f . r u n n i n g :
break
s e l f . i n t e r a c t V i e w ( vc , v i ew )
’ ’ ’
I n t e r a c t w i t h a g i v e n View
’ ’ ’
def i n t e r a c t V i e w ( s e l f , vc , v iew , t e x t = ’ I n pu tTex t ’ ) :
i f ’ a n d r o i d . w i dge t . Ed i tTex t ’ == v i ew . g e t C l a s s ( ) :
v i ew . t ype ( t e x t )
i f v i ew and v i ew . i s C l i c k a b l e ( ) and
not v i ew . g e t I d ( ) i n s e l f . i n t e r a c t e d :
p r i n t v i ew . g e t I d ( ) , v i ew . ge tText ( )
v i ew . touch ( )
s e l f . i n t e r a c t e d . append ( v i ew . g e tUn i q u e I d ( ) )
Figure 3.4: Code snipped of our middleware using AndroViewClient’s API to interact with an
app running in the device.
3.3 Dynamic Analysis
We have used an open source dynamic analysis tool called Droidbox [Lantz, 2014]
to monitor various activities that can be used to characterize app behavior and tell
apart benign from suspicious behavior [Suarez-Tangil et al., 2014b]. We then de-
scribe Droidbox together with another tool, called TaintDroid, that is instrumental for
detecting information leakage.
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3.3.1 Droidbox
Droidbox is a dynamic analysis tool that allows the execution of Android apps and
provides a variety of data about how an app is behaving. More precisely, Droidbox
monitors the execution of 11 different activities:
• crypto: generated when calls to the cryptographic API are invoked.
• netopen, netread, netwrite: associated with network I/O activities (opening a
connection, receiving, and sending data).
• fileopen, fileread, filewrite: associated with file system I/O activities (opening,
reading, and writing a file).
• sms: generated whenever a text message is sent or received.
• call : generated whenever a call is made or received from the device.
• leak : generated when a leakage of private information has occurred. This is
determined using tainting analysis [Enck et al., 2010].
• dexload : generated when native code is loaded dynamically.
We have extended Droidbox to allow the extraction of these activities programat-
ically.
3.3.2 Taintdroid
As introduced in Chapter 2, Taintdroid [Enck et al., 2010] uses dynamic taint anal-
ysis to track sensitive information throughout a program execution. Taintdroid in-
struments the DVM interpreter to provide the device with a variable-level tracking
90 3. Maldroid Lab: Research Malware Lab for Smart Malware Analysis and Detection
system, as well as message- and file-level tracking. This enhancement offers a valu-
able awareness of an app’s information flow during its execution. Figure 3.5 depicts
Taintdroid’s architecture as illustrated by Enck et al. in [Enck et al., 2010].
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Figure 3.5: Taintdroid’s architecture as illustrated in [Enck et al., 2010].
Taintdroid source code is available at the Author’s site8 for several versions of
Android such as the ones used by our sandbox, i.e., Android 2.1 and Android 2.3. In
our research lab, we use a version of Taintdroid distributed with Droidbox.
3.4 Cloud Analysis and Consumption Metering
Apart from traditional static and dynamic analysis techniques, a number of recent
works have opted for a radically different approach based on maintaining a synchro-
8http://appanalysis.org/
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Figure 3.6: Proof of concept of a clone cloud system.
nized replica of the device in the cloud. Paranoid Android [Portokalidis et al., 2010],
Secloud [Zonouz et al., 2013] and CloudShield [Barbera et al., 2013] are illustrative
examples of such systems. In these cases, all security-related tasks, including moni-
toring, analysis, and detection can be performed in an environment not exposed to
battery or computational constraints. Furthermore, multiple detection techniques
can be applied simultaneously, as the clone can be easily replicated. Maldroid Lab
implements a proof-of-concept cloud cloning system (see Figure 3.6) based on the
aforementioned approaches. We then describe the components of our Clone Cloud
system:
• Physical device. We instrumented a Google Nexus One phone with various
monitoring tools that collect user events, the context, etc. and transmit them
to the cloud. For this purpose, we used a combination of logcat and getevent
tools from Android Debug Bridge (ADB) [Android, 2014].
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• Cloud virtual device. In the cloud-end, a middleware implemented in Python
processes all inputs received, generates the associated models, and runs the
simulation. We inject events and contexts from the physical device into apps
using both Monkeyrunner [Android, 2014] and the Android emulator console
[Android, 2014].
One critical issue with these approaches is that keeping the clone synchronized
involves a constant exchange of activity update packets. For example, experiments
on Paranoid Android show that synchronizing the device with the cloud replicas require
exchanging traces at 2 KB/s for high-load scenarios and at 64 B/s for idle operation.
This definitely consumes power, although it may be worth doing if the clone is a
subject to intensive monitoring.
We also instrumented our physical device with a tool for estimating the energy
consumption of the device. The technical issues on metering and modeling power
consumption in mobile devices have received much attention lately. Built-in meters in
platforms such as Android provide a coarse power profile and are inadequate for most
applications. Our choice of Appscope [Yoon et al., 2012] in this Thesis is motivated by
its accuracy, and also because it provides separate energy consumption for each app
and process, detailing how much corresponds to CPU usage, networking, touchscreen,
etc. Other alternatives include PowerTutor [Zhang et al., 2010], Systemtap [Dediu,
2014a], Eprof [Pathak et al., 2012], and also the schemes discussed in [Dong and
Zhong, 2011; Hao et al., 2012; Nagata et al., 2012; Pathak et al., 2011].
We then describe Appscope and present a middleware called Crowdcosec imple-
mented in this Thesis for offloading on-board information to the cloud.
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3.4.1 Appscope
AppScope [Yoon et al., 2012] is an energy metering framework that monitors the
kernel activity of Android devices. AppScope collects usage information from the
monitored device and estimates the consumption of each running application using an
energy model given by DevScope [Jung et al., 2012]. AppScope provides the amount
of energy consumed by an app in the form of several time series, each one associated
with a component of the device (CPU, Wi-Fi, cellular, touchscreen, etc). AppScope
uses event-driven monitoring method that produces low overhead and provides high
accuracy. In fact, its authors report that AppScope incurs approximately 35mW and
2.1% in power consumption and CPU utilization overhead, respectively.
We have instrumented our Google Nexus One phone with AppScope. Figure 3.7
depicts the information provided by AppScope when measuring the power consump-
tion of an app while being executed in the device. AppScope provides information
about the power consumed by different applications running in the device. Addition-
ally, it also offers information about the energy consumed by each individual process
executed by every app. We have also implemented a number of shell scripts to au-
tomatically collect details of the energy consumed by the device from AppScope’s
logs. (Incidentally, this process turned out to be very challenging due to the lack of
documentation describing the format of AppScope’s logs.)
3.4.2 Crowdcosec
We have tested several open source sensing frameworks such as Funf9 from MIT,
SystemSens [Falaki et al., 2011] and ProfileDroid [Wei et al., 2012]. Our experience
9http://www.funf.org/
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Figure 3.7: Metering Facebook’s power consumption with Appscope.
was that all these frameworks were still at their first stages by the time we tested them.
Thus, we implemented our own sensing framework to retrieve system information
from a crowd of devices. In particular, we are currently extracting system calls
(syscalls) generated by the apps. We use for this purpose a tool called strace10.
However, we can easily extend our framework to retrieve other information from the
devices.
Our syscall module, only runs in rooted devices with super user privileges. Col-
lected syscalls are processed and sent to a remote server implemented over Apache11.
Crowdcosec allows also to process collected traces locally in the device. In this regard,
we instrumented our Crowdcosec app with a stripped version of Weka [Hall et al.,
2009] capable of running any Machine Learning algorithm implemented in Weka.
10strace is a debugging tool for Linux and some other Unix-like systems that allows to monitor the
system calls used by a program. strace for Android is available online at http://benno.id.au/blog/
2007/11/18/android-runtime-strace.
11http://www.apache.org/
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3.5 Onlinet Markets and Malware Repositories
As introduced in Chapter 2, Android’s architecture implements an open-market
model. Therefore, users are free to download applications from any market. We
then describe the legitimate and malicious repositories used to carry out experimen-
tation in our laboratory. We also introduce an open source remote access malware
called Androrat used in this Thesis.
3.5.1 Crawling Online Markets
There are a substantial number of Android application markets with a variety of apps
available for all users. Typically, legitimate developers upload paid apps to Android’s
official market, i.e., Google Play12. Contrarily, unofficial markets such as Aptoide13
generally host the “very same” applications for free. To retrieve a large amount of
samples, we have crawled the following two markets and downloaded apps from both
of them:
• Google Play. Google Play is the official Android distributor for Android apps.
Users are able to search for apps and download them, as well as get access to
lists of apps ranked by popularity.
We have implemented a Google Play crawler in Python to automatically down-
load apps from this market. The crawler uses an unofficial open-source API14
for automatically querying Google Play.
12http://play.google.com/store/apps
13http://www.aptoide.com/
14https://code.google.com/p/android-market-api/
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• Aptoide. Aptoide is a popular framework for deploying your own alternative
market. It has so far over 110K stores and a total of almost 200K apps and
about 800M downloads.
We have implemented an Aptoide crawler in Ruby to automatically download
apps from this market. The crawler uses the official Aptoide APIs to obtain
metadata from the markets and get the location of the app. Then, we use our
crawler to retrieve new apps.
We have currently crawled about 25K apps from both markets. We mainly have
apps from Aptoide, as Google Play limits the number of downloads per day and user.
3.5.2 Malware Repositories
The growth of Android malware has come hand in hand with the proliferation of
online repositories sharing the latest specimens. There are a number of public and/or
private malware repositories such as:
• Malware Genome Project. The Android Malware Genome Project15 is a
malware repository that covers the majority of malware families for Android
OS. All these samples have been collected and characterized into families by
Zhou and Jian in [Zhou and Jiang, 2012]. We accessed this repository at
the end of 2011. Back then it contained 1247 malicious apps grouped into
49 different families. These samples included specimens with a variety of in-
fection techniques (repackaging, update attacks, and drive-by-download) and
payload functionalities (privilege escalation, remote control, financial charge,
and private information exfiltration).
15Available at http://www.malgenomeproject.org
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• Virus Share. Virus Share16 is a repository of malware samples for security
researchers that counts with a massive number of malware samples —over
15M of them. We visit this repository on a regular basis to retrieve the latest
samples found in the wild.
• Contagio Mobile. Contagio Mobile17 is a public malware repository managed
by a group of independent security researchers and with great amount of sup-
port within the malware community. We also visit this repository regularly.
In total, our malware repositories in the lab currently have about 25K malware
samples.
3.5.3 Open Source Malware Remote Access Tool
Androrat [Bertrand et al., 2014] is an an open source malware Android Remote Access
Tool (RAT). RAT tools provide a backdoor to a remote operator, enabling access to
the device and its personal data. Androrat is provided with two different components:
(i) the remote manager running on a server, and (ii) the local agent running on the
device. We then describe each of these two components:
• Server: This component implements command and control and allows the user
to remotely control numerous devices. The devices are listed dynamically as
new users are connected.
• Client: This component implements all functionality required to provide the
server with the information requested. More precisely, Androrats counts in its
current implementation with the following capabilities:
16http://virusshare.com/
17http://contagiominidump.blogspot.com.es/
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– Get contacts (and all their information).
– Get call and messages logs.
– Get geolocation by GPS/Network.
– Monitor received messages and phone state in real time.
– Take a picture from the camera and stream sound or video.
– Do a toast.
– Send a text message or make a call.
– Open an URL in the default browser.
Figure 3.8 shows a snapshot of this tool running over our lab.
Figure 3.8: Exfiltrating personal information (SMSs) with Androrat.
II
Static-based Analysis

4
A Text Mining Approach to Analyzing
and Classifying Code Structures in
Malware Families
4.1 Introduction
The impressive growth both in malware and benign apps is making increasingly un-
affordable any human-driven analysis of potentially dangerous apps. For instance,
when confronted with a continuously growing stream of incoming malware samples,
it would be extremely helpful to differentiate between those that are minor variants
of a known specimen and those that correspond to novel, previously unseen sam-
ples. Grouping samples into families, establishing the relationships among them, and
studying the evolution of the various known “species” is also a much sought after
application.
Problems similar to these ones have been successfully attacked with Artificial
Intelligence and Data Mining techniques in many application domains, including mal-
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ware detection [Egele et al., 2012]. For instance, machine learning [Hou et al., 2010],
data mining [Liao et al., 2012; Thiruvadi and Patel, 2011], expert systems [Sahin
et al., 2012], and clustering [Delany et al., 2012], have been proposed to assist the
analyst in classifying the malware. We refer the reader to Chapter 2 for an overview
on automated malware analysis techniques.
In this chapter, we explore the use of text mining approaches to automatically an-
alyze smartphone malware samples and families based on the code structures present
in their software components. Such code structures are representations of the Con-
trol Flow Graph (CFG) of each method found in the app classes [Cesare and Xiang,
2010; Grace et al., 2012a]. A high level overview of the main building blocks and
salient applications of our approach, namely Dendroid [Suarez-Tangil et al., 2014c],
is provided in Figure 4.1. During the modeling phase, all different code structures
are extracted from a dataset of provided malware samples. A vector space model is
then used to associate a unique feature vector with each malware sample and family.
This vector representation is then used to illustrate two main applications:
• Automatic classification of unknown malware samples into candidate families
based on the similarity of their respective code structures. Our classification
scheme involves a preparatory stage where the sample is transformed into a
query in the text mining sense. Thus, a slight variation of this process can
be used to search for a set of given code structures in a database of known
specimens, a task that could be remarkably useful for malware analysts and app
market operators.
• We show how it is possible to perform an evolutionary analysis of malware
families based on the dendrograms obtained after hierarchical clustering. The
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Figure 4.1: Overview of Dendroid’s architecture.
process is almost equivalent to the analysis of the so-called phylogenetic trees
for biological species [Ruzgar and Erciyes, 2012], although using software code
structures rather than physical and/or genetic features. This enables us to
conjecture about evolutionary relationships among the various malware families,
including the identification of common ancestors. Additionally, it also enables
us to study the diversification process that they may have gone through as a
consequence of code reuse and malware re-engineering techniques.
In other domains, many works have applied text mining and information retrieval
techniques for decision making and classification, such as for example [Chibelushi
et al., 2004], and [Gadia and Rosen, 2008]. Furthermore, recent approaches have
also used text mining for detecting similarities [Oberreuter and Velásquez, 2013;
Rodriguez-Gonzalez et al., 2013].
Dendroid is novel in two separate ways. On the one hand, to the best of our
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knowledge using code structures to characterize Android OS malware families has
not been explored before. One major advantage of focusing on the internal structure
of code units (methods) rather than on their specific sequence of instructions is an
improved resistance against obfuscation (i.e., deliberate modifications of the code
aimed at evading pattern-based recognition [Rastogi et al., 2013b]). Furthermore,
such structures prove to be particularly useful for the case of smartphone malware,
where rapid development methodologies heavily based on code reuse are prevalent.
On the other hand, the idea of using text mining techniques to automate tasks such
as classifying specimens, searching for code components, or studying evolutionary
relationships of malware families is, to our knowledge, novel too. Besides, text
mining techniques were developed to efficiently deal with massive amounts of data,
a feature which turns out to be very convenient for the problems that we address
here.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we describe
the dataset of Android malware families used in this work, together with the tools
and methodology followed to extract code structures from each app. In Section 4.3
we analyze and discuss various statistical features of the code structures found in
the malware instances. Based on our findings from this analysis, in Section 4.4 we
propose Dendroid [Suarez-Tangil et al., 2014c], a text mining approach to classify
and analyze malware families according to the code structures present in their apps.
We first introduce a suitable vector space model, and report experimental results
related to classifying instances into families, measuring similarity among families, and
using dendrograms to analyze the evolutionary relationships among families. Finally,
Section 4.5 concludes the chapter and discusses our main contributions.
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4.2 Dataset and Experimental Setting
The work presented in this chapter is largely based on a sizable dataset of real-world
Android OS malware samples called Android Malware Genome Project and described
in Chapter 3. As commented before, this dataset contains 1247 malicious apps
grouped into 49 different families. For the purposes of this work, we discarded 16
out of the 49 families as they only contain one specimen each, resulting in a final
dataset of 1231 malware samples grouped into 33 families. More details on this will
be later provided in Section 4.3.
4.2.1 Extracting Code Structures
One key aspect of our work is the decomposition of an app into a number of con-
stituent code elements referred to as code chunks. Each code chunk corresponds to
a method associated with a class within the app. Thus, an app will be fragmented
into as many code chunks as methods contained in it. Rather than focusing on the
specific sequence of instructions contained in a code chunk, we extract a high-level
representation of the associated Control Flow Graph (CFG). CFGs use graphs as a
representation of the paths that a program might traverse during its execution. Each
node in a CFG represents a “basic block”, i.e., a piece of code that will be sequentially
executed without any jumps. The CFG of a piece of code is explicit in the source
code, is relatively easy to extract, and has been extensively used in static analysis
techniques [Nielson et al., 1999].
Each malware instance contained in the dataset described above has been first
disassembled into Dalvik instructions. We then used Androguard [Desnos, 2014]
to extract the code chunks of all malicious apps and compute their structure as
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described in Chapter 3. The sequence of instructions contained in a code chunk is
thus replaced by a list of statements defining its control flow, such as a block of
consecutive instructions (B), a bifurcation determined by an “if” condition (I), an
unconditional go-to jump (G), and so on. After parsing each code chunk with this
grammar, the resulting structure is a sequence of symbols of varying length (see
Figure 3.2 at Chapter 3).
After this process, each malware sample app is represented by a sequence:
app = 〈c1,c2, ... ,c|app|〉, (4.1)
where ci is a string describing the code structure of the i-th method in app, and |app|
is the total number of methods contained in app. In the remaining of this chapter, we
will refer to ci ’s indistinctly as code chunks or code structures. The resulting dataset
of code chunks, grouped by app and family as in the original Android Malware Genome
Project, has been made publicly available1.
4.3 Analysis of Code Structures in Android Malware
Families
In this section, we analyze and discuss various statistical features of the code struc-
tures found in the malware apps and families of the dataset described above. Our
findings will subsequently motivate the use of text-mining techniques for tasks such
as, for example, the classification of new apps into candidate malware families or the
analysis of similarities among families.
1http://www.seg.inf.uc3m.es/~guillermo-suarez-tangil/dendroid/codechunks.zip
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4.3.1 Definitions
We are interested in exploring questions such as how large, in terms of number of
code chunks (CCs), apps are; what the distribution of CCs across apps and families
is; or how discriminant a subset of CCs is for a given family. We next introduce a
number of measures that will be later used to perform this analysis.
Definition 1 (CC). We denote by CC(app) the set of all different CCs found in app
app. We emphasize that CC(app) is a set and, therefore, it does not contain repeated
elements.
Definition 2 (Redundancy). The redundancy, RD(app), of an app app is given by:
RD(app) = 1− |CC(app)||app| , (4.2)
where |app| is the total number of CCs (possibly with repetitions) in app.
Note that redundancy measures the fraction of repeated CCs present in an app,
with low values indicating that CCs do not generally appear multiple times in the app,
and vice versa.
Definition 3 (FCC). The set of family CCs for a family Fi is given by:
FCC(Fi) =
⋃
app∈Fi
CC(app). (4.3)
Definition 4 (CCC). The set of common CCs for a family Fi is given by:
CCC(Fi) =
⋂
app∈Fi
CC(app). (4.4)
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In short, the set CCC(Fi) contains those CCs found in all apps of Fi . Even though
this can be certainly seen as a distinctive feature of family Fi , it does not imply
that all those CCs are unique to Fi . For instance, code reuse—which is a recurrent
feature of malware in general and, particularly, of smartphone malware—will make
the same CCs appear in multiple families.
Definition 5 (FDCC). Given a set of malware families M = {F1, ... ,Fm}, a set
C = {c1, ... ,cn} of CCs is fully discriminant for Fi with respect to M iff:
(i) C ⊆ CCC(Fi), and
(ii) ∀Fk ∈M ,Fk 6= Fi : C ∩FCC(Fk) = /0.
We denote by FDCC(Fi |M ) the maximal set of fully discriminant CCs for Fi with
respect to M ; that is, C = FDCC(Fi |M ) iff C is fully discriminant for Fi with respect
to M , and for all C ′ such that C ′ is fully discriminant for Fi with respect to M ,
C ′ ⊆ C .
Put simply, a set of CCs is fully discriminant for a family Fi if and only if every
CC in the set appears in every app of Fi and, furthermore, no CC in the set appear
in any app of any other family. Consequently, such a set unequivocally identifies the
family, provided that it is not the empty set.
4.3.2 Results and Discussion
We computed the various measures and sets described above over all the apps and
families in our dataset. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 summarize the most relevant results.
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The entire dataset contains 84854 different CCs. In terms of number of unique
CCs, apps do not display a uniform behavior, neither within the same family nor
across families. Apps in some malware families have, on average, only a few differ-
ent CCs: see for example FakePlayer (6), GPSSMSSpy (13), or SndApps (28). In
contrast, others are quite large, such as for example zHash (1348), Pjapps (1160),
or DroidKungFu4 (936).
The variance, both of apps’ length and redundancy within each family, is generally
large, as illustrated by the boxplots shown in Figures 4.2(a) and 4.2(b). This can
be explained by a number of factors, including the fact that in many cases malware
belonging to the same family appears in very different apps, each one with its own set
and distribution of CCs. In general, however, all apps display a redundancy between
0.4 and 0.7 regardless of their size.
The size of the FCC, CCC, and FDCC sets for each family reveal some remarkable
details. The number of family CCs (FCC) varies quite significantly across families.
Furthermore, such variability seems uncorrelated with the average number of CCs in
the apps. The most likely explanation for this has to do with the proliferation and
prevalence of each malware family. Families such as AnserverBot, Geinimi, Pjapps,
and DroidKungFu appeared in a variety of very popular repackaged apps, and infected
a significant number of devices. Thus, finding the same malware in very different
apps induces a sharp increase in the size of FCC.
The CCC set removes this diversity and identifies code structures common to all
available apps within a family. The size of this set varies across families, being quite
low in families where the malware code has undergone significant evolution, possibly
after being included in different apps. For example, only 6 CCs appear in each of
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App stats Family stats
Family Fi |Fi | Avg{|CC(app)|} Avg{RD(app)} |FCC(Fi )| |CCC(Fi )| |FDCC(Fi |M )|
ADRD 22 416 0.59 2726 21 8
AnserverBot 187 367 0.64 17635 44 9
Asroot 8 78 0.57 462 1 0
BaseBridge 122 433 0.53 9918 5 0
BeanBot 8 746 0.68 3081 61 34
Bgserv 9 384 0.53 487 67 34
CruseWin 2 82 0.53 82 82 40
DroidDream 16 302 0.51 2545 10 0
DroidDreamLight 46 529 0.54 3339 40 13
DroidKungFu1 34 501 0.58 7609 10 0
DroidKungFu2 30 295 0.51 2418 9 0
DroidKungFu3 309 872 0.58 19092 48 11
DroidKungFu4 96 936 0.56 9239 19 2
DroidKungFuSapp 3 351 0.66 411 310 0
FakePlayer 6 6 0.73 7 10 2
GPSSMSSpy 6 13 0.44 23 9 3
Geinimi 69 430 0.58 12141 77 37
GingerMaster 4 223 0.64 297 159 108
GoldDream 47 513 0.54 9129 13 3
Gone60 9 35 0.41 56 26 5
HippoSMS 4 148 0.67 262 8 1
KMin 52 502 0.50 795 120 42
NickySpy 2 65 0.71 84 47 34
Pjapps 45 1160 0.58 15128 6 0
Plankton 11 133 0.52 876 14 2
RogueLemon 2 962 0.54 1441 483 321
RogueSPPush 9 365 0.60 633 114 60
SndApps 10 28 0.55 54 20 11
Tapsnake 2 33 0.57 55 12 2
YZHC 22 316 0.48 1704 33 11
Zsone 12 365 0.40 535 338 1
jSMSHider 16 113 0.46 266 64 52
zHash 11 1348 0.56 2344 645 390
Table 4.1: Statistical indicators obtained for all apps and families in the dataset.
the 45 samples of Pjapps. On the contrary, apps in unpopular or rare families share
essentially the same version of the malware: see for example zHash, where all its 11
apps share 645 CCs.
Finally, the rightmost column in Table 4.1 shows the number of fully discriminant
CCs for each family. Surprisingly, The FDCC set is non-empty for 26 out of the 33
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of (a) unique CCs (CC); (b) redundancy (RD); and (c) common and
fully discriminant CCs for each family (CCC/FDCC).
families. This suggest that, in principle, those CCs might be used as a “signature” to
perfectly classify an app into one of those families. We believe, however, that such a
scheme would be extremely weak for a number of reasons. One of the most important
112 4. A Text Mining Approach to Analyzing and Classifying Code in Malware Families
shortcomings of using FDCC as the basis to represent malware family features is that
it is very fragile: the addition of a new app to a family such that it does not share any
CCs with those already in the family automatically makes the CCC set empty, which
in turn makes FDCC empty too. Such an app might have actually been incorrectly
labeled as belonging to the family, or perhaps carefully constructed to avoid sharing
CCs with all other apps. In either case, the characterization of the family would not
be useful anymore.
We next study the distribution of CCs across families, which will motivate a more
robust representation of family features.
4.3.3 Distribution of Code Structures
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of CCs as a function of the number of families where
they appear. This plot is obtained by iterating over all different code structures and
computing, for each one of them, the number of different families where they appear.
(A CC appear in a family if it appears in at least one app of that family.) The results
reveal that 78.9% of all code structures appear in just one family. Note that this does
not mean that such a family is the same, as different code structures may appear
in different families. Rather, this value indicates that if a code structure is found in
one family, it is unlikely to find that same code structure in an app belonging to a
different family. Similarly, the number of code structures that appear in 2, 3, 4, and 5
different families drops to 12.6%, 3.5%, 1.5%, and 1.1%, respectively. Consequently,
less than 1% of all available code structures appear in 6 or more different families.
This distribution of code structures across malware families suggests that each
family can be sufficiently well characterized by just a few code structures, possibly
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of CCs as a function of the number of families where they appear.
accompanied by some extra information such as the frequency of that code structure
in each app of the family, the fraction of apps where it appears, etc. We next
elaborate on this.
4.4 Mining Code Chunks in Malware Families
Based on the findings discussed in the previous section, we next describe Dendroid,
our approach to analyzing malware samples and families based on mining code struc-
tures. We first present the vector space model used and describe the main features
of our prototype implementation. Subsequently we present two main applications—
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classifying unknown malware apps, and analyzing possible evolutionary paths of mal-
ware families—and discuss the experimental results obtained.
4.4.1 Vector Space Model
In this section, we adapt to our problem various numerical indicators well researched
in the field of information retrieval and text mining. One central concept in those
fields is the so-called Vector Space Model (VSM) [Salton et al., 1975], sometimes
known as Term Vector Model, where each object dj of a corpus is represented as a
vector of identifiers
dj = (w1,j , ... ,wk,j). (4.5)
Each identifier wi ,j is a measure of the relevance that the i-th term, mi , has in
object dj . In the most common setting, objects and terms are documents and words,
respectively. Thus, wi ,j is an indicator of the importance of word mi in document dj .
Many interesting problems related to information retrieval and text mining can
be easily reformulated in the VSM in terms of vector operations. For example, the
cosine of the angle between two vectors is a good measure of the similarity between
the associated documents. Such vector operations are the basis for a number of in-
teresting primitives, such as comparing two documents or ranking various documents
according to their similarity to a given query (after appropriately representing queries
as vectors too).
One popular statistical indicator used in the VSM is the term frequency-inverse
document frequency (tf-idf). Using the notation introduced above, the tf-idf wi ,j of
term mi in dj is the product of two statistics: (1) the term frequency (tf), which
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measures the number of times mi appears in dj ; and (2) the inverse document
frequency (idf), which measures whether mi is common or rare across all documents
in the corpus. Thus, a high tf-idf value means not only that the corresponding term
appears quite often in a document, but also that it is not frequent in other documents.
As a result, one important effect is that the tf-idf tends to filter out terms that are
common across documents.
Our proposal essentially mimics the model discussed above. Each family Fj is
represented by a vector vj = (I1,j , ... , Ik,j), where Ii ,j = I(ci ,Fj ,M ) is computed as
I(ci ,Fj ,M ) = ccf(ci ,Fj) ·iff(ci ,M ). (4.6)
The indicators ccf(c ,Fj) and iff(c ,M ) are approximately equivalent to the tf
and idf statistics, respectively, and can be computed as follows.
Definition 6 (CCF). The frequency of a CC c in a family Fj is given by
ccf(c ,Fj) =
∑app∈Fj freq(c ,app)
max{freq(c ,app) : app ∈ Fj} , (4.7)
where freq(c ,app) is the number of occurrences of CC c in app app.
Definition 7 (IFF). The inverse family frequency of a CC c with respect to a set of
malware families M = {F1, ... ,Fm} is given by
iff(c ,M ) = log
|M |
1+ |{Fi ∈M : c ∈ FCC(Fj)}| . (4.8)
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4.4.2 An example
We next illustrate the model presented above with a numerical example and discuss
some relevant features. Assume two different datasets, M1 and M2, of malicious
apps, with |M1| = 4 and |M2| = 400. Given a CC ci , we can easily see how each
family feature vector varies according to the relevance of ci .
On the one hand, when ci is a rather common CC (see Figure 4.4a), i.e., it
appears in most families, the iff value quickly vanishes (see Fig. 4.4b). Similarly, it
can also be observed how the components of a family vector grow when the frequency
of a CC increases, as shown in 4.4a. On the other hand, when ci is a very uncommon
CC, the iff value grows significantly: see, e.g., Figure 4.4 where iff(ci ,M2) is 16
times larger than iff(ci ,M1). The overall result is that the relevance of a CC is
strongly influenced by its frequency across families. Thus, CCs that are common to
many families have a low influence in the family feature vector, even if they are very
frequent.
4.4.3 Implementation
We have built a Java implementation of the VSM discussed above and applied it over
all families in our dataset to obtain a family feature vector for each of them. The
process is described by the algorithm shown in Figure 4.5 and outputs one vector vj
for each malware family Fj , with each vector component representing the relevance
of a CC in Fj .
The algorithm comprises three main steps: (i) initialization, (ii) inverse family
frequency computation, and (iii) CC frequency computation. First, we extract the
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F1 F2 F3 F4
Apps app1 app2 app3 app4 app5 app6 app7
Is ci in appk? X × X X × × ×
freq(ci , appk) 5 0 4 1 0 0 0
ccf(ci ,Fj) 9/5 1/1 0 0
iff(ci ,M1) log 41+2 = 0.288
I (ci ,Fj ,M1) 0.518 0.288 0.000 0.000
(a) Rather common CC with |M1|= 4.
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1
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3
Hx from -6 to 6L
(b) iff(ci ,M1)
F1 F2 · · · F400
Apps app1 app2 app3 app4 app5 · · · appn
Is ci in appk? X × × X X × X
freq(ci , appk) 5 0 0 2 7 0 1
ccf(ci ,Fj) 5/5 9/7 0 1/1
iff(ci ,M2) log 4001+3 = 4.605
I (ci ,Fj ,M2) 4.605 5.921 0.000 4.605
(c) Very uncommon CC with |M2|= 400.
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
4
5
6
7
Hx from -6 to 6L
(d) iff(ci ,M2)
Figure 4.4: Computation of I (ci ,Fj ,M ) and distribution of the iff value depending on the
popularity of the CC in two different malware datasets: tiny (a) and (b), and large (c) and
(d). Figure (b) and (d) represents the resulting iff with respect to the FCC, i.e.: iff(ci ,M ) =
log( |M |x ), where x = 1+ |{Fi ∈M2 : c ∈ FCC(Fj )}| and x = 1+ |{Fi ∈M2 : c ∈ FCC(Fj )}|
respectively.
frequency freq(c,app) for every CC c ∈ CC(app) of each app app ∈M (lines 2–5).
The inverse family frequency is then computed for each extracted CC using Eq. (4.8)
(lines 8–10). Finally, the frequency of each CC is computed by applying Eq. (4.8),
and the associated indicator for the CC is obtained (lines 11–16).
4.4.4 Modeling Families and Classifying Malware Instances
In our first experiment, we have tested the ability to correctly predict the family of a
malware instance. To do this, we have randomly split our dataset into k complemen-
tary folds, being k = 10. During the generation of each fold, we have guaranteed that
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Algorithm 1. Computing Family Vectors
Input:
Dataset of labeled malware apps (sequences of code chunks):
M = {(app1,Fapp1),(app2,Fapp2), ... ,((appp,Fappm))}
where Fappi ∈ {F1, ... ,Fq}
Output:
Vectors vj = (I1,j , ... , Ik,j) for each Fj ∈ {F1, ... ,Fq}
Algorithm:
1 FCC(Fj) = /0 ∀j = 1, ... ,q
2 For each (app,Fapp) ∈M do
3 FCC(Fapp) = FCC(Fapp) ∪ CC(app)
4 Update freq(c ,app) for each c ∈ CC(app)
5 end-for
6 C(M ) =
⋃q
j=1FCC(Fj)
7 k = |C(M )|
8 For each i = 1, ... ,k do
9 Compute iff(ci ,M ) according to (4.8)
10 end-for
11 For each Fj do
12 For each i = 1, ... ,k do
13 Compute ccf(ci ,Fj) according to (4.7)
14 vj[i ] = Ii ,j = ccf(ci ,Fj) ·iff(ci ,M )
15 end-for
16 end-for
17 return {v1, ... ,vq}
Figure 4.5: Algorithm for obtaining each family vector.
every family-subset contains at least one sample. Once the dataset is partitioned,
we have randomly selected one fold as validation data, and the remaining ones are
used as training data.
The training folds were used to derive a vectorial representation for each malware
family as described in Section 4.4.1. A total number of 84854 CC were found
across all instances in the dataset, so each family is represented by a vector with
this dimensionality, as specified in (4.6). We note, however, that such vectors are
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Algorithm 2. 1-NN Malware Classifier
Input:
Family vectors {v1, ... ,vq} and data structures
〈C(M ),iff(ci ,M )〉
Malware instance app
Output:
Predicted family Fj
Algorithm:
1 for each ci ∈ C(M ) do
3 z[i ]) = freq(ci ,app) ·iff(ci ,M )
4 end-for
5 j = arg mini{dist(z,vi)}
6 return Fj
Figure 4.6: 1-NN malware classification algorithm.
very sparse (as expected by the analysis given in Section 4.3), which in practice
makes it very efficient to store and manipulate them. For illustration purposes, the
largest family vectors correspond to DroidKungFu3 (19091 non-null components),
AnserverBot (17634), Pjapps (15127), and Geinimi (12140). On average, only
around 11% of each feature vector contains discriminant information.
The validation fold was processed in a similar way, obtaining a vectorial represen-
tation for each malware instance. We then implemented a 1-NN (nearest neighbor)
classifier [Tan, 2005] to compute the predicted family for each malware instance
under test. Such a prediction is the family whose vector is closest to the instance’s
vector (see Fig. 4.6). 1-NN is a widely used method in data mining that only requires
to compute n distances and one minimum. To compute distances between vectors,
we relied on the well-known cosine similarity:
Definition 8 (Cosine similarity). The cosine similarity between two vectors z =
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(z1, ... ,zk) and v= (v1, ... ,vk) is given by
sim(z,v) = cos(θz,v) =
z ·v
‖ z ‖‖ v ‖ =
k
∑
i=1
uivi√√√√ k∑
i=1
u2i
√√√√ k∑
i=1
v 2i
. (4.9)
The cosine similarity, which measures the cosine of the angle between vectors z
and v, has been extensively used to compare documents in text mining and informa-
tion retrieval applications. Besides, it is quite efficient to evaluate in domains such
as ours, since vectors are sparse and, therefore, only a few non-zero dimensions need
to be considered in the computation. As for our purposes a distance, and not a
similarity, is required, we use:
dist(z,v) = 1− sim(z,v). (4.10)
Results have been cross-validated with each of the k folds that were previously
generated. The classification error per family attained in this experiment is shown
in Table 4.2. A closer inspection reveals that the classification error is not uniform
across families. On the contrary, errors concentrate on 6 out of the 33 malware fami-
lies studied (AnserverBot, BaseBridge, and DroidKungFu1 through DroidKungFu4),
while instances belonging to the remaining 27 families are perfectly classified.
Interestingly, DroidKungFu has been considered a milestone in Android OS mal-
ware sophistication [Zhou and Jiang, 2012]. After the release of its first version, a
number of variants rapidly emerged, including DroidKungFu2 through DroidKungFu4
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Classification Error (%)
ADRD 0.00% GingerMaster 0.00%
AnserverBot 4.66% GoldDream 0.00%
Asroot 0.00% Gone60 0.00%
BaseBridge 7.92% HippoSMS 0.00%
BeanBot 0.00% KMin 0.00%
Bgserv 0.00% NickySpy 0.00%
CruseWin 0.00% Pjapps 0.00%
DroidDream 0.00% Plankton 0.00%
DroidDreamLight 0.00% RogueLemon 0.00%
DroidKungFu1 12.92% RogueSPPush 0.00%
DroidKungFu2 19.46% SndApps 0.00%
DroidKungFu3 8.12% Tapsnake 0.00%
DroidKungFu4 18.21% YZHC 0.00%
DroidKungFuSapp 0.00% Zsone 0.00%
FakePlayer 0.00% jSMSHider 0.00%
GPSSMSSpy 0.00% zHash 0.00%
Geinimi 0.00%
Table 4.2: Average malware classification error per family using 1-NN with 10-fold cross-
validation.
or DroidKungFuApp. A common feature shared by all these variants is the use of
encryption to hide their existence. In fact, some of them embedded their payloads
within constant strings or even resource files (e.g., pictures, asset files, etc.). Further-
more, DroidKungFu aggressively obfuscates the class name and uses native programs
(Java Native Interface, or JNI) precisely to made the analysis difficult. Similarly,
AnserverBot use sophisticated techniques to obfuscate all internal classes, methods,
and fields. Moreover, instead of enclosing the payload within the app, AnserverBot
dynamically fetches and loads it at runtime (this is known as update attacks). In
this regard, some authors (e.g., [Zhou and Jiang, 2012]) believe that AnserverBot
actually evolved from BaseBridge and inherited this feature from it. Our results
seem to confirm this hypothesis.
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More insights can be gained by observing the confusion matrix given by a larger
dataset of k = 2 folds and approximately an equal number of malware instances
in each fold (see Table 4.3). Each cell (x ,y) in the matrix shows the number of
instances belonging to family x whose predicted family is y . Here, for instance, we
can observe that 5 out of the 61 samples of BaseBridge have been predicted as
AnserverBot. Similarly, we can observe that a few samples of DroidKungFu1 have
been classified as DroidKungFu2 and, in a similar way, there is some misclassifications
between DroidKungFu3 and DroidKungFu4. Thus, the aforementioned classification
error is actually justified by the evolutionary relationships of these particular malware
strands.
4.4.5 Evolutionary Analysis of Malware Families
In this section, we discuss the application of hierarchical clustering to the feature
vectors that model samples and family. The resulting dendrograms are then used
to conjecture about their evolutionary phylogenesis, giving a valuable instrument to
discover relationships among families. We first describe the hierarchical clustering
algorithm currently included in Dendroid. Subsequently we discuss the results ob-
tained.
4.4.5.1 Single Linkage Hierarchical Clustering
Single Linkage Clustering, also known as nearest neighbor clustering, is a well-known
method to carry out an agglomerative hierarchical clustering process over a popula-
tion of vectors. The algorithm, shown in Figure 4.7, keeps a set of clusters, K , which
is initialized to the set of family vectors. At each iteration it, the two closest clusters
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ADRD 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
AnserverBot 0 89 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 93
Asroot 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
BaseBridge 0 5 0 56 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61
BeanBot 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Bgserv 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
CruseWin 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
DroidDream 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
DroidDreamLight 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
DroidKungFu1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
DroidKungFu2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
DroidKungFu3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 141 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 154
DroidKungFu4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48
DroidKungFuSapp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
FakePlayer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
GPSSMSSpy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Geinimi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34
GingerMaster 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
GoldDream 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Gone60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
HippoSMS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
KMin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26
NickySpy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Pjapps 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 22
Plankton 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
RogueLemon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
RogueSPPush 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
SndApps 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5
Tapsnake 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
YZHC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 11
Zsone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 6
jSMSHider 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 8
zHash 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
11 94 4 60 4 4 1 8 23 18 14 149 53 1 3 3 34 2 23 4 2 26 1 22 5 1 4 5 1 11 6 8 5 610
Table 4.3: Confusion matrix for malicious app classification.
r,s ∈ K are combined into a larger cluster vrs. The distance matrix between each
pair of clusters is then updated by removing both r and s, adding the newly created
vrs, and finally computing the distances from vrs to each remaining cluster x through
a linkage function. In our case, such a function is simply the shortest between the
distance from x to r and the distance x to s. Furthermore, the algorithm keeps a list
L(it) with the distances at which each fusion takes place. The process is iterated
until the set of clusters K is reduced to one element.
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Algorithm 3. Single-linkage hierarchical clustering of malware families
Input:
Family vectors {v1, ... ,vq}
Output:
Proximity matrices D(t) = [dij ] and linkages at each level L(k)
Algorithm:
1 K = {v1, ... ,vq}
2 D(0) = [dij ] = dist(vi,vj) for all vi,vj ∈K
3 it = 0,L(it) = 0
4 while |K | 6= 1 do
5 Find r,s ∈K such that dist(r,s) = min
a,b∈K
{dist(a,b)}
6 Merge r,s into new cluster vrs
7 it = it+1
8 L(it) = dist(r,s)
9 D(it) = D(it−1) deleting the rows and columns corresponding
to r and s
10 Add to D a new row and column for vrs
11 D[vrs,x] = dist(vrs,x) =min{dist(r,x),dist(s,x)} for all x
12 K =K ∪{vrs}\{r,s}
13 end-while
14 return 〈D(0), ... ,D(it),L〉
Figure 4.7: Single linkage hierarchical clustering algorithm for malware families.
4.4.5.2 Results and Discussion
The results of a hierarchical clustering can be visualized in a dendrogram as the one
depicted in Figure 4.9 for the dataset used in this work. The dendrogram represents a
tree diagram where links between the leaves (malware families) illustrate the parental
relationships (ancestors and descendants) in a hierarchy. Thus, clusters (denoted as
vrs in Figure 4.7–line 6) are tree nodes representing merged families, i.e., a common
ancestor. The paths that group together different families illustrate the phylogenetic
evolution of the “species.” Furthermore, the distance D(t) between an ancestor and
its descendants is a measure of their similarity and, therefore, can be interpreted as an
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Figure 4.8: Distance matrix between pairs of malware families.
evolutionary (or diversification) distance. Note that the sequence of such distances
is provided as an output by the algorithm in Figure 4.7.
The initial proximity matrix, D(0), for all the families in our dataset is graphi-
cally shown in Figure 4.8. As anticipated by the results of the previous experiment,
the similarity among some groups of families is striking, while in other cases there
are substantial differences. The results after applying hierarchical clustering to the
datasets are displayed in the dendrogram shown in Figure 4.9. There are a number
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of interesting observations:
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Figure 4.9: Dendrogram obtained after hierarchical clustering over the dataset.
• BaseBridge and AnserverBot are intimately related, hence that they appear as
variants of a common ancestor. Besides, their linkage (distance) is very small
compared to the rest of the families, which suggest a large share of relevant
code structures and, perhaps of functionality too.
• The case of the DroidKungFu variants is remarkably captured. It transpires
from our results that DroidKungFu1 and DroidKungFu2 are alike, and the
same occurs with the pair DroidKungFu3 and DroidKungFu4. Furthermore,
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both pairs descend from a common ancestor, say DroidKungFuX, which in turn
is connected with GoldDream. This branch connects with another one formed
by the pair Plankton-DroidDreamLight, and both groups relate to Pjapps,
which is among the oldest examples of sophisticated Android OS malware. Fi-
nally, the relationship between this group, Zsone-DroidDream, and BaseBridge-
AnserverBot could be explained by a number of reasons, including the fact that
they probably share common engines.
• The remaining malware families seem rather unrelated, and no significant evo-
lutionary relationship can be inferred. Note, too, that distances approach 1 in
this area of the dendrogram, which suggest a very weak connection.
4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed a text mining approach to automatically clas-
sify smartphone malware samples and analyze families based on the code structures
found in them. Our proposal is supported by a statistical analysis of the distribu-
tion of such structures over a large dataset of real examples. Our findings point
out that the problem bears strong resemblances to some questions arising in au-
tomated text classification and other information retrieval tasks. By adapting the
standard Vector Space Model commonly used in these domains, we have explored
the suitability of such techniques to measure similarity among malware samples, and
to classify unknown samples into known families. Our experimental results suggest
that this technique is fast, scalable and very accurate. We have subsequently studied
the use of hierarchical clustering to derive dendrograms that can be understood as
phylogenetic trees for malware families. This provides the analyst with a means to
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analyze the relationships among families, the existence of common ancestors, the
prevalence and/or extinction of certain code features, etc. As discussed in this The-
sis, automated tools such as these will be instrumental for analysts to cope with the
proliferation and increasing sophistication of malware.
III
Dynamic-based Analysis

5
Alterdroid: Differential Fault Analysis of
Obfuscated Malware Behavior
5.1 Introduction
More sophisticated obfuscation techniques, particularly in code, are starting to ma-
terialize [Huang et al., 2013; Linn and Debray, 2003; Rastogi et al., 2013b]. These
techniques and trends create an additional obstacle to malware analysts, who see
their task further complicated and have to ultimately rely on carefully controlled dy-
namic analysis techniques to detect the presence of potentially dangerous pieces of
code.
Approaches based on dynamic code analysis such as the ones described in Chapter
2 are promising, but current works [Egele et al., 2012], [Rastogi et al., 2013a],
[Shabtai et al., 2014] only provide an holistic understanding of the behavior of an
app. This feature challenges the identification of grayware and the attribution of
malicious behavior to components of the app. Thus, current approaches are prone
to miss on their identification and further human—costly—efforts are required as
132 5. Alterdroid: Differential Fault Analysis of Obfuscated Malware Behavior
shown by Zhou and Jiang in [Zhou and Jiang, 2012].
Recent works approach the detection of obfuscated malware by mining identifi-
able static features such as cryptographic functions [Calvet et al., 2012]. However,
Schrittwieser et al. [Schrittwieser et al., 2013] demonstrate the incompleteness of
these and other semantic-aware detectors [Christodorescu et al., 2005] by means of
“covert computation”. As regards the various ways to obfuscate or locate obfuscated
code in binary data, [Ker et al., 2013] describes most relevant steganography and
steganalysis techniques including active [Fisk et al., 2003; Li and Craver, 2011] and
passive wardens.
Fuzz Testing or Fuzzing is a technique commonly used for providing inputs when
testing software for security purposes [Takanen et al., 2008]. Fuzzing technique is re-
cently gaining popularity for automating the dynamic analysis of apps in smartphones
[Machiry et al., 2013; Mahmood et al., 2012; Rastogi et al., 2013a; Shabtai et al.,
2014; Zheng et al., 2012]. Basically, Fuzzing aims at providing different streams of
events to the app for further monitoring the behavior of the device. Fuzzing was orig-
inally proposed for finding software crashes or unexpected behaviors by deliberately
introducing faulty inputs.
In this chapter we describe Alterdroid [Suarez-Tangil et al., 2014a], a fuzzing-
based technique for detecting obfuscated malware components distributed as parts
of an app package. Such components are often hidden outside the app main code
components, as these may be subject to static analysis by market operators. The
key idea in Alterdroid consists of analyzing the behavioral differences between the
original app and an altered version where a number of modifications (faults) have
been carefully introduced. Such modifications are designed to have no observable
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effect on the app execution, provided that the altered component is actually what
it should be and does not have any hidden functionality. For example, replacing the
value of some pixels in a picture or a few characters in a string encoding an error
message should not affect execution. However, if after doing so it is observed that
a dynamic class loading action crashes or a network connection does not take place,
it may well be that the picture was actually a piece of code or the string a network
address or a URL.
At high level, Alterdroid has two differentiated major components: fault injection
and differential analysis. The first one takes a candidate app—the entire package—
as input and generates a fault-injected one. This is done by first extracting all
components in the app and then identifying those suspicious of containing obfuscated
functionality. Such identification is done on an anomaly-detection basis by comparing
certain statistical features of the component’s contents with a predefined model for
each possible type of resource (i.e., code, pictures and video, text files, databases,
etc.). Faults are then injected into candidate components, which are subsequently
repackaged, together with the unaltered ones, into a new app. This process admits
simultaneous injection of different faults into different components and is driven
by a search algorithm that attempts to identify where the obfuscated functionality
is hidden. Both the original and the fault-injected apps are then executed under
identical conditions (i.e., context and user inputs), and their behavior is monitored
and recorded in the form of two activity signatures. Such signatures are merely
sequential traces of the activities executed by the app, such as for example opening a
network connection, sending or receiving data, loading a dynamic component, sending
an sms, interacting with the file system, etc. Both behavioral signatures are then
treated as in a string-to-string correction problem, in such a way that computing
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the Levenshtein distance (also known as edit distance) between them returns the list
of observable differences in terms of insertions, deletions and substitutions. Such a
list, called the differential signature, is finally matched against a rule set where each
rule encodes a relationship between the type of functionality presumably hidden and
certain patterns in the differential signature.
The contributions of this chapter can be summarized in what follows:
1. We introduce the notion of differential fault analysis for detecting obfuscated
malware functionality in smartphone apps.
2. We provide simple yet powerful theoretical models for fault injection operators,
behavioral signatures and rule-based analysis of differential behavior.
3. We describe the functional components of Alterdroid, a prototype implemen-
tation of our differential fault analysis model for Android apps. The system
includes instantiations for key tasks such as identifying components to be fault-
injected and a search-based approach to track down obfuscated components
in an app.
4. We also show how Alterdroid’s functional architecture supports a distributed
deployment of different modules, which allows offloading various analysis to
the cloud and running them in parallel.
Additionally, we illustrate our approach by discussing the step-by-step analysis of
three Android malware samples that incorporate hidden functionality in repackaged
apps: DroidKungFu, AnserverBot, and GingerMaster.
Fault injection analysis has been widely used for software assurance against fault
tolerance [Gray, 1986; Natella et al., 2013]. Our approach uses Fuzzing both for au-
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tomating the generation of inputs given to the sandbox and to inject fault conditions
into components of the program. To the best of our knowledge differential fault
analysis is a novel approach compared to existing works aiming at analyzing malware
in smartphones.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we introduce
formal models for fault injection and differential analysis. Section 5.3 describes Al-
terdroid’s architecture and its key functional components, discusses the complexity
of differential fault analysis, and provides an overview of our proof-of-concept imple-
mentation. Subsequently in Section 5.4 we describe the analysis of three Android
malware samples with Alterdroid. Finally, in Section 6.6 we conclude the chapter
by summarizing our main contributions and discussing limitations and directions for
future research.
5.2 A Differential Fault Analysis Model
This section introduces the theoretical background used in Alterdroid [Suarez-Tangil
et al., 2014a] to inject faults into apps, represent behavioral differences between apps,
and deducing properties from such behavioral differences considering injected faults
and observed differences. The overall dynamics of the differential fault analysis pro-
cess (i.e., the mechanism governing which faults are injected and where) is external
to this model and will be discussed later in Section 5.3.
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5.2.1 Fault Injection Model
An app P can be seen as a collection of components
P = {c1,c2, ... ,ck}. (5.1)
A component can be composed of a number of classes (i.e., code), but also other
resources that are dynamically accessed, such as for example asset files. Components
have a type, such as for example code, picture, video, database, etc. We define a
type function τ(c) that returns the type of component c .
Fault conditions can be injected into an app by altering one or more of its com-
ponents. Assume that C is the set of all possible app components and ψ(c) is the
alteration made over a component c ∈ C. A Fault Injection Operator is a transfor-
mation
ψci : 2P → 2C
ψci (P ) = P \{ci}∪{ψ(ci)}
(5.2)
That is, ψci (P ) returns a modified version of P where component ci has been re-
placed by ψ(ci). Depending on the functionality of c and the nature of the modifica-
tions introduced by ψ, replacing c by ψ(c) may, or may not, translate into observable
differences in the execution of P . In this work, we restrict ourselves to FIOs that
make alterations to data components only, not to instructions. Data components
include the value of variables found in the code, and also asset files such as databases,
pictures, audio and video files, etc. We will abuse notation and write τ(ψci ) for τ(ci);
i.e., we consider that the type of a FIO is the type of all components it can be applied
to.
FIOs can be arbitrarily complex and, in some cases, their operation may depend
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on the type and/or current value of the component to be altered. We will also make
use of very simple FIOs that treat components as a bit string, such as for example:
• rrepc(·): replaces the value of component c for a randomly chosen bit string.
• zeroc(·): replaces the value of component c for a string of zeros of the same
length.
• rmutcj (·): flips the j-th bit of of component c .
The FIOs defined above are rather generic. In some cases, we might want to
define further datatype-specific operators. These will be useful to modify in a syntax-
preserving way certain data objects (e.g., multimedia files) when the focus is on
changing the content without rendering the object unusable.
5.2.2 Modeling Differential Behavior
A key task in our system is the analysis of the behavioral differences between an
original app and a slightly modified version of it after applying a FIO. We next
introduce a model to represent traces of activities and differences between traces.
5.2.2.1 Behavioral Signatures
An app interacts with the platform where it is executed by requesting services through
a number of available system calls. These define an interface for apps that need to
read/write files, send/receive data through the network, make a phone call, etc.
Rather than focusing on low-level system calls, in this work we will describe an
app’s behavior through the activities it executes (see also Chapter 7–Section 7.2.3).
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In some cases there will be a one-to-one correspondence between an activity and
a system call, while in others an activity encompasses a sequence of system calls
executed in a given order. In what follows, we assume that
A= {a1,a2, ... ,ar} (5.3)
is a set of all relevant and observable activities an app can execute.
The execution flow of an app P may follow different paths depending on its inputs.
We group such inputs into two main classes:
• A sequence u of user-provided inputs U, such as for example those acquired
through the touchscreen.
• A sequence of contexts g, defining the state of the environment when the
execution takes place. Each context (state) is represented by a set of variables
that provide the app with information such as current location, time, energy
level, temperature, etc.
We will denote by P (u|g) the execution of P with user inputs u in context g.
The observable behavior resulting from the execution of P (u|g) is summarized in
a behavioral signature β[P (u|g)], this being a time series given by
β[P (u|g)] = 〈s1,s2, ... ,sn〉, si ∈ A (5.4)
Note that this signature model does not take into account the duration of each
activity or the time elapsed between each two of them, but only their relative order.
We will abuse notation and omit the associated app and its inputs when it is irrelevant
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or clear from context.
Finally, we will denote by len(β) the length of signature β, defined as the number
of activities in the series.
5.2.2.2 Differential Signatures
We are interested in analyzing the differences between two observed behaviors given
by their respective behavioral signatures. We approach this problem as one of string-
to-string correction, where differences are represented as the minimum number of
edit operations needed to transform one signature into the other. Given an be-
havioral signature β = 〈s1,s2, ... ,sn〉, we define the next three families of signature
transformation operators (STO):
• Insai (β) = 〈s1, ... ,si ,a,si+1, ... ,sn〉 ∀a ∈ A, ∀i ∈ [1,n]
• Deli(β) = 〈s1, ... ,si−1,si+1, ... ,sn〉 ∀si ∈ A, ∀i ∈ [1,n]
• Subai (β) = 〈s1, ... ,si−1,a,si+1, ... ,sn〉 ∀a ∈ A, ∀i ∈ [1,n]
Let
O=
⋃
i ,a
(
Insai ∪Deli ∪Subai
)
(5.5)
be the set of all possible STOs. Given two behavioral signatures β1 and β2, we
define the differential signature ∆(β1,β2) as an ordered sequence of STOs:
∆(β1,β2) = 〈o1,o2, ... ,ok〉 oi ∈O (5.6)
such that
ok ◦ok−1 ◦ · · · ◦o1(β1) = β2 (5.7)
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where oi ◦oj denotes the composition of STOs oi and oj . In other words, the differen-
tial signature ∆(β1,β2) provides a sequence of insertions, deletions and substitutions
that transforms β1 into β2. Note that, in general, ∆(β1,β2) 6= ∆(β2,β1).
For the purposes of this work, we are interested in minimal differential signatures,
i.e., sequences of minimum length. The most straightforward way to compute the
minimal differential signature is by computing the Levenshtein distance (also known
as edit distance) between β1 and β2 assuming that all operators have equal cost
[Kumazawa and Tamai, 2011]. This computation returns not only the distance, but
also the optimal differential signature.
5.2.3 Analyzing Differential Signatures
Let
P ′ = Ψ(P ) = ψcrr ◦ψcr−1r−1 ◦ · · · ◦ψc11 (P ) (5.8)
be the app resulting after the sequential application of FIOs ψ1, ... ,ψr to components
c1, ... ,cr of app P . Let β[P ] and β[Ψ(P )] be the behavioral signatures obtained after
executing P and Ψ(P ) under the same conditions1, and let ∆(β[P ],β[Ψ(P )]) be their
differential signature. The analysis model used in this work is based on deducing
properties of P from the presence or absence of certain patterns in ∆(β[P ],β[Ψ(P )])
and the properties of the FIO Ψ. We next describe these two elements in turn.
Note than ψ denotes a single FIO operating on a given component and Ψ a
number of of FIOs operating on a collection of components of an app P .
1That is, the same sequence of user inputs and contexts.
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5.2.3.1 FIO Classes
We identify two broad classes of FIOs:
• A FIO ψci is said to be indistinguishable if ∆(β[P ],β[ψci (P )]) = /0 for all apps
P containing component ci . In other words, a FIO is indistinguishable if it
does not affect the execution flow of any app and, therefore, the behavioral
signatures before and after applying it coincide.
• A FIO ψci is said to be distinguishable if ∆(β[P ],β[ψci (P )]) 6= /0 for all apps
P containing component ci . Thus, distinguishable FIOs always manifest as
nonempty differential signatures.
In what follows, the predicate ind(ψci ) models this property:
ind(ψci ) =
 true if ψ
ci is indistinguishable
false otherwise
(5.9)
5.2.3.2 Properties of Differential Signatures
Patterns in differential signatures will be modeled as first-order logical predicates
upon which Boolean formulae can be defined. Thus, analyzing a differential signature
reduces to evaluating a number of Boolean formulae linked to properties of the app
and the FIO, i.e.:
P has property x ⇐⇒ Φx
(
Ψ,∆(β[P ],β[Ψ(P )])
)
= true (5.10)
We consider two basic predicates:
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• equal(∆1,∆2) = true iff ∆1 = ∆2, where ∆1 and ∆2 are differential signatures.
Note that the empty set is a valid differential signature.
• contains(∆,o) = true iff ∆ = 〈o1,o2, ... ,ok〉 and ∃ oj ∈ ∆ such that oj = o.
Standard symbols will be used for Boolean formulae, including quantifiers (∃, ∀),
negation (¬), conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), etc.
5.2.3.3 Examples
We next illustrate the concepts introduced above through a number of examples.
Example 1. Assume that cicon is an icon image used by an app P in its user
interface. Modifying some pixels of such icon, or even replacing it by another valid
icon does not affect at all the execution flow of P . If nonetheless the icon is replaced
and the modified app behaves different from the original app under exactly the same
conditions, it can be deduced that the original icon contained some functionality,
such as e.g., a piece of compiled code masqueraded as an icon. This intuition can be
generalized through the following rule (hidden functionality in component, or HFC):
RHFC : c ∈ P contains hidden functionality ⇐⇒
ind(ψc) ∧ ¬equal(∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]), /0)
Example 2. A more specific case of the situation discussed above occurs when
modifications on a component c result in the absence of a dynamic loading action,
which are used to load code pieces into memory. In such a case, it may be possible
that c contains hidden code that is dynamically loaded. The following rule captures
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this:
RCDC : c ∈ P contains dynamic code ⇐⇒
ind(ψc) ∧ ∃ i : contains(∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli),si = dex_load (5.11)
Example 3. Let v be a variable such that their content has no influence on the
program flow. For example, v could be a string containing an error message which
may be displayed at some point. Such strings have been broadly used in existing
malware to hide URLs that point to services from where the malware can download
further code, receive instructions, send data, etc. To avoid detection, the string is
often obfuscated and the URL is only revealed at execution time after applying some
transformations. Thus, any modification on the string such that the URL is damaged
will likely result on the impossibility of establishing a connection. The following rule
captures this intuition:
RURL : v ∈ P contains an URL ⇐⇒
ind(ψv ) ∧ ∃ i : contains(∆(β[P ],β[ψv (P)]),Deli),si = net (5.12)
Example 4. Similarly to the cases discussed above, it may be possible to find
out whether a component c leaks information through a number of sensors (e.g.,
accelerometer, GPS, etc.) if, after modifying it, the differential signature lacks an
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access to such a sensor and a network connection:
RSDL : c ∈ P leaks sensor data ⇐⇒ ind(ψc) ∧(
∃ i1 : contains
(
∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli1
) ∨
∃ i2 : contains
(
∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli2
) ∨
...)
∧ ∃ j : contains(∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Delj)
(5.13)
where si1 = accelerometer , si1 = gps, and sj = network
5.3 Alterdroid: Differential Fault Analysis of Obfus-
cated Apps
In this section we describe Alterdroid, our approach to study obfuscated malware
code based on the differential fault analysis model discussed in the previous section.
The high level architecture of Alterdroid is shown in Figure 5.1. There are two
differentiated major blocks. The first one generates a number of fault-injected apps.
This process is carried out by first extracting all app components and identifying
those of interest (CoI), i.e., those suspicious of containing hidden functionality. An
iterative process then selects candidate CoI and injects faults into them. Both the
modified and the unmodified components are then repackaged together into a new
app. The second block generates stimuli for both apps (user inputs and context) and
executes them, generating a pair of behavioral signatures. The differential signature
is then computed and matched against a database of patterns to identify the presence
of hidden functionality.
5.3. Alterdroid: Differential Fault Analysis of Obfuscated Apps 145
Select 
Components 
Extract 
Components App 
Inject 
Faults 
Identify 
CoI 
Repackage 
Components 
Generate 
Inputs Execution 
Differential 
Signature 
Pattern 
Matching 
Execution 
Activity 
Signature 
Activity 
Signature 
Rules 
Fault Injection 
Differential Analysis 
Figure 5.1: Alterdroid architecture.
We next provide a detailed description of the key modules of Alterdroid and the
current prototype implementation.
5.3.1 Identifying Components of Interest
The first step in the analysis of an app is to identify component of interest (CoI).
Such components will be later fault injected according to some strategy in order to
analyze the resulting behavior.
We say that a component c of type τ(c) in an app P is of interest if it does not
fit a model Mτ(c) defined for all components of type τ(c). In our current version of
Alterdroid, models measure statistical features only, such as for example the expected
entropy, the byte distribution, or the average size. Such features are computed from
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a dataset of components of the same type, such as text files, pictures, code, etc.
For each model M , we assume a Boolean function test(c ,M ) that returns true if
c complies with M , and false otherwise. For example, if M is a byte distribution,
then test() could be a goodness-of-fit test (e.g., chi-square) between M and c ’s byte
distribution. More formally,
c ∈ CoI(P ) ⇐⇒ test(c ,Mτ(c)) = false (5.14)
In our experience, such simple models suffice to spot the most common—and
rather simple—obfuscation methods observed in smartphone malware, including code
camouflaged as supplementary multimedia files, connection data hidden in text vari-
ables, etc.
Alterdroid also supports an exhaustive analysis mode in which some additional
components may be considered CoI, even if they comply with their type model. In
this mode, a component is considered CoI if it is CoI as defined above or there exists
an indistinguishable operator for it. Formally
c ∈ CoI(P ) ⇐⇒ (test(c ,Mτ(c)) = false) or(∃ ψc : ind(ψc)) (5.15)
The rationale of this mode is to also check components for which we know in advance
that alterations do not translate into noticeable differences. This is very useful
to detect more sophisticated obfuscation methods that try to evade detection by
carefully modifying the code so as it fits the statistical model of the component. As
a side effect, however, the exhaustive analysis mode may end up with a large set of
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Algorithm 1. COI Obtention
Input:
App: P = {c1,c2, ... ,ck}
Set of type normality models: {M1,M2, · · · ,Mn}
Set of FIOs: {ψ1,ψ2, · · · ,ψm}
Mode: normal / exhaustive
Output:
CoI: List of all components of interest
Algorithm:
1 CoI← /0
2 For each c ∈ P do
3 if [test(c ,Mτ(c)) = false] or
[(mode = exhaustive) and (∃ ψi : τ(ψi) = τ(c))]
4 then
4 CoI← CoI∪{c}
5 end-for
6 return CoI
Figure 5.2: Algorithm for obtaining components of interest from an app.
CoI.
The algorithm shown in Figure 5.2 describes the process discussed above to
identify COI in Alterdroid.
5.3.2 Generating Fault-injected Apps
Components of interests identified in the previous stage are injected with faults and
reassembled, together with the remaining app components, to generate a faulty app
P ′. This process can generate several fault-injected apps, as there are multiple ways
of applying different FIOs to different components in the CoI set. In Alterdroid, fault-
injected apps are generated one at a time and sent for differential analysis. If no
evidence of malicious behavior is found in the differential analysis, the fault injection
process is invoked again to generate a different faulty app, and so on.
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Assume that CoI = {c1,c2, ... ,cn} and that for each ci ∈ CoI there is a set of
FIOs Fi = {ψcii1 ,ψ
ci
i2
, ... ,ψciimi } that can be applied to ci . Recall that FIOs can be quite
specific and, therefore, not all FIOs are applicable to all components. All possible
fault-injected apps can be generated by a naïve strategy that applies each FIO to
each component one at a time:
ψc1i1 (P ), ... ,ψ
c1
im1
(P ), ... ,ψcni1 (P ), ... ,ψ
cn
imn
(P ) (5.16)
Thus, there are ∑nj=1mj possible fault-injected apps, one for each possible component-
FIO pair.
All FIOs in Alterdroid are indistinguishable. This allows for a more efficient fault
injection process based on the fact that the composition of indistinguishable FIOs
is an indistinguishable FIO. Consequently, if the same FIO is applied to multiple
components and there is hidden functionality in just one of them, the resulting app
will behave exactly as if just the malicious component would have been fault injected.
The resulting fault injection process is as follows:
1. For each FIO ψj , generate P ′j by applying it to all ci ∈ CoI
P ′j = Ψj(P ) = ψ
c1
ij
◦ψc2ij ◦ · · · ◦ψ
cn
ij
(P ) (5.17)
where ψcij is the void operator if Ψj is not applicable to ci . The resulting P
′
j is
sent for differential analysis with respect to the original P .
2. If there is one P ′j such that the differential analysis spots malicious behavior,
the component responsible for it can be identified by searching over all ci ∈ CoI
with just the corresponding FIO Ψj . This process can be done in logarithmic
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time by ordering all components and recursively applying Ψj to half of them,
rather than in linear time by just applying Ψj to each ci ∈ CoI in turn.
The overall process, which is entwined with the differential analysis stage dis-
cussed later, is summarized in the algorithm shown in Figure 5.3. Note that in
this description the process stops when just one malicious component is identified.
Extending the algorithm to search for all of them is straightforward.
5.3.3 Applying Differential Analysis
Differential analysis between a candidate fault-injected app and the original app is
carried out by following the model described in Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3. The process
comprises the following steps:
1. Generate an appropriate usage pattern u and context g [Rastogi et al., 2013a;
Zheng et al., 2012] to feed both apps and extract their behavioral signatures,
β[P (u|g)] and β[P ′(u|g)]. Both the original and the fault-injected app are tested
under the same conditions and using the same input. Note that this assumes
that the execution of an app is completely deterministic.
2. Generate the differential signature ∆(β[P (u|g)],β[P ′(u|g)]) from the behavioral
signatures obtained above.
3. Apply sequentially all rules Ri over ∆(β[P (u|g)],β[P ′(u|g)]) and return those
that match.
The process is summarized in the algorithm given in Figure 5.4.
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Algorithm 2. Fault Injection and Malicious Search
Input:
App: P
CoI = {c1,c2, ... ,cn}
Set of FIOs: F = {ψ1,ψ2, · · · ,ψm}
Output:
List of all malicious components
Algorithm:
1 maliciousComp← null
2 For each FIO ψj do
3 P ′j ← P
4 For each ci ∈ CoI do
5 if ψj is applicable to ci then
6 P ′j = ψ
ci
j (P )
7 end-if
8 end-for
9 if DiffAnalysis(P , P ′, ψj) 6= /0 then
10 maliciousComp← SearchComponent(ψj ,P ,CoI,1,n)
11 end-if
12 end-for
13 return maliciousComp
Function SearchComponent(ψj ,P ,CoI,min,max)
1 P ′j ← P
2 For i =min to max do
3 if ψj is applicable to ci then
4 P ′j = ψ
ci
j (P )
5 end-if
6 end-for
7 if DiffAnalysis(P , P ′,ψj) 6= /0 then
8 if min =max then
9 return cmin
10 else
11 SearchComponent(ψj ,P ,CoI,min,(max −min)/2)
12 SearchComponent(ψj ,P ,CoI,(max −min)/2),max)
13 end-if
Figure 5.3: Algorithm for injecting faults and searching for malicious components after differential
analysis.
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Algorithm 3. Differential Analysis
Input:
Apps: P and P ′
FIO ψ
Set of rules: R = {R1,R2, ... ,Rp}
Output:
Matching rules
Algorithm:
1 (u,g)← GenUsagePatterns(P )
2 β← GenBehavioralSig(P ,u,g)
3 β′← GenBehavioralSig(P ′,u,g)
4 ∆(β,β′)← ComputeDiffSig(β,β′)
5 matchingRules← /0
6 For each Ri ∈ R do
7 if match(Ri ,ψ,∆(β,β′)) then
8 matchingRules←matchingRules∪{Ri}
9 end-if
10 end-for
11 return matchingRules
Figure 5.4: Algorithm DiffAnalysis for generating differential signatures and identifying matching
rules.
5.3.4 Implementation
Alterdroid is implemented over our Maldroid Lab described in Chapter 3. App com-
ponents are extracted and later on (after fault injection) repackaged using our static
analysis component. We then generate common sequences of events and execute
each app dynamically. In order to generate behavioral signatures, Alterdroid monitors
the execution of the following different activities: crypto, netopen, netread, netwrite,
fileopen, fileread, filewrite, sms, call, leak, and dexload.
Our prototype allows performing analysis tasks in parallel. We presently limit our
implementation to a small number of CoI models, FIO operators, and differential
matching operators. Nonetheless, our architecture allows security experts to further
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extend this and configure their own operators based on their experience.
5.3.4.1 CoI Models
Alterdroid currently supports the following models for identifying CoIs:
• EXEFileMatch. This model analyzes components of type Dalvik Executable
Format (DEXFileMatch), Application Package file format (APKFileMatch),
and Executable and Linkable Format (ELFFileMatch), i.e., τ(c)= 〈DEX ,APK ,
ELF 〉. The model defined for these components is based on the magic number
defined in the header of the file.
• ImgFileMatch. This model analyzes components of type picture, such as PNG,
JPG, or GIF images, i.e., τ(c) = 〈PNG , · · · ,JPG 〉. This model is based on the
magic number defined in the file header, similarly to the model above.
• EncryptedOrCompressedMatch. This model matches any file whose entropy,
measured at the byte level, exceeds a given threshold. In such a case, the file
is considered to contain random or encrypted information and, therefore, is
selected for fault analysis. We set the current threshold to 3.9. Such value
was chosen after measuring the entropy of several files before and after being
encrypted with DES.
• ExtensionMismatch. This model identifies files such that their magic numbers
do not match the file extension. For instance, we found several APK files with
DB extension and several encrypted files with JPG extension. We currently sup-
port two submodels: ImgFileExtensionMismatch and APKFileExtensionMismatch.
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FIO Type Targeted CoIs ind
GenericFMutation Any file
ImgExtensionMismatch
EncryptedOrCompressed
APKFExtensionMismatch
X
–
X
ImgFileChange Any image ImgFileMatch X
ScriptFileChange Non-compiled program TextScriptMatch ×
APKFileChange Android app APKFileMatch ×
DEXFileChange Dalvik executable DEXFileMatch ×
ELFFileChange Executable and linkable ELFFileMatch ×
Table 5.1: FIOs implemented in Alterdroid’s current version and their corresponding CoIs.
• TextScriptMatch. This model analyzes components that match any ASCII
text executable file, i.e., τ(c) = Script. This model is also based on the magic
number defined in the file header.
All CoIs described above are implemented in Python. The set can be easily
extended to incorporate additional models by simply adding the corresponding Python
module.
5.3.4.2 Fault Injection Operators
FIOs in Alterdroid are strongly typed. This avoids syntactic or unexpected errors
during the execution of the modified app. For instance, if a generic FIO modifies
randomly chosen bits of a JPEG without considering the file structure, it may end
up with a malformed picture that could cause the app to crash during execution. We
currently support the next list of FIOs (see also Table 5.1):
• ImgFileChange. This FIO changes a number of pixels of image file compo-
nents. The FIO type matches components of type ImgFileMatch. This is an
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indistinguishable FIO due to the nature of the changes and the type of compo-
nent. Thus, although the image resulting from the injection will be different,
this change should not alter the app execution flow.
• EXEFileChange. This FIO replaces the file with a well-formed APK, DEX or
ELF file that effectively does nothing, equivalent to a NOP (no-operation)
injection. This change should cause a different behavior in the resulting differ-
ential signature as the former EXE file has been replaced. Thus, this FIO is
distinguishable.
• ScriptFileChange. This FIO replaces the file with a valid NOP script. It only
matches components of type ScriptFileChange. This FIO is also distinguish-
able.
• GenericFileMutation. It randomly changes several bytes of a file. This FIO is
applied when there is no information about the file type and its structure, e.g.,
when injecting faults to encrypted files (EncryptedOrCompressedMatch) or
when the file extension does not match its magic number ExtensionMismatch.
This FIO might be distinguishable or indistinguishable, depending on the file
type.
As in the case of CoI models, FIOs are implemented in Python and provided with
Alterdroid’s current version. Again, the set can be easily extended with additional
FIOs by adding the corresponding Python module.
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Name Contains Rule
RNAC
Net. Activity
Component
ind(ψc)∧ ∃ i1 : contains
(
∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli1=netopen
)
∨ ∃ i2 : contains
(
∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli1=netread
)
∨ ∃ i3 : contains
(
∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli2=netwrite
)
RFAC
File Activity
Component
ind(ψc)∧ ∃ i1 : contains
(
∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli1=fileopen
)
∨ ∃ i2 : contains
(
∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli1=fileread
)
∨ ∃ i3 : contains
(
∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli2=filewrite
)
RDLC Data Leakage
Component
ind(ψc)∧ ∃ i : contains(∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli=leak)
RSAC SMS Activity
Component
ind(ψc)∧ ∃ i : contains(∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli=sms)
RPAC Payload Activity
Component
ind(ψc)∧ ∃ i : contains(∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli=dexload)
RUPC
Update Payload
Component
ind(ψc)∧ ∃ i1 : contains
(
∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli1=netread
)
∧ ∃ i : contains(∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli=dexload)
RCAC Crypto Activity
Component
ind(ψc)∧ ∃ i : contains(∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli=crypto)
RCPC
Crypto Payload
Component
ind(ψc)∧ ∃ i1 : contains
(
∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli1=crypto
)
∧ ∃ i : contains(∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]),Deli=dexload)
RHFC Hidden Function-
ality Component
ind(ψc)∧ ¬equal(∆(β[P ],β[ψc(P)]), /0)
Table 5.2: Basic indistinguishable differential rules implemented in Alterdroid.
5.3.4.3 Differential Rules
The basic set of differential rules incorporated in Alterdroid comprises the 9 rules
shown in Table 5.2. They all apply to indistinguishable FIOs and cover the most
common examples of obfuscated functionalities: network activity, file activity, data
leakage, SMS activity, hidden payloads, update attacks, cryptographic activity, cryp-
tographic payloads, and generic hidden functionality.
To reduce the complexity of the search space, all basic rules apply to indistinguish-
able FIOs. However, for the sake of completeness our implementation incorporates
several distinguishable FIOs, and new rules can be further added to match them. For
instance, given an app that incorporates a DEX program used to enhance photos
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taken from the camera, we can use a rule to check whether this CoI actually does
just that or not.
Thus, if after applying a FIO over this component the differential signature shows,
for instance, changes in network activity, we may suspect that the CoI contained other
functionality piggybacked on the DEX.
Formally, given DEXFileMach ∈ CoIs and its corresponding distinguishable FIO
(i.e., DEXFileChange), the following rule captures this intuition:
RDEX : dex ∈ P contains NET activity ⇐⇒
¬ind(Ψdex) ∧ ∃ i : contains(∆(σ[P ],σ[Ψdex(P )]),Deli=net) (5.18)
Note that we limit our implementation to a small number of indistinguishable
FIOs and matching rules. Nonetheless, our architecture allows security experts to
further extend this and configure their own FIOs and rules based on their experience.
5.4 Evaluation
We next report a number of experimental results obtained with our prototype im-
plementation of Alterdroid. These results illustrate how our system can be used by
market operators and security analysts to facilitate the analysis of complex obfus-
cated mobile malware. We first present the results of testing Alterdroid against two
datasets of smartphone malware samples found in the wild, including a performance
analysis of the entire differential fault analysis process. We finally discuss in more
detail three representative case studies.
5.4. Evaluation 157
5.4.1 Analytical Results
We tested Alterdroid against a dataset composed of around 6K apps retrieved from
Aptoide (AP) alternative market and VirusShare (VS) repository (see Chapter 3—
Section 3.5.2). Every app was executed over a time span of 120 seconds—current
malware is generally quite eager to run their payloads promptly [Suarez-Tangil et al.,
2014a], so this time suffices to activate most malicious payloads. Table 5.3 provides
a summary of the obtained experimental results, including the average time required
for analyzing one app (this includes the time for extracting CoIs and injecting faults
into them.
When analyzing the distribution of CoIs throughout the apps in our datasets, we
observed that some apps have a fairly large amount of CoIs (see Figure 5.5). For
instance, we can find some apps with over 5K images (ImgFileMatch). Conversely,
we could find many apps with fewer CoIs. On average, our experiments show that
there are about 146 and 284 CoIs per app in VS and AP respectively, as shown in
Table 5.3. Note that the number of CoIs from AP is twice the number of CoIs from
VS. In any case, the amount of potentially malicious components is significant and
the time required to analyze each of them manually is shown affordable.
Finally, our results report a number of apps matching against the rules imple-
mented in our prototype. For instance, we could identify 220 apps reporting com-
ponents containing SMS functionality (RSAC) from all 2.9K samples in VirusShare.
Conversely, we could not find any RSAC rule in Aptoide (see Table 5.3). One alarming
result is that we found a significant number of apps, i.e.: 669, reporting components
containing data leakage functionality (RDLC) in Aptoide.
One interesting aspect of Alterdroid is that it can inject all selected FIOs at once.
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VirusShare (VS) Aptoide (AP)
Su
m
. No. Apps 2 913 2 994
Avg. No. CoIs 145.6 284.4
Avg. No. FIOs 138.3 273.5
C
oI
s
ImageFileMatch 3279 5215
EncryptedOrCompressed 16 687 35 293
ImageExtensionMismatch 5 771 5 246
DEXFileMatch 2 827 2 995
APKFileMatch 1 087 58
APKExtensionMismatch 517 39
F
IO
s ImageFile 397 248 813 754
GenericMutationFile 5 714 5 237
R
ul
es
No. RFAC 2 802 2 962
No. RNAC 2 773 2 929
No. RDLC 1 971 669
No. RSAC 220 0
– Avg. Overhead 584.51 s. 666.67 s.
Table 5.3: Analysis of the VS and AP datasets. The number of CoIs and FIOs is given on
average per app. The number of matches (NAC and DLC) is given in absolute value, and the
overhead is on average per app.
Furthermore, Alterdroid allows performing several analyses concurrently. In fact, our
current experimental setup allows the execution of 15 instances of Android in parallel.
Thus, this simple optimization strategy reduces the average execution time per app
at 32.62 and 44.44 seconds for VS and AP, respectively.
One challenge we faced when analyzing apps from Aptoide is identifying whether
some behaviors were malicious or not. Many legitimate apps are not fully malicious
but carry out activities that may constitute a privacy risk for some users. During
our analysis, most such suspicious behaviors were related with accessing local data
and exfiltrating it over the network. We did not analyze in detail whether this was
an intrinsic behavior of the app caused by the fault-injection process, for example
because the app contained an integrity check. Nonetheless, this indicates that the
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Figure 5.5: Distribution of the number of ImageFileMatch in the VirusShare (VS) and Aptoide
(AP) datasets.
app was behaving suspiciously and therefore it is worth analyzing.
5.4.2 Performance
The time taken by the entire differential analysis process depends on the number of
different fault-injected apps to be explored, the time required to generate each of
them, and the time taken by the differential analysis over each one:
t = nfaultApps · tgenFaultApp · tdiffAnalysis (5.19)
As for the first term, if |CoIs| = n and there are m FIOs, the fault injection
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algorithm shown in Figure 5.3 generates O(m+ logn) different fault-injected apps
to be analyzed. Each one of those apps has been injected with at most n faults, one
per component. The time tgenFaultApp required to inject one fault depends on the
specific FIO, although most of them run in constant time or are linear in the size of
the component to be fault-injected. Finally, differential analysis requires:
• Executing the two apps. In Alterdroid this is done by a component which
admits as input the time texec during which the app will be executed.
• Obtaining the differential signature, which reduces to computing an edit dis-
tance between the two activity signatures. If these signatures have lengths h1
and h2, then this process takes O(h1 ·h2) steps.
• Pattern-matching the differential signature with the rule-set, which takesO(|R |).
Apart from texec, the two most critical parameters affecting the total analysis time
are n and m, as defined above (i.e., number of CoIs and FIOs, respectively). Fig. 5.6
shows the average execution time of the SearchComponent identification algorithm at
the core of Alterdroid for different values of n, m, and texec. For example, the analysis
of an app containing 100 CoIs for which 10 FIOs are applicable, and executing each
fault-injected app 120 s, will require around 5 minutes. The time increases to 2.5
hours and 4.5 hours if the app contains 1K or 10K CoIs, respectively. If we decrease
the dynamic execution time of each app to 60 s, these figures reduce to 2.7 minutes,
1.3 hours, and 2.9 hours, respectively.
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Figure 5.6: Average execution time of the SearchComponent algorithm for different number of
FIOs and dynamic analysis time.
5.4.3 Case Studies
We next illustrate how Alterdroid can be used by market operators and security an-
alysts to facilitate the analysis of complex obfuscated mobile malware. We present
three case studies of malicious apps found in Android markets: GingerBread, Droid-
KungFu, and AnserverBot. These three samples constitute representative cases as
they incorporate obfuscation techniques of various degrees of sophistication, as well
as some malicious features common in malware for smart devices (see Chapter 2)
such as aggressive privilege escalation exploits, C&C-like functions and information
leakage. Figure 5.7 summarizes the behavior of the malware that will be discussed
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Figure 5.7: Malware’s activity during a time span of 120 seconds. The x-axis represent the
sequence of activities observed during the execution.
throughout this section. Subsequently, we evaluate the performance of our approach
over a number of malware samples found in the wild [Zhou and Jiang, 2012].
5.4.3.1 DroidKungFu
DroidKungFu (DKF) is one of the major Android malware outbreaks. DKF’s main
goal is to collect a variety of information on the infected device, including the IMEI
number, phone model, as well as the Android OS version.
DKF is mostly distributed through open or alternative markets through repack-
aging, i.e., by piggybacking the malicious payload into a variety of legitimate appli-
cations. Apps infected with DKF are distributed together with a root exploit hidden
within the app’s assets, namely Rage Against the Cage (RAC). In order to hinder
static analysis, this encrypted payload is only decrypted at runtime.
In this case study, we analyze one DKF variant by first extracting its components
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of interest and further applying fault injection and differential analysis over them. We
observed that the sample contained about 170 resource files, including PNG (153
files), MP3 (6 files), XML (2 files), DEX (1 file) and RSA key file, among others. All
these assets are, in principle, suspected of containing obfuscated functionality. We
note here that applying stand-alone static detection techniques would not be enough
to identify malicious payloads without requiring human-driven inspections. This is
due to the way that DKF obfuscates its core components. Specifically, each variant
uses a different encryption key hidden throughout the code. Even when we attempt
to apply stand-alone dynamic analysis, we observe that this technique only gives a
rough notion of the holistic behavior of the app. In fact, the behavior introduced by
DKF is strongly entwined with the original code of the repackaged app, in such a
way that some of its key activities, such as for instance network connections, might
be easily seen as normal.
The above-mentioned variant of DKF was fed to Alterdroid. It first identified
a number of components of interest, being in all the cases assets associated with
the app. Various faults were then injected into such components, and the resulting
app was executed and compared with the original one. Figure 5.7 (DroidKungFu)
graphically shows the differential behavior reported by Alterdroid when analyzing such
fault-injected app. Activities launched by the original piggybacked app correspond
to the full plot, while the behavior after fault injection is given just by the green
(legitimate app) and red spots (DKF). In this particular case, a text file pertaining
to the assets was randomly modified. This file was later identified as the component
containing the RAC exploit. Our analysis shows that disabling the access to such a
functionality stops the malware from: establishing a network connection (netopen,
netwrite), leaking some information through it (leak), and later performing some
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Input-Output (I/O) operations (fileread). These findings agree with previous reports
about DKF, including those undertaken by Jiang and Zhou [Zhou and Jiang, 2012].
5.4.3.2 AnserverBot
Our second case study deals with AnserverBot (ASB), a specimen similar to the first
versions of DKF in terms of sophistication and distribution strategy [Suarez-Tangil
et al., 2014c]. However, ASB introduces an update component that allows it to
retrieve at runtime secondary payloads and the latest C&C URLs from public blogs.
Additionally, it also incorporates advanced anti-analysis methods to avoid detection.
On the one hand, it introduces an integrity component to check if the app has been
modified. On the other hand, it piggybacks the main payload in native runnable
code. Furthermore, ASB obfuscates its internal classes and methods, and partitions
the main payload in two different parts: while one of them will be installed, the
other one is dynamically loaded without actually being installed. More specifically,
ASB hides one of these components into the assets folder under any of the following
names: anservera.db or anserverb.db. Furthermore, ASB inserts a new component
named com.sec.android.provider.drm that executes a root exploit known as Asroot
[Grace et al., 2012b].
As in the case of DKF, we observed that all ASB samples contain a non-negligible
amount of candidate components to be analyzed. The specimen we deal with in this
case study contained about 78 resource files, including 54 image files, one database,
one DEX file, and a ZIP file, to name a few. After a few iterations of the fault
injection process Alterdroid succeeds in positively identifying the actual payload within
the DB file, as well as the behavior related to such component. More precisely, this
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CoI is triggered after observing a mismatch between the magic number of the file
(APK) and the actual extension of the data base (DB). In fact, when a fault is
injected over the database, the ASB’s integrity check naturally aborts its execution
and produces a result similar to that expected from the original app. Figure 5.7
(AnserverBot) graphically shows the exhibited differential behavior. As observed,
ASB first establishes a network connection (netopen and netwrite) after loading
the main payload (fileread operations followed by dexload). After that, it keeps on
reading data that is finally leaked out. Interestingly, the legitimate application uses
the network as well, although it does not leak any personal information.
5.4.3.3 GingerMaster
GingerMaster (GM) was the first known Android malware to use root exploits for
privilege escalation on Android 2.3. GM’s main goal is to exfiltrate private information
such as the device ID (IMEI, MSI, etc.) or the contact list stored in the phone. GM is
generally repackaged with a root exploit known as GingerBreak [Grace et al., 2012b],
which is stored as a PNG and a JPG asset file. Right after infecting the device, GM
connects to the C&C server and fetches new payloads.
We analyzed a GM sample containing around 61 asset resources, 30 of which
were pictures in different formats. From those 30 pictures, Alterdroid identified 4
as strongly suspicious. (Actually, a detailed analysis shows that they are malformed
PNGs and that they also contain several ASCII text scripts.) Alterdroid was also able
to identify that such malformed images files play a key role in triggering the payloads
piggybacked into the legitimate app, including the ASCII text scripts.
Figure 5.7 (GingerMaster) shows the differential behavior obtained when one of
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such images is fault injected. Our analysis shows that GM starts the execution of a
service that performs some IO operations (file-read and file-write) before finally leak-
ing private information through the network (net-write and leak). Again, even when
the malicious components are hidden, Alterdroid proved to be able to discriminate
them and facilitate the identification of the underlying malicious behavior.
5.5 Conclusions
Today’s mobile security requires new approaches to protect users’ devices as tradi-
tional detection techniques are overwhelmed by the sophistication and obfuscation
of current mobile malware [Leavitt, 2013]. Furthermore, the current panorama and
trends suggest that automated malware detection and analysis is a major requirement
for apps review.
Differential fault analysis in the way implemented by Alterdroid is a powerful and
novel dynamic analysis technique that can identify potentially malicious components
hidden within an app package. Additionally, empowering dynamic analysis with a
fault injection approach can be used to differentiate the ”gray“ behavior from the
legitimate when analyzing grayware. This is a good complement to static analysis
tools, more focused on inspecting code components but which could well miss pieces
of code hidden in data objects or just obfuscated.
Alterdroid is thought as a general purpose framework with a very versatile archi-
tecture that can be extended in a number of ways. In this chapter, we have described
this architecture together with a formal notion of differential fault analysis. Addition-
ally, we present an open-source engineered version Alterdroid striving on offering an
automated tool for malware analysis. Furthermore, based on our experimental re-
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sults, we reduced from 6K apps to 2.6K apps suspicious of containing data leakage
functionality. In addition, performance figures are given and discussed, showing the
feasibility of such a novel approach to differential analysis. Even though Alterdroid is
presently a perfectly functional proof of concept, its open architecture and available
open sources can make it the basis for further research work and production/profes-
sional software.
Although current malware is relatively naïve, more sophisticated obfuscation
techniques—particularly in code—are starting to materialize. Cryptography is one
recurrent technique used by malware developers. Nonetheless, we believe that mal-
ware could be already using other advanced techniques for hiding their components
such as, for instance, Steganography. This technique would allow them to conceal
their malicious components within other objects of the code. This is specially critical
when these components are hidden within distinguishable components.

IV
Cloud-based Analysis

6
Power-aware Anomaly Detection in
Smartphones
6.1 Introduction
Many security issues can be essentially reduced to the problem of separating malicious
from non-malicious activities. Such a reformulation has turned out to be valuable
for many classic computer security problems, including detecting network intrusions,
filtering out spam messages, or identifying fraudulent transactions. But, in general,
defining in a precise and computationally useful way what is harmless or what is
offensive is often too complex. To overcome these difficulties, many solutions to such
problems have traditionally adopted a machine learning approach, notably through
the use of classifiers to automatically derive models of good and/or bad behavior
that could be later used to identify the occurrence of malicious activities.
Anomaly-based detection strategies have proven particularly suitable for scenarios
where the main goal is to separate “self” (i.e., normal, presumably harmless behavior)
from “non-self” (i.e., anomalous and, therefore, potentially hostile activities). In
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this setting, one often uses a dataset of self instances to obtain a model of normal
behavior. In detection mode, each sample that does not fit the model is labelled as
anomalous. This notion has been thoroughly explored over the last two decades and
applied to multiple domains in the security arena [Chandola et al., 2009; Estévez-
Tapiador et al., 2004; Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009].
More recently, many security problems related to smartphone platforms have been
approached with anomaly-based schemes (see, e.g., [Burguera et al., 2011; Dini
et al., 2012; Feizollah et al., 2014; Rosen et al., 2013; Shabtai et al., 2012]). One
illustrative example is found in the field of continuous—or implicit—authentication
through behavioral biometrics [De Luca et al., 2012; Jakobsson et al., 2009; Shi et al.,
2011]. The key idea here is to equip the device with the capability of continuously
authenticate the user by monitoring a number of behavioral features, such as for
example the gait—measured through the built-in accelerometer and gyroscope—,
the keystroke dynamics, the usage patterns of apps, etc. These schemes rely on
a model learned from user behaviors to identify anomalies that, for example, could
mean that the device is mislaid, in which case it should lock itself and request a
password.
Proposals for detecting malware in smartphones have also made extensive use
of anomaly detection approaches. Most schemes are built upon the hypothesis that
malicious apps somehow behave differently from goodware. The common practice
consists of monitoring a number of features for non-malicious apps, such as for
example the amount of CPU used, network traffic generated, system/API calls made,
permissions requested, etc. These traces are then used to train models of normality
that, again, can be used to spot suspicious behavior. Modeling app behavior in this
way is particularly useful in two scenarios. The first one is related to the problem of
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repackaged apps, which constitutes one of the most common distribution strategies
for smartphone malware. In this case, the malicious payload is piggybacked into a
popular app and distributed through alternative markets. Detecting repackaged apps
is a challenging problem, in particular when the payload is obfuscated or dynamically
retrieved at runtime. The second problem is thwarting the so-called grayware, i.e.,
apps that are not fully malicious but that entail security and/or privacy risks of which
the user may not be fully aware. For instance, an increasing number of apps access
user-sensitive information such as locations frequently visited, contacts, etc., and
send it out of the phone for obscure purposes [Kranz et al., 2013]. As users find it
difficult to define their privacy preferences in a precise way, automatic methods to
tell apart good from bad activities constitute a promising approach.
Essentially all machine learning-based anomaly detection solutions can be broken
down into the following functional blocks:
• Data acquisition. Activity traces are required both for (re-)training the model of
normality and in detection mode. The nature of the data collected varies across
applications and may include events such as system calls, network activities,
user-generated inputs, etc.
• Feature extraction. Machine learning algorithms require data to be expressed
in particular formats, commonly in the form of feature vectors. A number of
features are extracted from the acquired activity traces during a preprocessing
stage. The complexity of such preprocessing depends on the problem and
ranges from computationally straightforward procedures (e.g., obtaining simple
statistics from the data) to more resource intensive transformations.
• Training. A representative set of feature vectors is used to train a model that
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captures the underlying notion of normality. This process may be done offline,
in which case periodic re-training is often necessary in order to adapt the model
to drifts in behavioral patterns, or else constantly as new data arrives.
• Detection. Once a behavioral model is available, it is used along with a similarity
function to obtain an anomaly score for each observed feature vector. This
process is often carried out in real time and requires constant data acquisition
and feature extraction.
All the functions described above can be quite demanding—particularly if they
must operate constantly—and it is debatable whether they can be afforded in energy-
constrained devices with limited computational capabilities. As a consequence, a
number of recent works (see, e.g., [Barbera et al., 2013; Portokalidis et al., 2010;
Zonouz et al., 2013]) have suggested externalizing some of these tasks to dedicated
servers in the cloud or to other mobile devices nearby [Yu et al., 2013]. However,
these proposals do not provide a detailed analysis of the cost in terms of energy
consumption.
Although off-loading computation seems intuitively advantageous, such a strategy
has an implicit trade-off between the energy savings resulting from not performing
on-platform computations and the costs involved in data exchanges over the network.
Intermediate strategies are also possible, such as for example off-loading the training
stage only and performing detection locally, or externalizing everything but the data
acquisition and preprocessing stages. Additionally, each plausible placement strategy
has consequences in aspects other than energy consumption. For example, off-loaded
detection may result in delays in detecting anomalous events, or even malfunctions
if network connectivity is unavailable.
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Intuition suggests that intensive monitoring is prohibitive for platforms such as
the current generation of smartphones [Rachuri et al., 2014]. However, the energy
consumption trade-offs among the various on-platform and externalized computation
strategies are unclear. Several works (e.g., [Kumar and Lu, 2010; Namboodiri and
Ghose, 2012; Tandel and Venkitachalam, 2013]) have addressed the issue of deciding
whether to cloud is a better option than not to cloud for mobile systems. For
example, in [Namboodiri and Ghose, 2012] it is shown that determining an energy
efficient strategy is a complex task and require a fine characterization of the impact
of several parameters, including the type of device and the application domain. Their
approach focuses on three rather generic applications: word processing, multimedia,
and gaming for both laptops and mobile devices. Authors conclude that “cloud-based
applications consume more energy than non-cloud ones” when using platforms such
as mobile devices. In contrast, other works such as [Tandel and Venkitachalam, 2013]
and [Kumar and Lu, 2010] show that offloading is generally profitable energy-wise,
particularly for intensive computation tasks that require relatively small amount of
communications.
In this chapter, we address the problem discussed above and assess the energy-
consumption trade-offs among different strategies for off-loading, or not, functional
tasks in machine learning based anomaly detection systems. Our analysis is motivated
by, and hence strongly biased towards, security applications of anomaly detectors,
such as for example malware detection or behavioral authentication. Nevertheless,
the majority of our experimental setting, results and conclusions are general and may
be of interest to other domains where smartphone-based anomaly detectors are used
(e.g., health monitoring applications [Kranz et al., 2013]).
In summary, our results confirm the intuition that externalized computation is,
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by far, the best option energy-wise. However, one rather surprising finding is that
it is several orders of magnitude cheaper than on-platform computations, which
suggests that networking is much more optimized than computation in such platforms.
Furthermore, we have noticed substantial differences among the machine learning
algorithms tested. Since some of them appear not to scale well for large feature
vectors and/or datasets, developers should make careful choices when opting for
one algorithm or another. In addition, anomaly detectors are found to consume
considerably more energy than popular apps such as games or online social networks,
which motivates the need for more lightweight machine learning algorithms.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the experi-
mental setting used in our work, including the platform used, the anomaly detectors
tested and the experiments carried out. Empirical results are discussed in Section 6.3,
and energy-consumption linear models are numerically derived for each separate func-
tion. Such models are used in Section 6.4 to analyze various off-loading strategies
and provide a comparative discussion. In Section 6.5 we illustrate the main findings
discussed throughout the chapter using an anomaly-based detector of repackaged
malware. Section 6.6 concludes the chapter by summarizing our contributions and
main conclusions.
6.2 Experimental Setting
In this section, we describe the experimental framework used for evaluating energy
consumption in Android devices, including the machine learning algorithms evaluated,
the tests carried out, and the tools and operational procedures used to measure
power.
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6.2.1 Machine Learning Algorithms
We have tested three machine learning algorithms that can be used as anomaly
detectors. Our choosing of these particular schemes is motivated by the different
computational approaches followed by each one of them, and also because they are
representative of broad classes of machine learning strategies: decision trees [Quinlan,
1986], clustering [Fisher, 1987], and probabilistic approaches [Hastie et al., 2005].
For completeness, we next provide an overview of each algorithm’s working principles.
• J48 is a Java implementation of the classic C4.5 algorithm [Hastie et al., 2005].
The procedure builds a decision tree from a labelled training dataset using
information gain (entropy) as a criterion to choose attributes. The algorithm
starts with an empty tree and progressively grows nodes by choosing those
attributes that most effectively split the dataset into subsets where one class
dominates. This procedure is recursively repeated until reaching nodes where
all instances belong to the same class [Hastie et al., 2005].
The resulting tree can be used as a classifier that outputs the class of future
observations based on their attributes. The binary setting (i.e., two classes:
normal and anomalous) is commonly used in anomaly detection problems, al-
though it is perfectly possible to train a classifier with more a complex class
structure.
• K-means is a clustering algorithm that groups data into k clusters and returns
the geometric centroid of each one of them. Given a dataset composed of
feature vectors D = {x1, ... ,xn}, the algorithm searches for a partition of D
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into k clusters {s1, ... ,sk} such that the within-cluster sum of squares
k
∑
i=1
∑
xj∈si
‖ xj −µi ‖2 (6.1)
is minimized, where µi is the geometric mean of the vectors in si .
When used in a supervised training setting, each centroid µi receives a class
label derived from the labels of the samples associated with the corresponding
cluster. Labelled centroids can be then used, together with a nearest neighbor
classifier, to determine the class of an observation by simply assigning it to a
cluster according to some distance. Clustering algorithms have been extensively
used in anomaly detection, particularly in one-class settings where only normal
training instances are available. In such cases, a sample is often labelled as
anomalous if its sufficiently far away from its nearest centroid.
• OCNB (One Class Naïve Bayes) [Hastie et al., 2005] is a supervised learn-
ing algorithm that has been successfully used in a wide range of applications.
OCNB is often a very attractive solution because of its simplicity, efficiency
and excellent performance. It uses the Bayes rule to estimate the probability
that an instance x = (x1, ... ,xm) belongs to class y as
P(y |x) = P(y)
P(x)
P(x |y) = P(y)
P(x)
m
∏
i=1
P(xi |y) (6.2)
so the class with highest P(y |x) is predicted. (Note that P(x) is independent of
the class and therefore can be omitted.) The naïvety comes from the assump-
tion that in the underlying probabilistic model all the features are independent,
and hence P(x |y) = ∏mi=1P(xi |y). The probabilities P(xi |y) are derived from
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a training set consisting of labelled instances for all possible classes. This is
done by a simple counting procedure, often using some smoothing scheme to
ensure that all terms appear with non-zero probability. The priors P(y) are
often ignored.
In a one-class (OC) setting the training set consists exclusively of normal data.
Since a profile of non-self behavior is not required, the detection is performed
by simply comparing the probability of a sample being normal (or, equivalently,
the anomaly score) to a threshold. Such a threshold can be adjusted to control
the false and true positive rates, and the resulting ROC (Receiver Operating
Characteristic) curve provides a way of measuring the detection quality.
6.2.2 Instrumentation
The experiments have been conducted in a Google Nexus One smartphone. Power
consumption has been measured by applying a battery of tests involving both compu-
tation and communication capabilities. Each test is an app containing some of the
functionality present in a given anomaly detector, such as for example the training
process or the detection stage. The app is loaded into the device and repeatedly
executed using some provided configuration. The process is sequential, so only one
execution is run at a time.
The device was previously instrumented with AppScope [Yoon et al., 2012] as
described in Chapter 3. As mentioned before, AppScope provides the amount of
energy consumed by an app in the form of several time series, each one associated
with a component of the device (CPU, Wi-Fi, cellular, touchscreen, etc.). We restrict
our measures to CPU for computations and Wi-Fi for communications, as our tests
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do not have a graphical user interface, do not require user interaction and, therefore,
do not use any other component.
6.2.3 Energy Consumption Tests
The energy consumption tests were independently carried out over the four functional
tasks described in Section 6.1 in order to obtain a separate consumption model for
each anomaly detection component. With this aim in mind, we designed the following
four families of tests:
1. Data preprocessing. The underlying machine learning algorithm takes as input
a dataset of behavioral patterns encoded in some specific format, often in the
form of feature vectors. Obtaining such patterns may involve non-negligible
computations, such as for example computing histograms, obtaining statistics,
applying data transformations, etc. In our case, this stage consisted of process-
ing a trace file where an ordered list of system calls executed by a monitored
app was provided. The trace is sequentially read using a sliding window and a
feature vector is computed for each window. The vector is then written into an
Attribute-Relation File Format (ARFF) file, which will be later used for training
or detection purposes. Overall, the preprocessing requires some on-platform
computations and also reading and writing files. We used generic I/O Java
components for this task, such as FileInputStream and BufferedReader.
2. Training. The training process reads an ARFF dataset and builds a model of
normal behavior according to some machine learning algorithm. We prepared
three different subtests, one for each algorithm discussed above. We used an
stripped version of the well known Weka [Hall et al., 2009] library for Android
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devices, as this implementation is reasonably optimized. Training involves a
number of parameters that may influence the algorithm’s running time. In
our case, each algorithm was provided with the configuration yielding optimal
detection results as discussed in the previous section.
3. Detection. This tests measures the amount of energy consumed by a constantly
running detector. Again, we prepared one sub-test for each machine learning
algorithm and implemented the detector using the stripped version of Weka.
Each detector is assumed to have the behavioral model already loaded, so the
test only measures energy consumption associated with loading a test vector
and deciding its class (normal or anomalous).
4. Communications. In this test we measured the amount of energy consumed
by sending and receiving data over a Wi-Fi connection. As the amount of
data exchanged and the frequency of such exchanges may vary across oper-
ational scenarios, we focused on obtaining a model of energy consumed per
exchanged byte. We identified three subtests here, depending on whether a se-
cure (encrypted and authenticated) channel is necessary or not. The tests were
implemented using standard Java libraries, such as HttpURLConnect and Http-
sURLConnect for insecure and secure communications, respectively. Besides,
we tested two different networking scenarios. In the first one, the detector com-
municates with a locally reachable device, which implies low network latency.
For these cases we tested both open and WPA-protected Wi-Fi networks. In
this case, the time required for a packet to travel from the device to the server
and back (Round-Trip Time, RTT) is about 0.6 ms. In the second scenario, we
assumed that the detector communicates with a device located reasonably far
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Test Subtest No. Executions
Data preprocessing Preprocessing 30
Training
Training.J48 30
Training.K-means 30
Training.OCNB 30
Detection
Detection.J48 30
Detection.K-means 30
Detection.OCNB 30
Comms
Comms.LoLat.Open.HTTP 30
Comms.LoLat.Open.HTTPS 30
Comms.LoLat.WPA.HTTP 30
Comms.LoLat.WPA.HTTPS 30
Comms.HiLat.WPA.HTTP 30
Comms.HiLat.WPA.HTTPS 30
Table 6.1: Energy consumption tests executed.
away in terms of network latency, such as for example in a cloud service accessi-
ble via Internet. In our experimental setting, the server is accessed via Internet
using a WPA-protected Wi-Fi network with a network latency of around 31 ms.
As indicated above, each test is a separate app that is installed on the device,
executed, measured with AppScope, and finally uninstalled. Each test was executed
30 times with different input parameters, such as the length and number of feature
vectors in the training dataset and the frequency of sending and receiving data over
the network. We elaborate on this later when discussing the experimental results.
The test suite is summarized in Table 6.1.
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6.3 Energy Consumption of Anomaly Detection Com-
ponents
We next present the experimental results obtained after running the tests described
in the preceding section. We group the results into two separate categories: compu-
tation and communications. The first one includes data preprocessing, training, and
detection, while the second focuses on data exchange over the network. We finally
obtain and discuss linear regression models for each algorithm and functional task.
6.3.1 Computation
We experimentally found that energy consumption related to preprocessing, training,
and detection tasks depends on:
• The length |v | of the feature vectors, measured as the number of attributes
that each vector has.
• The size |D| of the dataset, measured as the number of vectors to be pro-
cessed, i.e., generated during preprocessing, used for training, or evaluated
during detection.
We executed all the preprocessing, training, and detection tests with values of
|v | = 10, 100, 200, 300, and 400. These lengths are representative of the feature
vectors used in most security applications of machine learning. On the other hand,
for each vector length we generated datasets of sizes |D| = 10, 50, 100, 200, 500,
and 1000, and then computed the average energy consumption per vector. The
184 6. Power-aware Anomaly Detection in Smartphones
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0
50
100
150
200
250
Vector length
Jo
ul
es
 
 
Training − J48
Training − K−means
Training − OCNB
Detection − J48
Detection − K−means
Detection − OCNB
Preprocessing
Figure 6.1: Energy consumption results in Joules per vector for different vector lengths for the
preprocessing, training, and detection tests.
average energy consumption in Joules (J) per vector for each vector length is shown
in Figure 6.1. Several conclusions can be drawn from these results:
1. Data preprocessing consumes very little energy when compared to detection
and training. This cannot be easily generalized, as it strongly depends on the
sort of preprocessing applied. In our case data preprocessing is quite straight-
forward (computing histograms) and consumes less than 10 J/vector.
2. For a given algorithm, detection is significantly cheaper than training in terms
of energy consumption, but there are exceptions. For example, for both J48
and OCNB, and vectors of length 100 training requires around 50 J/vector
more than detection. This difference increases to more than 100 J/vector for
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lengths greater than 300. K-means is an exception, with training and detection
consuming approximately the same power.
3. The algorithm matters: K-means consumes far less than J48 and OCNB. In
turn, OCNB is more expensive power-wise than J48, both in training and de-
tection.
4. For the three tasks, consumption increases approximately linearly in |v |.
6.3.2 Communications
Each communication test consists of the app sending and receiving 10 large files
to/from a server, using both HTTP and HTTPS. After each test, the total energy
consumed is divided by the number of bytes sent or received to obtain a normalized
measure in Joules per byte. Each test was repeated 30 times, resulting in the boxplots
shown in Figure 6.2.
The results are quite surprising. On the one hand, we found no significant dif-
ference between using HTTP or HTTPS. In other words, key establishment plus
encryption/decryption for each packet sent/received seems to be extremely efficient
in terms of energy consumption. One possible explanation for these figures might
be related to the granularity used by AppScope to measure energy and compute the
attribution of consumption. AppScope uses application-specific energy consumption
data for each hardware component. However, authors argue that the “system” con-
sumes a certain amount of energy when communications are used. It may be the
case that AppScope is not attributing the consumption of crypto operations to the
app using HTTPS.
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Figure 6.2: Energy consumption results in Joules per byte exchanged (sent or received) for the
communication test.
Apart from the observation above, our results suggest that network latency has a
clear influence in the consumption. In our experiments, increasing latency from 0.6
ms to 31 ms resulted in 8 times more power. This may just be a consequence of the
app execution taking more time to transmit the data.
6.3.3 Linear Models
We used the figures obtained above to derive linear energy consumption models that
could be later used to determine the best deployment strategy for each function
depending on aspects such as the remaining energy available on the device or the
detection architecture. To do this, we applied a simple linear regression analysis using
least squares over the energy consumption data.
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In the case of the computation functions, each model has the form:
Ef (|v |) = αf · |v |+ yf (6.3)
where f ∈ {pre,tra,det}, i.e., preprocessing, training, and detection, respectively.
Similarly, energy consumption incurred by communications is estimated by a linear
model:
Ecomms(nb) = γ ·nb (6.4)
where nm is the number of bytes to be sent or received, and γ is the average energy
consumption of the network configuration used by the device.
The coefficients thus estimated are provided in Table 6.2 and confirm the conclu-
sions drawn above. For example the slope α of the three training algorithms reveals
the difference between K-means, which introduces a multiplying factor of 0.11 J per
additional attribute in the vector, and J48/OCNB, for which such a factor is 0.45
J and 0.57 J, respectively. Similarly, OCNB is clearly much more costly in terms of
detection, with a 0.15 J factor per additional vector attribute against 0.05 and 0.08
for J48 and K-means, respectively.
6.4 Deployment Strategies and Trade-offs
Based on the findings presented in the previous section, we next discuss different
deployment strategies for the various functions composing an anomaly detection
system and analyze the associated energy consumption costs.
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Function Model
Computation αf yf
Preprocessing – 0.00 2.82
Training
Training.J48 0.45 24.45
Training.K-means 0.11 7.85
Training.OCNB 0.57 18.78
Detection
Detection.J48 0.05 9.04
Detection.K-means 0.08 7.16
Detection.OCNB 0.15 6.34
Communications γ
Comms
Comms.LoLat.Open.HTTP 8.74 ·10−7
Comms.LoLat.Open.HTTPS 5.09 ·10−7
Comms.LoLat.WPA.HTTP 5.81 ·10−7
Comms.LoLat.WPA.HTTPS 5.18 ·10−7
Comms.HiLat.WPA.HTTP 8.31 ·10−6
Comms.HiLat.WPA.HTTPS 8.34 ·10−6
Table 6.2: Regression coefficients for the linear energy consumption models for computation
and communication tasks.
6.4.1 Energy Consumption Strategies
We make two assumptions in our subsequent analysis. Firstly, data acquisition is
executed in the device by means of some instrumentation procedure, e.g., through
the system API to get access to activity traces. This would not be strictly true
for some recently proposed approaches based on keeping a synchronized clone of
the device in the cloud [Chun et al., 2011; Portokalidis et al., 2010; Zonouz et al.,
2013]. We believe, however, that the overhead incurred by such approaches may be
equivalent to that of directly monitoring the device, although this issue needs further
investigation. Secondly, our envisioned applications require relatively straightforward
data preprocessing (see Table 6.2) that can easily be incorporated into the data
acquisition module. As a result, both acquiring the data and preparing the feature
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vectors incur a constant overhead for all discussed strategies and will be left out of
our analysis.
The two remaining functional blocks are training and detection. Each one, or
both, of them can be placed locally in the device (L) or off-loaded to a remote server
(R). This gives rise to four possible strategies that will denoted by LL, LR, RL, and
RR. In all cases, energy consumption is a linear function:
Ei ,j(t) = pii ,j · t (6.5)
with i , j ∈ {L,R}, where pii ,j is determined by each strategy.
In what follows |v | represents the length in bytes of each feature vector; |D| is
the size of the dataset used for training, measured in number of vectors; |M| is the
size in bytes of the normality model returned by the training process; and ωt and ωd
represent the frequencies at which training and detection take place, respectively.
• Local Training, Local Detection (LL). In this case the entire operation of the
detector is executed locally in the device. The energy consumption factor piLL
is composed of two terms: Et(|v |) Joules per vector in the dataset during
training, plus Ed(|v |) Joules per vector for each detection event. Overall, we
have:
piLL = ωt |D|Et(|v |)+ωdEd(|v |) (6.6)
• Local Training, Remote Detection (LR). In this scenario training takes place
in the device but detection is off-loaded. During training, energy consumption
is equivalent to the corresponding term in (6.6) plus the cost of sending the
model M to the cloud (Ed(|M|)). In detection mode, every vector must be also
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sent out for analysis. We consider here that receiving the result has a negligible
cost, as it may just be 1 bit (normal/anomalous). In summary:
piLR = ωt
(
|D|Et(|v |)+Ec(|M|)
)
+ωdEc(|v |) (6.7)
• Remote Training, Local Detection (RL). This strategy captures the idea of
off-loading the model training stage while performing detection locally. To do
this, every time that a (re-)training event is triggered the entire dataset must
be sent out for analysis and, subsequently, the model must be received. In
detection mode, energy consumption for each analyzed vector is ascribed to
the device, resulting in:
piRL = ωt
(
|D|Ec(|v |)+Ec(|M|)
)
+ωdEd(|v |) (6.8)
• Remote Training, Remote Detection (RR). Finally, this strategy considers the
possibility of externalizing all functions to a remote server. Consequently, the
only energy consumption attributed to the device is that related to sending and
receiving feature vectors both for training and detection. Thus:
piRR = ωt |D|Ec(|v |)+ωdEc(|v |) (6.9)
We then discuss the tradeoffs between these four possibilities. In particular, we
compare the LL strategy with the other three to understand the potential gains from
off-loading training, detection, or both.
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6.4.2 LL vs LR
The LL strategy is preferred to LR if:
piLL ≤ piLR
ωt |D|Et(|v |)+ωdEd(|v |) ≤ ωt
(
|D|Et(|v |)+Ec(|M|)
)
+ωdEc(|v |)
ωdEd(|v |) ≤ ωtEc(|M|)+ωdEc(|v |)
ωdEd(|v |) ≤ (ωt +ωd)Ec(|M|+ |v |)
Ed(|v |) ≤ ωt +ωdωd Ec(|M|+ |v |) (6.10)
Note that, in general, ωd  ωt , in which case the term ωt+ωdωd ≈ 1. Alternatively, in
the extreme case of training being done for each incoming vector, we have ωd = ωt
and ωt+ωdωd = 2. Renaming this term as
z =
ωt +ωd
ωd
∈ [1,2] (6.11)
and using the linear forms of Ed and Ec we can rewrite the inequality above as:
α|v |+ y ≤ zγ(|v |+ |M|)
(α− zγ)|v | ≤ γ|M|− y
|v | ≤ z γ|M|− y
α− zγ (6.12)
A simple analysis of the orders of magnitude of the quantities involved in (6.12)
provides some insights. Recall that α ≈ 10−2, y ≈ 10 and γ ≈ 10−7 (see Table 6.2).
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Replacing these values in (6.12), and ignoring the factor z , we get
|v | ≤ 10
−7|M|−10
10−2−10−7 ≈ 10
−5|M| (6.13)
Consequently, the right-hand term in (6.12) will be negative unless |M| is of the order
of 106 or greater. However, almost all machine learning algorithms produce models
that rarely exceed a few hundred kilobytes.
The main conclusion that can be drawn is that the LL strategy is worse energy-
wise than the LR unless the model is so large and the vectors tiny enough so that the
energy consumed by sending both the model and the vectors to the cloud outweighs
the energy of performing detection locally.
6.4. Deployment Strategies and Trade-offs 193
6.4.3 LL vs RL
In this case we have:
piLL ≤ piRL
ωt |D|Et(|v |)+ωdEd(|v |) ≤ ωt
(
|D|Ec(|v |)+Ec(|M|)
)
+ωdEd(|v |)
ωt |D|Et(|v |) ≤ ωt
(
|D|Ec(|v |)+Ec(|M|)
)
|D|Et(|v |) ≤ |D|Ec(|v |)+Ec(|M|)
|D|Et(|v |) ≤ Ec(|D||v |+ |M|)
|D|(α|v |+ y) ≤ γ(|D||v |+ |M|)
|D|α|v |+ |D|y ≤ |D|γ|v |+ γ|M|
|D|(α− γ)|v | ≤ γ|M|− |D|y
|v | ≤ γ|M|− |D|y|D|(α− γ) (6.14)
Expression (6.14) presents a trade-off somewhat similar to that discussed in the
previous section, but more acute. The fact that training takes place remotely factors
in the size of the dataset in the inequality, which must be transferred for the remote
server to build up the model. The overall consequence is however similar: the RL
strategy consumes less than LL unless the model is sufficiently large with respect to
the size of the dataset. Since the factor −|D|y appears in the numerator of (6.14),
the model size must now be even greater than in the previous case.
In summary, outsourcing the training stage is consistently better than performing
it locally unless the datasets to be sent for analysis and the models received are
massive.
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6.4.4 LL vs RR
Local training and detection consumes less than a fully off-loaded operation if:
piLL ≤ piRR
ωt |D|Et(|v |)+ωdEd(|v |) ≤ ωt |D|Ec(|v |)+ωdEc(|v |)
ωt |D|
(
Et(|v |)−Ec(|v |)
)
≤ ωd
(
Ec(|v |)−Ed(|v |)
)
(6.15)
Note that in (6.15) the various energy consumption functions are applied to inputs
of the same length |v |. However, communications are several orders of magnitude
cheaper than training and detection, so
Et(|v |)−Ec(|v |)≈ Et(|v |) (6.16)
and
Ec(|v |)−Ed(|v |)≈−Ed(|v |) (6.17)
Replacing this in (6.15) we get
ωt |D|Et(|v |)≤−ωdEd(|v |) (6.18)
which never holds. The conclusion is clear and, in a sense, rather expected from the
findings discussed in the two previous sections: off-loading the entire operation of
the detector is always better in terms of energy consumption than operating locally
in the device.
Taking another look at (6.15), the only scenario where LL may be competitive
against RR arises when Ec(|v |)≥Ed(|v |). This situation may correspond to extremely
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lightweight detectors in which computing the anomaly score takes less power than
sending the vector over the network. In such a case, (6.15) can be reduced to:
|D| Et(|v |)
Ec(|v |)−Ed(|v |) ≤
ωd
ωt
(6.19)
which essentially establishes that local operation pays off power-wise if training is
very infrequent, does not consume much energy, and the datasets are not very large.
6.4.5 Discussion
The analysis conducted in the previous three sections point out to one definite conclu-
sion: externalizing computation, both training and detection activities, is by far the
best option in terms of energy consumption. A deeper look at the trade-offs derived
above reveals that the core of this argument is intimately related to the enormous
differences in energy consumption existing between computation and networking ac-
tivities. In platforms such as the current generation of smartphones, communications
appear to be extraordinarily optimized in terms of energy requirements, whereas com-
putation is significantly more demanding. In fact, we have seen that communications
in current Android devices have similar energy consumption than early wireless sensor
devices such as MICAz or TelosB [De Meulenaer et al., 2008]. In the case of appli-
cations such as anomaly detection, the best strategy is undoubtedly to externalize
all computation functions, including continuous detection, whenever possible.
In terms of performance criteria other than energy consumption, off-loading may
or may not have an impact depending on the application domain. Loss of network
connectivity—or even sufficient degradation—is a major threat for outsourced detec-
tion, as the device may be forced to functioning without the detection service while
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the remote server is unreachable. Similarly, network delays may be a critical point in
applications where near real-time detection is required. In such cases, these aspects
must be weighed against the energy saving benefit.
Offloading resource-intensive tasks to the cloud is a topic that has gained mo-
mentum in recent years. Several works (e.g., [Kumar and Lu, 2010; Namboodiri and
Ghose, 2012; Tandel and Venkitachalam, 2013]) have addressed the issue of decid-
ing whether to cloud is a better option than not to cloud for mobile systems. For
example, in [Namboodiri and Ghose, 2012] it is shown that determining an energy
efficient strategy is a complex task and require a fine characterization of the impact
of several parameters, including the type of device and the application domain. Their
approach focuses on three rather generic applications: word processing, multimedia
and gaming for both laptops and mobile devices. Authors conclude that “cloud-based
applications consume more energy than non-cloud ones” when using platforms such
as mobile devices. In contrast, other works such as [Tandel and Venkitachalam, 2013]
and [Kumar and Lu, 2010] show that offloading is generally profitable energy-wise,
particularly for intensive computation tasks that require relatively small amount of
communications.
Finally, the security and privacy aspects of offloading computation to the cloud
is a major concern that may prevent many users from relying on external services,
particularly when confidential data is involved in the training and detection datasets.
In this context, many works have dealt with the problem of securely outsourcing
computation (see, e.g. [Wang et al., 2011]). One common assumption is to consider
the external server as untrusted and to encrypt all data sent out for processing. In
order to assess the extra energy consumption incurred by encrypting data prior to
sending it, we evaluated three of the most common ciphers found in cryptographic
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Cipher Mode γ
AES-128 CTR 7.62 ·10−9
3DES CTR 9.52 ·10−9
RC4 – 7.62 ·10−9
Table 6.3: Average energy consumption per encrypted byte.
libraries and used nowadays: AES, 3DES, and RC4. The experimental setting and
energy consumption tests are identical to those described in Section ??. We carried
out 30 independent tests and divided, in each case, the total energy consumed by the
number of encrypted bytes to obtain a normalized measure in Joules per byte. The γ
factor obtained is shown in Table 6.3. As it can be observed, the cost of encryption
is negligible when compared to that of training and detection tasks and does not
affect the general conclusions discussed above. These results indicates that current
encryption algorithms are extremely efficient in terms of energy consumption. This
is further supported by the results shown in the literature during the last years aiming
at providing low budget cryptography to enable wireless security [De Meulenaer et al.,
2008; Fan et al., 2013; Karaklajiić et al., 2010; Kerckhof et al., 2012; Verbauwhede,
2011].
6.5 Case Study: A Detector of Repackaged Malware
We next illustrate some of the conclusions drawn in the preceding sections with real-
world application: an anomaly-based detector for repackaged malware in Android
apps. The use of anomaly detectors for this purpose has been proposed in a number
of recent works (see, e.g., [Burguera et al., 2011; Shabtai et al., 2012]). Although in
all cases the performance of such approaches is reasonably good in terms of detection
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quality, to the best of our knowledge none has explored the energy consumption
savings gained by outsourcing it.
6.5.1 The Detector
Sequences of system calls have been recurrently used by anomaly detection systems
for security applications in smartphones [Blasing et al., 2010; Burguera et al., 2011;
Lin et al., 2013; Shabtai et al., 2012]. All apps interact with the platform where they
are executed by requesting services through a number of available system calls. These
calls define an interface that allow apps to read/write files, send/receive data through
the network, read data from a sensor, make a phone call, etc. Legitimate apps can be
characterized by the way they use such an interface [Lin et al., 2013], which facilitates
the identification of malicious components inserted into an seemingly harmless app
and, more generally, other forms of malware [Suarez-Tangil et al., 2014b].
Based on this idea, we have built an anomaly detector that combines some of
the ideas already proposed in previous works1. Feature vectors consist of histograms
computed from a trace of system calls using a sliding window of length W . We
determined experimentally that windows of length 400 result in very good detection
performance. The number of systems calls varies across architectures and it is often
between 200 and 400. Thus, during the training period all processes of normal apps
are monitored and the corresponding feature vectors are generated. Such vectors are
then used to train a normality model.
In detection mode, the algorithm takes as input a sequence sq of N system calls
1We deliberately omit a number of details about our detector, particularly those related to the
detection quality for different parametrizations, as this is not the main focus of this work and has
been reported elsewhere.
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and extracts the N −W + 1 feature vectors using a sliding window. Each one of
these feature vectors is then classified as normal or anomalous. Let A be the number
of vectors identified as anomalous. Then, the sequence—and, therefore, the app—is
classified according to the following rule:
det(sq) =
 legitimate if
A
N−W+1 < ρ
repackaged otherwise
(6.20)
where ρ is an adjustable detection threshold.
The detection procedure described above is intimately related to the nature of
repackaged malware. In general, not all the system call windows issued by a repack-
aged app will be anomalous, as they may be generated by non-malicious code. Thus,
detection must be based on analyzing sets of windows and seeking if a fraction of
them are anomalous. In our experiments, we obtained good results with sequences
of at least 10 windows and thresholds ρ around 0.1. For example, one of the apps
we used for testing detection performance is a popular game named Mx Moto by
Camel Games. The app can be purchased from Google Play for 1.49 eand so far
has been downloaded 100K times. The same app can also be found in alternative
markets for free [Zhou and Jiang, 2012], in most cases repackaged with a malware
known as Anserverbot. We tested the original app together with various repackaged
variants, obtaining in all cases a detection rate of 100% with no false positives with
the OCNB detector. These results are congruent with those reported in similar works
based on anomaly detection [Burguera et al., 2011; Shabtai et al., 2012].
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Type No. Apps No. Events Throttle (ms) Syscalls/s
Goodware
10 5000 1000 180.43
35 1000 5000 453.91
50 5000 1000 307.62
Malware
10 5000 1000 112.39
35 1000 5000 128.66
50 5000 1000 161.90
All 190 — Average 224.16
Table 6.4: Average number of system calls per second in different executions of both goodware
and malware.
6.5.2 Testing Framework
We tested the energy consumption of three detectors built as described above, one
for each machine learning algorithm evaluated. Only the LL and RR strategies were
studied, as they represent opposite cases for placement decisions. For the latter,
the high latency configuration with WPA and HTTPS was used. In order to study
energy consumption for different apps and/or detector configurations, we gathered
a dataset of 190 apps containing both goodware and malware. For each one of
them, we derived the average number of system calls per second issued depending
on different usage intensity rates (throttle). These figures are obtained by running
each app in a controlled environment and automatically injecting user events at a
throttle pace. The results are shown in Table 6.4 and reveal that apps can generate
up to a few hundred system calls per second. Even though user-driven apps may well
function at lower paces, these rates are useful for apps where high frequency testing
is required.
Each detector is evaluated for different vector lengths. Again, our goal is mea-
suring how the amount of energy varies in a real setting depending on the choice of
this parameter. (Recall that in terms of detection quality, best results are obtained
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for |v |= 100.) Finally, each detector was continuously executed during 1 week, and
the amount of energy consumed so far was measured at 4 control points: after 10
minutes, 1 hour, 1 day, and 1 week. During this period, detection is triggered as of-
ten as a sufficiently large sequence of system calls is available, and re-training occurs
every 10 minutes.
6.5.3 Results and Discussion
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Figure 6.3: Average energy consumption for different detectors using the LL (Computation) and
RR (Communications) strategies.
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Figure 6.3 shows the average energy consumed by the three detectors for the
LL and RR strategies. (Note that the latter is independent of the algorithm as only
communications are involved.) The plots are consistent with the results discussed in
the previous section and confirm that outsourced detection is much more efficient
energy-wise than on-platform operation. Consider, for example, the case of vectors
of 100 attributes. During the first 10 minutes, both the OCNB and the J48 detectors
have consumed more than 105 J. During the same period, the detector located in
the cloud has required less than 104 J. After 1 day, cloud-based detectors consume
roughly the same amount of energy than on-platform detectors over 1 hour. Note,
too, that the frequency of re-training is extremely high in this setting, and that the
difference would be substantially greater if training occur more sporadically.
Another interesting finding is that differences among algorithms are noticeable
after some time, especially for large vectors. In general, OCNB is much more de-
manding than K-means and J48 when vectors with a hundred attributes are involved.
Finally, in order to contextualize the energy implications of constantly running a
detector, we have measured the energy consumed by some popular apps during 10
minutes (see Table 6.5). These apps are representative of three broad classes of
popular activities: games, online social networking, and multimedia content. The
amount of energy consumed by the three ranges between approximately 550 J and
645 J, most of it being related to the graphical user interface. For comparison
purposes, running our detector in the device with the less demanding algorithm (J48)
takes around 15 J per detection. At full throttle (i.e., around 224 detections per
second) this implies a consumption of around 2 MJ in 10 minutes. Even if detection
only takes place at a rate of 1 per second, the overall consumption in 10 minutes is
still around 9 KJ. In contrast, outsourced detection using WPA, HTTPS, and high
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App CPU Comms Display Total
YouTube 30.11 12.59 508.90 551.59
MX Moto 129.24 5.75 509.54 644.52
Facebook 137.76 27.42 471.42 637.27
Table 6.5: Consumption (in Joules) of three popular apps during a time span of 10 minutes.
latency consumes around 112 J and 0.5 J in the same conditions, respectively.
The figures discussed above reinforce the conclusion that externalized operation
of anomaly detection seems to be the only reasonable choice in terms of energy
consumption. However, given that cloud-based processing may raise some privacy
concerns in certain applications, this also motivates the need for more lightweight
anomaly detection techniques that may be suitable for on-platform operation.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have discussed the power consumption trade-offs among various
strategies for executing anomaly detection components directly on mobile platforms
or remotely in the cloud. Both our theoretical analysis and experimental results con-
firm that there is actually little choice but to offload everything to the cloud. Reasons
for this include the differences between the energy efficiency of computation and com-
munications in current platforms, and also various parameters related to the anomaly
detection setting, such as the dataset sizes and the operation frequency. We believe
that the linear models provided in this work may be useful in other contexts to ob-
tain estimates about the energy consumption of different alternatives. Furthermore,
such models can be easily extended to other machine learning algorithms by simply
deriving the appropriate coefficients α and y .

7
Detecting Targeted Smartphone
Malware with Behavior-Triggering
Stochastic Models
7.1 Introduction
Malware for smartphones is a problem that has rocketed in the last few years [Juniper,
2013]. The presence of increasingly powerful computing, networking and sensing
functions in smartphones has empowered malicious apps with a variety of advanced
capabilities [Suarez-Tangil et al., 2014b], including the possibility to determine the
physical location of the smartphone, spy on the user’s behavioral patterns, or com-
promise the data and services accessed through the device. These capabilities are
rapidly giving rise to a new generation of targeted malware that makes decisions on
the basis of factors such as the device location, the user’s profile, or the presence of
other apps (e.g., see [Felt et al., 2011c; Hasan et al., 2013; Raiu and Emm, 2013;
Zawoad et al., 2013]). The idea of behaving differently under certain circumstances
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was also successfully applied in the past. For instance, Stuxnet [Langner, 2011]
remained dormant until a particular app was installed and used at certain location,
having as a target Iranian Nuclear Plants. Other malware targeted governments
and private corporations—mostly in the financial and pharmaceutical sectors [Corpo-
ration, 2013]. Another representative example of targeted malware is Eurograbber
[Kalige and Burkey, 2012], a “smart” Trojan targeting online banking users. The
situational awareness provided by smartphone platforms makes this type of attacks
substantially easier and potentially more dangerous. More recently, other examples
of targeted malware include FinSpy Mobile [Marquis-Boire et al., 2013], a general
surveillance software for mobile devices, and Dendroid Remote Access Toolkit (RAT)
[Rogers, 2014], which offers capabilities to target specific users.
A similar problem is the emergence of the so-called grayware [Felt et al., 2011c],
i.e., apps that cannot be completely considered malicious but whose behavior may
entail security and/or privacy risks of which the user is not fully aware. For example,
many apps using targeted advertisements are particularly aggressive in the amount
of personal data they gather, including sensitive contextual information acquired
through the device sensors. The purpose of such data gathering activities is in many
cases questionable, and many users might well disapprove it, either entirely or in
certain contexts.1
Both targeted malware and grayware share a common feature that complicates
their identification: the behavior and the potential repercussions of executing an
app might depend quite strongly on the context where it takes place [Capilla et al.,
2014] and the way the user interacts with the app and the device [Gianazza et al.,
1Classical examples include two popular games, Aurora Feint and Storm8, which were removed
from the Apple Store for harvesting data and phone numbers from the user’s contact list and sending
them to unknown destinations as introduced in Chapter 2.
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2014]. We stress that this problem is not addressed by current detection mecha-
nisms implemented in app markets, as operators are overwhelmed by the number
of apps submitted for revision every day and cannot afford an exhaustive analysis
over each one of them [Chakradeo et al., 2013]. A possible solution to tackle this
problem could be to implement detection techniques based on dynamic analysis (e.g.,
Taintdroid [Enck et al., 2010]) directly in the device. However, this is simply too
demanding for battery-powered platforms. Several recent works [Chun et al., 2011;
Kosta et al., 2012; Portokalidis et al., 2010; Zonouz et al., 2013] have proposed to
keep a synchronized replica (clone) of the device virtualized in the cloud. This would
facilitate offloading resource-intensive security analysis to the cloud, but still does
not solve one fundamental problem: grayware and targeted malware instances must
be provided with the user’s particular context and behavior, so the only option left
would be to install the app, use it, and expect that the analysis conducted over the
clone—hopefully in real time—detects undesirable behaviors. This is a serious limi-
tation that prevents users from learning in advance what an app would do in certain
situations, without the need of actually reproducing such a situation.
Recent works such as PyTrigger [Fleck et al., 2013] have approached the prob-
lem of detecting targeted malware in Personal Computers (PC). To do so, it is
sought to trigger specific malware behaviors by injecting activities collected from
users (e.g., mouse clicks and keyword inputs) and their context. This approach
cannot be adopted to platforms such as smartphones because the notion of sensed
context is radically different here. Other schemes, including the work presented in
[Gianazza et al., 2014; Jensen et al., 2013; Rastogi et al., 2013a; Zheng et al.,
2012], do focus on smartphones but concentrate exclusively on interactions with the
Graphical User Interface (GUI) and are vulnerable to context-based targeted attacks.
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Two works closer to our proposal are Context Virtualizer [Liang et al., 2013] and
Dynodroid [Machiry et al., 2013], where a technique called context fuzzing is intro-
duced in the former and used in the latter. The main aim in [Liang et al., 2013;
Machiry et al., 2013] is to automatically test apps with real-world conditions, in-
cluding user-based contexts. These tools, however, are intended for developers who
want to learn how their apps will behave when used in a real setting. Contrarily, our
focus is on final users who want to find out if they will be targeted by malicious or
privacy-compromising behaviors. Finally, other works such as CopperDroid [Reina
et al., 2013] focus on malware detection as we do, but with a static approach (based
on information extracted from the manifest) that, besides, does not consider the
user context.
In this chapter, we address the problem of identifying targeted grayware and
malware and propose a more flexible approach compared to other proposals to deter-
mining whether the behavior of an app is compliant with a particular set of security
and privacy preferences associated with an user. Our solution is based on the idea of
obtaining an actionable model of user behavior that can be leveraged to test how an
app would behave should the user executes it in some context. Such a testing takes
place over a clone of the device kept in the cloud. This approach removes the need
of actually exposing the device (e.g., we let the device access only fake data and not
real). More importantly, the analysis is tailored to a given user, either generally or for
a particular situation. For example, a user might want to explore the consequences
of using an app in the locations visited during working days from 9 to 5 or during a
planned trip.
Section 7.2 introduces the theoretical framework used to model triggering pat-
terns and app behavior. In Section 7.3, we describe the architecture of our proposal
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and a proof-of-concept prototype, and discuss the experimental results obtained in
terms of testing coverage and efficiency. In Section 7.4, we discuss the detection
performance with two representative case studies of grayware and targeted malware
instances. Finally, Section 7.5 extracts some conclusions.
7.2 Behavioral Models
This section introduces the theoretical framework used in our proposal (presented in
Section 7.4) to trigger particular app behaviors and determining whether they entail
security risks to the user (as shown in Section 7.4). More precisely, we present
models for the user-provided inputs, the resulting app behavior, and the mechanism
used to assess potential risks.
7.2.1 Triggering Patterns
Inputs provided by the user to his device constitute a major source of stimuli for
triggering certain app behaviors. We group such inputs into two broad classes of
patterns, depending on whether they refer to inputs resulting from the user directly
interacting with the app and/or the device (e.g., through the touchscreen), or else
indirectly by the context (e.g., location, time, presence of other devices in the sur-
roundings).
7.2.1.1 Usage Patterns
Usage patterns model sequences of events resulting from the actions of the user
during his interaction with an app. Such events are internal messages passed on to
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the app by the device, such as starting an activity, or clicking a button. We underline
that our focus is on the events and not on the actions that generate them, as the
same event can be triggered through different input interfaces (e.g., touchscreen,
voice). Let the following be a set of all possible events for all apps:
B = {e1,e2, ... ,en}. (7.1)
Thus, the interaction of a user with an app can be represented as an ordered
sequence:
u= 〈ε1,ε2, ... ,εk〉, εi ∈ B. (7.2)
We will refer to such sequences as usage traces. Interactions with an app at different
times and/or with different apps will result in different usage traces.
7.2.1.2 Context Patterns
Apps may behave differently depending on conditions not directly provided by the
user, such as the device location, the time and date, the presence of other apps
or devices, etc. We model this using the widely accepted notion of context [Conti
et al., 2012]. Assume that v1, ... ,vm are variables representing contextual elements
of interest, with vi ∈ Vi . Let the following be the set of all possible contexts:
X = V1×·· ·×Vm. (7.3)
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As above, monitoring a user during some time interval will result in a sequence refer
to as context traces:
g= 〈x1,x2, ... ,xl〉, xi ∈ X . (7.4)
7.2.2 Stochastic Triggering Model
Usage and context traces are used to derive a model that captures how the user
interacts with an app or a set of apps. For this purpose, we rely on a discrete-time
first-order Markov process (i.e., a Markov chain [Norris, 1998]) M= (S ,A,Π) where:
• The set of states S is given by:
S = B×X = {s1, ... ,sN}. (7.5)
We will denote by q(t) ∈ S the state of the model at time t = 1,2, ... , repre-
senting one particular input event executed in a given context.
• The transition matrix is given by:
A= [aij ] = P[q(t+1) = sj |q(t) = si ], (7.6)
where aij ∈ [0,1] and ∑Nj=1 aij = 1.
• The vector of initial probabilities is given by:
Π = (pii) = P[q(1) = si ], (7.7)
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with pii ∈ [0,1] and ∑Ni=1pii = 1.
The model above is simple yet powerful to model user-dependant behavioral pat-
terns when interacting with an app. The model parameters can be easily estimated
from a number of usage and context traces. Assume that O = {o1,o2, ... ,oT} is a
sequence of observed states (i.e., event-context pairs) obtained by monitoring the
user during a representative amount of time. The transition matrix can be estimated
as:
aij =
∑Tt=2P[q(t) = sj |q(t−1) = si ]
∑Tt=2P[q(t) = sj ]
=
∑Tt=2P[ot = sj |ot−1 = si ]
∑Tt=2P[ot = sj ]
, (7.8)
where both probability terms are obtained by simply counting occurrences from O.
The process can be trivially extended when several traces are available.
The model above should be viewed as a general modeling technique that can be
applied at different levels. Therefore, if one is interested in modeling input events
irrespective of context, the set of states—and, therefore, the chain—can be reduced
to B. The same applies to context; e.g., states could be composed exclusively of
time-location pairs.
Markov chains are often represented as a directed graph where vertices represent
states and edges between them are labelled with the associated transition probability.
We will call the degree of a state, denoted by deg(si), to the number of states
reachable from s in just one transition with non-null probability
deg(si) = #{pij |pij > 0}. (7.9)
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The degree distribution of a chain is given by:
P(k) = P[deg(s) = k ]. (7.10)
7.2.3 App Behavior and Risk Assessment
An app interacts with the device by requesting services through a number of avail-
able system calls. These define an interface for apps that need to read/write files,
send/receive data through the network, make a phone call, etc. Rather than focusing
on low-level system calls, in this chapter we will describe an app behavior through the
sequence of activities it executes (see Chapter 5-Section 5.2.2). Activities represent
high-level behaviors, such as for example reading from or writing into a file, opening
a network connection, sending/receiving data, etc. In some cases, there will be a
one-to-one correspondence between an activity and a system call, while in others an
activity may encompass a sequence of system calls executed in a given order. In
what follows, we assume that
A= {a1,a2, ... ,ar} (7.11)
is the set of all relevant activities observable from an app execution.
The execution flow of an app may follow different paths depending on the input
events provided by the user and the context. Let σ = 〈σ1, ... ,σk〉 be a sequence of
states as defined above. We model the behavior of an app when executed with σ as
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input as the sequence
β(σ) = 〈αi , ... ,α〉, αi ∈ A, (7.12)
which we will refer to as the behavioral signature induced by σ.
Behavioral signatures constitute dynamic execution traces generated with usage
and context patterns specific to one particular user. Analysis of such traces will be
instrumental in determining whether there is evidence of security and/or privacy risks
for that particular user. The specific mechanism used for that analysis is beyond the
scope of our current work. In general, we assume the existence of a Risk Assess-
ment Function (RAF) implementing such a analysis. For example, general malware
detection tools based on dynamic analysis could be a natural option here. The case
of grayware is considerably more challenging, as the user’s privacy preferences must
be factored in to resolve whether a behavior is safe or not.
7.3 Targeted Testing in the Cloud
In this section, we first describe the architecture and the prototype implementation
of a cloud-based testing system for targeted malware and grayware based on the
models discussed in the previous section. We then provide a detailed description
of various experimental results obtained in two key tasks in our system: obtaining
triggering models and using them to test a cloned device.
7.3.1 Architecture and Prototype Implementation
A high level architectural view of our system is shown in Figure 7.1. There are
two differentiated major blocks: (i) the evidence generation subsystem, and (ii) the
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Figure 7.1: System architecture and main building blocks.
behavioral modeling and risk assessment subsystem. The first one extracts usage and
context traces from the device and generates the stochastic triggering model. This
process is carried out by first cloning the user device into the cloud and then injecting
the triggering patterns over the clone. The second block extracts the behavioral
signatures from the clone(s) and applies the RAF over the evidences collected. We
next provide a detailed description of our current prototype implementation.
The experiments have been conducted over the laboratory described in Chapter 3.
Specifically, we instrumented both a physical device and a cloud-virtual device. We
inject events and contexts into apps and monitor the resulting behavior. We chose 20
relevant activities to characterize app behavior (see Table 7.1), which include infor-
mation about calls to the crypto API (cryptousage), I/O network and file activity
(opennet, sendnet, accessedfiles, etc.), phone and SMS activity (phonecalls,
sendsms), data exfiltration through the network (dataleak), and dynamic code in-
jection (dexclass), among others.
Finally, we implemented a simple yet powerful RAF (Risk Assessment Function)
for analyzing behavioral signatures. In essence, the scheme is based on a pattern-
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Activities
• sendsms • servicestart • phonecalls • udpConn • cryptousage
• sendnet • netbuffer • activities • dexclass • activityaction
• dataleak • enfperm • opennet • packages • permissions
• recvs • recvnet • recvsaction • fdaccess • accessedfiles
Table 7.1: Set of activities (A) monitored from an app execution and used to characterize its
behavior.
matching process driven by a user-specified set of rules that identify behaviors of
interest according to his security and privacy preferences. Such rules are first-order
predicates over the set of activities A, allowing the user to specify relatively com-
plex patterns relating possible activities in a signature through logical connectives.
Regardless of this particular RAF, our prototype supports the inclusion of standard
security tools such as, e.g., antivirus packages or other security monitoring compo-
nents. These can be easily uploaded to the clone and run while the testing carries
on.
7.3.2 Experiment I: The Structure of a Triggering Model
In this first experiment, we monitored all events triggered by a user executing several
apps on his device during a representative amount of time. The resulting event
set contained about |S | =8K states, distributed over various observations traces
of around |O| = 37K states. We then used such traces to estimate the transition
matrix using Eq. (7.8). The resulting Markov chain turned out to have various
interesting features. For example, its degree distribution follows a power-law of the
form P(k) = k−α (see Fig. 7.2) with α= 2.28 for k ≥ 2. This suggests that events
and contexts follow a scale-free network [Clauset et al., 2009], which is not surprising.
Recall that an edge between two nodes (events) indicates that the destination event
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Figure 7.2: (a) Markov model representing contextual and kernel input events for a user inter-
acting with an Android platform; (b) Degree distribution, in log-log scale, of the model in (a) as
defined in Section 7.2.2.
occurs after the source event.
A power-law distribution such as the one shown in Figure 7.2 reveals that most
events have an extremely low number of “neighbors”; i.e., once an event has happened,
the most likely ones coming next reduce to about 100 out of the 8K possible. Only
a small fraction of all events are highly connected, meaning that almost any other
event is possible to occur after them. For instance, in our traces we found that over
half of the states were only connected to just one state. In contrast, one state was
found to be connected to more than 4000 other states.
These results make sense due to the following reason: input and context events
do depend quite strongly on those issued immediately before. For example, the
probability of moving from one place to another nearby is much higher than to
a remote place. The same applies to sequences of events, where the probability
distribution of the next likely event reflects the way we interact with the app. As we
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will next see, this structure makes testing extremely efficient.
7.3.3 Experiment II: Speed of Testing
We performed a number of experiments to measure how fast input events can be
injected into an Android application sandbox. Such events include not only input
events, but also a variety of contexts’ traces comprising phone calls, SMS messages
and GPS locations. We studied the time taken by both the sandbox and the operating
system to process each injected event. Our results suggest that the time required to
process injected states (input or context events) varies depending on the type of state
(see Table 7.2). For instance, it takes around 0.35 seconds, on average, to inject
an SMS and process it trough the operating system. In contrast, geolocation events
can be injected almost 100 times faster. We also observed a significant difference
between the capabilities of the sandbox and the OS running on top of it. For instance,
while the sandbox is able to process about 2800 geolocation states per second, the
OS can only absorb around 100 each second. We suspect that this throughput might
be improved by using more efficient virtual frameworks, such as Qemu for Android
x862 or ARM-based hardware for the cloud.3
For comparison purposes, the lower rows in Table 7.2 show the average and peak
number of events generated by human users, both for usage (e.g., touch events) and
context events, as reported in previous works [Wei et al., 2012].
2http://www.android-x86.org/
3http://armservers.com/
7.3. Targeted Testing in the Cloud 219
Automatic Injection
Injected Event Emulator Layer App Layer
Sensor event 7407.66 events/s 1.26 events/s
Power event 361.77 events/s 19.16 events/s
Geolocation event 2810.15 events/s 111.87 events/s
SMS event 451.27 events/s 0.35 events/s
GSM call/cancel event 1726.91 events/s 0.71 events/s
Human Generated
Event Type Average Peak
Usage patterns 5 events/s 10 events/s
Context patterns 10 events/s 25 events/s
Table 7.2: Event injection rates for different types of events over a virtualized Android device
(top), and rates generated by real users based on profiling 67 apps [Wei et al., 2012] (bottom).
7.3.4 Experiment III: Coverage and Efficiency
We perform a number of experiments to evaluate the performance of our proposal.
We aim at measuring the time required to reach an accurate decision by means of sim-
ulation. More precisely, we simulate an injection system configured with an specific u
and g randomly generated and with different number of states |S |= 100,1000,10000.
The configuration of each experiment is based on the findings shown in previous
section as detailed bellow. First, we generated two types of Markov model chains: (i)
one random scale-free network of events using a preferential attachment mechanism
as defined by Barabási–Albert (BA) [Albert and Barabási, 2002], and (ii) another
random network with attachment mechanism as defined by Erdős-Rényi (ER) model
[Erdős and Rényi, 1960]. Then, we simulated a user providing inputs to a device
together with its context at a rate of 10 events per second. We chose this throughput
as it is a realistic injection rate (see Table 7.2).
In each experiment, we generate a number of random Markov chains and calcu-
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late the cumulative transition probability covered when traversing from one state to
another of the chain for the first time. Formally, let
rw = 〈si1,si2, ... ,sin〉, sij ∈ S (7.13)
be a random walk over the chain, with aij ij+1 > 0 ∀ij , and let
T (rw) = {(sij ,sij+1) | sij ∈ S \{sin}} (7.14)
be the set of all transitions made during the random walk. We define the coverage of
rw as the amount of transitions seen by rw , weighted by their respective probabilities
and normalized to add up to one, i.e.:
Coverage(rw) =
1
N ∑
(p,q)∈T (rw)
apq. (7.15)
The coverage is used to evaluate both the efficiency and the accuracy of our
system. On the one hand, it can be used to measure the amount of a user’s common
actions triggered given a limited period of testing time. Additionally, it also shows
how fast the system tests the most common actions. Results for sets of events of
various sizes are shown in Figure 7.3, where the curves have been averaged over 10
simulations. The results show that the coverage reached when testing networks of
sizes |S |= 100, 1000, and 4000 states is very satisfactory. Such a good performance
is related to the scale-free distribution of states through time. Thus, a coverage
above 80% is reached in less than two minutes for 100 states, and in approximately
1 hour for 4000 states.
It is important to emphasize that the coverage reported in Figure 7.3 corresponds
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Figure 7.3: Efficiency and accuracy of the decision for a Barabási-Albert and Erdős-Rényi network
model.
to one test sequence randomly drawn according to the user’s behavioral model. If the
process is repeated or carried out in parallel (e.g., over a clone), other test sequences
may well explore behaviors not covered by the first one. This is illustrated in Table
7.3, where we show the total testing coverage as a function of the number of clones
tested in parallel, each on with a different input sequence. Thus, after two hours
testing just one clone results in a coverage slightly above 84%. However, if five clones
are independently tested in parallel, the overall results is a coverage of around 93%
of the total user behavior. This time-memory trade-off is a nice property, allowing
to increase the coverage by just testing multiple clones simultaneously rather than
by performing multiple test over the same clone.
Reaching a 100% coverage is, in general, difficult due to the stochastic nature of
the models. This is not critical, as those behavioral patterns that are left unexplored
correspond to actions extremely unlikely to be executed by the user. In practical terms
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Number of parallel clones
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10 min. 42% 60% 68% 73% 76% 79% 81% 81% 82.5% 83.4%
60 min. 79% 86% 89% 90% 90% 91% 91% 91% 91% 95%
120 min. 84% 87% 88% 88% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93%
Table 7.3: Coverage given by our model when running multiple parallel clone given a limited
testing time for a network of |S |= 4000 states.
this is certainly a risk, but one relatively unimportant as the presumably uncovered
malware instance would not activate for this user except with very low probability.
7.4 Case Studies
In this section we present two case studies illustrating how the injection of user-
specific behavioral patterns can contribute to reveal malware with targeted activa-
tion mechanisms. We cover dormant and anti-analysis malware, as these scenarios
constitute representative cases of targeted behaviors in current smart devices [Suarez-
Tangil et al., 2014b]. For each case, we first provide a brief description of the rationale
behind the malware activation condition and then discuss the results obtained after
applying the injection strategy presented in this work. In all cases, the evaluation has
been conducted using the android remote access tool (RAT) described in Chapter 3.
More precisely, we have adapted Androrat [Bertrand et al., 2014] to incorporate the
specific triggering conditions.
7.4.1 Case 1: Dormant Malware/Grayware
Piggybacked malware [Zhou et al., 2013] is sometimes programmed to remain dor-
mant until an specific situation of interest presents itself [Zhou and Jiang, 2012].
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Wake-up conditions
User presence USB connected, screen-on action, accelerator changed, etc.
Location Location change event, near an address, leaving an area, etc.
Time A given day and time, after a certain period of time, etc.
Hardware Power and LED status, KEY action, LOCK event, etc.
Configuration Apps installed, a given contact/phone number in the agenda, etc.
Table 7.4: Typical wake-up conditions for malware activation.
This type of malware is eventually activated to sense if the user context is relevant
for the malware. If so, then some other malicious actions are executed. For instance,
a malware aiming at spying a very specific industrial system, such as the case of
Stuxnet, will remain dormant until the malware hits the target system. Similarly,
in a Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) context, malware targeting a specific office
building can remain dormant until the device is near a certain location.
Typically, malicious apps are activated when the BOOT_COMPLETED event is trig-
gered regardless of the context of the infected device. A recent study on Android
malware [Zhou and Jiang, 2012] suggests that the tendency is shifting towards more
sophisticated activation triggers so as to better align with the malware incentives and
the pursued goals. This results in a variety of more complex activation conditions,
such as those shown in Table 7.4.
We instrumented Androrat to activate the RAT component only when the device
is in a certain location. We use a mock location near the Bushehr’s nuclear plant,
simulating a possible behavior for a Stuxnet-like malware. Specifically, the RAT is only
activated when the device is near the location: 28.82781◦ (latitude) and 50.89114◦
(longitude). Once the RAT is activated, we send the appropriate commands to
exfiltrate ambient and call recordings captured through the microphone, the camera,
and the camcorder.
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Figure 7.4: Markov chain for the location.
For testing purposes, we built a symbolic model representing the abstract geo-
graphic areas of a given user working at Bushehr’s plant. Figure 7.4 represents the
Markov Model chain for the different areas and the transitions between them. For
instance, the model represents a user traveling from HOME (xH) to WORK (xW )
with a probability of P(xH |xW ) = 0.7.
Given the above model, we then inject testing traces drawn from the chain into the
sandbox instrumented with Androrat. The sandbox is configured with a generic RAF
aiming at identifying when operations involving personal information occur together
with network activity. Results show how the malware is not activated until we start
injecting mock locations. A few seconds after the first injection, the behavioral
signature collected reported, as expected, both data leakage (dataleak) and network
activity (sendnet).
We next defined an alternative scenario in which an app accesses the user location
and sends an SMS to one of his contacts whenever he is leaving a certain region,
such as for instance WORK (xW ). To this end, we implement an app and tested
it against three users with different contexts and concerns about their privacy. The
first user has strict privacy policies and visits very frequently the location xW . The
second user has the same policy as the first one but has never visited such a location.
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Finally, the last user visits xW as well but has a more flexible privacy policy. For
the sake of simplicity, we use the same triggering model described in the previous
example for user one and three (see Figure 7.4), while the second user has a different
Markov chain. Results show that:
• For the first user, the behavioral signature reported data leakage activity (dataleak)
as well as SMS activity (sendsms). As both are in conflict with this user’s pri-
vacy preferences, this is marked as undesirable behavior.
• In the case of the second user, the model injects locations other than those
triggering the grayware component. Consequently, no significant behavioral
signature is produced.
• Finally, the events injected for the third user trigger the grayware component,
resulting in data leakage and SMS activity. However, as these do not oppose
his privacy preferences, no alert is issued.
This example reinforces the view that not only malware activation can be user
specific, but that the consequences of such a malware may also be perceived very
differently by each user.
7.4.2 Case 2: Anti-analysis Malware
Malware analysis is typically performed in a virtual sandbox rather than in a physical
device due to economic and efficiency factors [Suarez-Tangil et al., 2014b]. These
sandboxes often have a particular hardware configuration that can be leveraged by
malware instances to detect that they are being analyzed and deploy evasion counter-
measures [Rogers, 2014], for example by simply not executing the malicious payload
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HW feature Default value
IMEI 000000000000000
IMSI 012345678912345
SIM 012345678912345
Phone Number 1-555-521-PORT (5554)
Model Number sdk
Network Android
Battery Status AC on Charging 50%
IP Address 10.0.2.X
Table 7.5: Default hardware configuration for Android emulator.
if the environment matches a particular configuration. Sandboxes for smartphone
platforms have such artifacts. For instance, the IMEI, the phone number, or the IP
address are generally configured by default. Furthermore, other hardware features
such as the battery level are typically emulated and kept indefinitely at the same sta-
tus: e.g., AC on and Charging 50%. Table 7.5 summarizes some of these features
in most Android emulators along with their default value.
Hardware features such as those described above can be set prior to launching the
sandbox. This will prevent basic fingerprinting analysis, for example by setting random
values for each execution. However, smarter malware instances might implement
more sophisticated approaches, such as waiting for a triggering condition based on
a combination of hardware changes. Motivated by this, we modified Androrat to
activate the RAT component only after AC is off and the battery status is different
from 50%. Once the RAT is activated, we send appropriate commands to exfiltrate
some personal information from the device such as SMSs, call history, etc.
In principle, there are as many triggering conditions as combinations of possible
hardware events. Although our framework support injection of all possible hardware
events via the Android emulator console [Android, 2014], for simplicity we restricted
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Status Health Present AC Capacity
unknown
charging
discharging
not-charging
full
unknown
0−100%
good
overheat false off
dead true on
overvoltage
failure
Table 7.6: Different hardware states for power status of the device.
Figure 7.5: Markov chain for the battery status.
our experimentation to the subset of power-related events described in Table 7.6.
Based on the different power states, we built a model of the battery usage ex-
tracted from an actual device when used by a real user. The resulting model is shown
in Figure 7.5. We then tested Androrat against this model generated using the same
RAF configuration used in previous cases. The results show that the behavioral signa-
ture not only reported dataleak and sendnet, but also file activity (accessedfiles),
thus confirming that the malware activated as it failed to recognize its presence in a
sandbox.
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7.5 Conclusions
The problem of detecting targeted malware via behavioral analysis requires the ability
to reproduce an appropriate set of conditions that will trigger the malicious behavior.
Determining those triggering conditions by exhaustively searching through all possible
states is an undecidable problem. In this chapter, we have proposed a novel system
for mining the behavior of apps in different user-specific usage scenarios and contexts.
Our experimental results show that modeling such patterns as Markov chains reduces
the complexity of the search space while still offering an effective representation of
the usage and context patterns.
Our approach represents a robust building block for thwarting targeted malware,
as it allows the analyst to automatically generate patterns of input events to stimulate
apps. As the focus of this chapter has been on the design of such a component, we
have relied on ad hoc replication and risk assessment components to discuss the
quality of our proposal. We are currently extending our system to support: (a) a
replication system to automatically generate and test clones of the device under
inspection; and (b) a general framework to specify risk assessment functions and
analyze behavioral signatures obtained in each clone. Finally, in this chapter we
have not discussed the potential privacy implications associated with obtaining user
behavioral models. Even if such profiles are just used for testing purposes, they do
contain sensitive information and must be handled with caution. This and other
related privacy aspects of targeted testing will be tackled in future work.
V
Conclusions, Future Work and
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Conclusions
Smart devices equipped with powerful sensing, computing, and networking capa-bilities have increasingly become the platform of choice—mostly in the form of
smartphones and tablets— for many users, outselling the number of PCs worldwide.
The rapid development of smartphone technologies and its widespread user accep-
tance have come hand in hand with a similar increase in the number of malicious
software targeting such platforms. This increase is accompanied, in some cases, by
sophisticated techniques purposely designed to overcome security architectures and
detection mechanisms. This Thesis examines the problem of such smart malware
and addresses several fundamental issues when automating its analysis in large-scale
scenarios.
This Chapter provides the conclusions of this dissertation. We first summarize
the main contributions and discuss how they meet the objectives established. Next,
we identify and discuss a number of challenging open issues that should be tackled in
future work. Finally, we list various results (publications, software, etc.) that have
resulted from this Thesis.
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8.1 Contributions
We next summarize the contributions made in this work and discuss the main con-
clusions that arise from them:
1. The comprehensive analysis presented in Chapter 2 on the evolution of malware
in smart devices motivates the need for intelligent instruments to automate
their analysis. To do so, we have first provided an overview of the security
models and protection mechanisms present in current platforms for smart de-
vices. Next, we have proposed a characterization of malware in terms of three
key factors: pursued goals and associated behaviors; distribution and infection
channels; and privilege acquisition strategies. Our analysis of some represen-
tative samples demonstrates that malware is becoming increasingly complex
and adaptive, with constantly changing goals and using multiple distribution
and infection strategies. We have also provided an analysis of the 20 most
significant proposals for detecting and analyzing malware for smart devices
proposed between 2010 and 2014. First, we have identified and classified all
device features where malware behavior could manifest. This taxonomy has
been complemented with additional elements, such as where the monitoring
and analysis tasks take place, or the specific detection technique used. Then,
we have provided key elements for the design of novel techniques aiming at
detecting and analyzing smart malware. Finally, Chapter 3 presents the design
and development of a research lab for smart malware analysis and detection.
This lab compiles together—and extends—the most cutting-edge open source
tools for all static-, dynamic-, and cloud-based analysis. This lab facilitates
the automation of smart malware analysis, and we believe it will be extremely
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useful to other researchers aiming at automating malware analysis for smart
detection.
2. Static analysis is a relatively fast approach to identify malicious software. For
this reason, it has been widely used by existing techniques to search for suspi-
cious components. The techniques introduced in Chapter 4 demonstrate that
exploiting static features for mining structural patterns in smart malware is
extremely efficient. In particular, we have successfully applied a text mining
approach to automatically classify smartphone malware samples and analyze
families based on the code structures found in them. Our proposal is sup-
ported by a statistical analysis of the distribution of such structures over a
large dataset of real examples. Our findings point out that the problem bears
strong resemblances to some questions arising in automated text classification
and other information retrieval tasks. By adapting them to these domains, we
have explored the suitability of such techniques to measure similarity among
malware samples, and to classify unknown samples into known families. Our
results suggest that this technique is fast, scalable, and very accurate. Fur-
thermore, this technique also provides the analyst with a means to analyze the
relationships among families, the existence of common ancestors, the preva-
lence and/or extinction of certain code features, etc. Altogether, this reveals
that automated tools are instrumental for analysts to cope with the prolifera-
tion and increasing sophistication of malware.
3. Smart malware often relies on obfuscation techniques to avoid detection and
to make static analysis harder. Chapter 5 uses dynamic analysis to address this
type of malware and introduces a novel technique based on differential fault
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analysis to automate its identification in large-scale markets. Our approach
demonstrates how fault injection can be used to analyze the behavioral dif-
ferences between the original app and a number of automatically generated
versions of it where a number of modifications (faults) have been carefully in-
jected. Observable differences in terms of activities that appear or vanish in
the modified app are used to successfully identify potentially malicious compo-
nents hidden within an app package. Finally, we show how this approach is
a good complement to static analysis tools, more focused on inspecting code
components but which could well miss pieces of code hidden in data objects or
just obfuscated.
4. Adapting and adopting both static- and dynamic-based analysis tools to battery-
powered devices is a challenging problem. Relying on offloaded (i.e., cloud-
based) engines has been suggested an alternative for empowering constrained
devices with powerful detection capabilities. In Chapter 6, we have discussed
the power consumption trade-offs among various strategies for executing anomaly
detection components directly on mobile platforms or remotely in the cloud.
When researchers are confronted with this dilemma, we have shown that there
is actually little choice but to offload everything to the cloud. Reasons for
this include the differences between the energy efficiency of computation and
communications in current platforms, and also various parameters related to
the anomaly detection setting, such as the dataset sizes and the operation
frequency.
5. The consumption model previously proposed reveals that the use of detection
techniques built in the device is unaffordable. Chapter 7 shows that cloud-based
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approaches can be adopted to analyze targeted malware. Current dynamic-
based detection strategies are shown to be extremely inefficient when dealing
with this type of malware, as analysts must reproduce very specific activation
conditions to trigger malicious payloads. First, we position that determining
those triggering conditions by exhaustively searching through all possible states
is an undecidable problem. To this end, we have proposed a novel system based
on cloud cloning for mining the behavior of apps in different user-specific usage
scenarios and contexts. We have revealed that using a simple yet powerful
stochastic model reduces the complexity of the search space while still offering
an effective representation of the usage and context patterns of the targeted
device. Finally, we have provided the analyst with a robust system for auto-
matically detecting targeted malware. The main building blocks of this system
are: the evidence generation subsystem, and the behavioral modeling and risk
assessment subsystem. The first one extracts usage and context traces from
the device and generates the stochastic triggering model. The second block ex-
tracts the behavioral signatures from the clone(s) and applies a risk assessment
over the evidences collected.
8.2 Open Issues and Future Work
Malware in smart devices still pose many challenges and a number of important issues
need to be further studied and addressed with novel solutions. This section identifies
some open issues where research is needed.
• Cooperative security. In the near future it is very likely that many users will
own a network of smart devices, including smartphones, smart TVs and other
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home appliances, and wearable computing platforms. Such networks could
be leveraged to implement cooperative security functions, as a complement
to cloud-based and on-platform monitoring and analysis mechanisms. Ideally,
several connected devices could cooperate to improve security in a number of
ways. For example, resource-intensive tasks can be delegated to devices with a
permanent power source to preserve the battery of mobile platforms. Similarly,
mutually monitoring schemes could be interesting, where each device monitors
the behavior of others to detect compromise.
• Trusted software. In the case of current smartphones and tablets, trust on
the non-malicious nature of an app is based on two factors: (i) the implicit
assumption that the market operator has conducted some security review before
making the app available for download; and (ii) the identity of the developer,
given by the signature attached to the app, which also provides some evidence
of the app’s integrity. The first point is not fully reliable, as operators cannot
afford to carry out an exhaustive analysis over every submitted app; and, even if
they could, there is still some non-negligible probability of sophisticated malware
evading detection. As for the identify of the developer and the app’s integrity,
evidence suggests that most users do not pay much attention to them, or
positively ignore them when downloading apps from alternative markets.
We believe that further efforts to improve trust in software are required. This
will be increasingly necessary in the near future, as the number of developers—
and, hence, apps—will likely grow very significantly. Reputation systems [Viriya-
sitavat and Martin, 2012; Zacharia et al., 2000] adapted to this context might
offer some added value, in particular by exploiting interactions in large user
communities such as, for example, those provided by online social networks
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[Govindan and Mohapatra, 2012]. But other mechanisms for building trust
could also apply, such as for example remote attestation protocols [Nauman
et al., 2010; Saroiu and Wolman, 2010; Viriyasitavat and Martin, 2012] or any
other schemes to ensure the authenticity and integrity of software.
• Malware in other smart devices. The experience gained from current smart-
phones suggests that malware will also hit other smart devices as soon as they
appear. Evidence in other pervasive technologies already exists. For exam-
ple, nowadays Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are used in a
wide range of applications, such as transport tickets, access control systems,
e-passports, e-health applications, etc. The benefits of adopting RFID technol-
ogy for identification purposes are clear, but its associated security risks need
to be addressed. One of them—often underestimated—is malware. The use
of Internet-enabled mobile devices as RFID readers makes this sort of attacks
potentially more harmful. Most previous works have focused on securing the
communication link between the tag and the (mobile) reader. There are, how-
ever, some preliminary works [Rieback et al., 2006; Yan et al., 2009] on RFID
malware, but further studies and solutions are required. Similarly, Implantable
Medical Devices (IMDs) and other medical devices will likely be an attractive
target for attackers due to the economic value of the information they can
provide [Burleson et al., 2012; Clark and Fu, 2012; Clark et al., 2013].
• Forensics-based analysis for smart device protection. Sometimes malicious
programs uninstall themselves after achieving their goals. However, analyzing
evidences that they leave behind could be used as an input for detecting future
propagation using the same infection vector. Identifying such traces is a great
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challenge, particularly due to the availability of anti-forensic tools for devices
such as smartphones [Distefano et al., 2010]. In this regard, two different
approaches might be worth exploring. On the one hand, deleting evidences
or attempting to neutralize any source of evidence usually produces fresh new
evidences. On the other hand, new paradigms such as the aforementioned
replicas in the cloud, allow the creation of novel forensic approaches on the
cloud based on virtual introspection.
• Offloaded security. Applications are increasingly requiring the user to autho-
rize the transference of personal information to the cloud as part of the normal
use of the application. For instance, WhatsApp sends the user’s address book
to establish friendship connections [WhatsApp, 2014]. However, even if the
user authorizes such a transference, it does not mean that it will be used for
purposes other than those conveyed to the user, such as for example market
research. In other cases, users are only informed that some personal informa-
tion will be sent, but the particulars about what specific items or how it will
be used are not given. Identifying misuse of personal information, both on-
platform and in the cloud, is a challenging problem that is typically tackled by
legal enforcement mechanisms, but technical approaches should be explored.
For instance, in the same way that Google App Engine [Google, 2014a] is used
to deploy in-the-cloud applications—monitored by Google—, back-end services
for smartphones and other smart devices could be moved to a cloud controlled
and monitored by a trusted third party. This could make feasible to monitor
behavior and enforce security policies in the cloud end of the service, thus
complementing other security mechanisms applied in the device.
Similar privacy-related problems arise in cloud-based monitoring schemes, pri-
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marily in those that maintain a virtualized replica of the device to carry out mon-
itoring tasks that are unaffordable to perform directly on the device. Privacy-
preserving monitoring systems for this scenario are required, but also more
lightweight monitoring and detection mechanisms that can run on platform
with an appropriate balance between efficacy and power consumption.
• Stegomalware: In the case of smart malware, one commonly observed tech-
nique consists of hiding modules containing malicious functionality in places
that static analysis tools overlook (e.g., within data objects). More sophisti-
cated hiding techniques, particularly in code, are starting to materialize. These
techniques and trends create an additional obstacle to malware analysts, who
see their task further complicated and have to ultimately rely on carefully con-
trolled dynamic analysis techniques, such as Alterdroid, to detect the presence
of potentially dangerous pieces of code. We believe that smart malware could
be using advanced techniques, such as steganography, for concealing their mod-
ules within another components of the code. This is specially critical when this
components are hidden within distinguishable components (see Alterdroid—
Chapter 5).
8.3 Results
All contributions resulting from this Thesis (see Section 1.3 in Chapter 1) have been
sent for publication to top ranked peer reviewed journals and international conferences
in the Computer Science area. Furthermore, software produced as a result of this
Thesis has been sent for copyright protection and made available for fair use1 to the
1Permits the use of a copyrighted work for nonprofit or educational purposes.
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research community.
This section reports all results published and/or submitted during this PhD, and
Table 8.1 presents a summary. The index used for evaluating the journals we aim at
this dissertation is the Impact Factor (I.F.) as defined by the Journal Citation Report
(JCR) from Thomson Reuters2. Similarly, the Computer Research and Education
ranking (CORE) from Computer Research & Education3 is used to evaluate the
conferences. These rankings are typically based on the acceptance ratio, number
of submissions, citations, and the position of the publication venue with respect to
others in the same category.
Publications Indexes Rank
Journals Published : 3 JCR Q1
Submitted : 2 JCR Q1/2
Conferences Published : 1 CORE A
Others Copyrighted : 4 – –
Total 10
Table 8.1: Summary of the publications of this Thesis and the citation indexes of their corre-
sponding publication venue.
8.3.1 Publications Thesis
We list all publications that arise from this Thesis organized by contribution:
2http://thomsonreuters.com/journal-citation-reports/
3www.core.edu.au/
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P1: “Evolution, Detection and Analysis of Malware for Smart Devices” .
• Authors: Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Juan E. Tapiador, Pedro Peris-
Lopez, and Arturo Ribagorda.
• In: IEEE Comms Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 16:2, pp. 961-987 (2014).
• I.F. (2012): 4.81.
• Position in category: 2/132 (Q1) in Computer Science.
P2: “Dendroid: A Text Mining Approach to Analyzing and Classifying
Code Structures in Android Malware Families” .
• Authors: Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Juan E. Tapiador, Pedro Peris-
Lopez, and Jorge Blasco.
• In: Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 41, pp. 1104-1117 (2014).
• I.F. (2012): 1.85.
• Position in category: 56/243 (Q1) in Engineering.
P3: “Thwarting Obfuscated Malware via Differential Fault Analysis” .
• Authors: Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Flavio Lombardi, Juan E. Tapiador,
and Roberto Di Pietro.
• In: IEEE Computer, vol. 47:6, pp. 24-31 (2014).
• I.F. (2012): 1.68.
• Position in category: 9/50 (Q1) in Computer Science.
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P4: “Detecting Targeted Smartphone Malware with Behavior-
Triggering Stochastic Models” .
• Authors: Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Mauro Conti, Juan E. Tapiador,
and Pedro Peris-Lopez.
• To: European Symposium On Research In Computer Security (ES-
ORICS), September 2014.
• Rank (2013): CORE A in Computer Software.
8.3.2 Submitted Publications
We list all works that arise from this Thesis submitted for consideration to be pub-
lished organized by contribution:
P5: “Alterdroid: Differential Fault Analysis of Obfuscated Malware
Behavior” .
• Authors: Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Juan E. Tapiador, Flavio Lombardi,
and Roberto Di Pietro.
• To: IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, submitted September
2014.
• I.F. (2012): 2.91.
• Position in category: 12/135 (Q1) in Computer Science.
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P6: “Power-aware Anomaly Detection in Smartphones: An Analysis of
On-Platform versus Externalized Operation” .
• Authors: Guillermo Suarez-Tangil, Juan E. Tapiador, Pedro Peris-
Lopez, and Sergio Pastrana.
• To: Pervasive and Mobile Computing, submitted February 2014.
• I.F. (2012): 1.63.
• Position in category: 27/172 (Q1) in Computer Science.
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8.3.3 Copyright Software and Patents
We list the copyright software submissions resulting from this Thesis:
• Software Registration I: Alterdroid. This software compiles all source code
related to the following contribution: “Differential fault analysis of obfuscated
malware behavior ”.
• Software Registration II: CloneCloud. “A stochastic behavioral-triggering
model for targeted malware detection” requires a number of scripts to auto-
matically generate android apps equipped with a number of anomaly detection
algorithms.
• Software Registration III: CrowdDroid. This software comprises an Android
app for monitoring system calls from physical Android smartphones and an
Apache server app for collecting such information. This software has been
used to evaluate the anomaly detectors described in ‘A stochastic behavioral-
triggering model for targeted malware detection”.
• Software Registration IV: Maldroid Lab. This software compiles all source
code related to the following contribution: “A research lab of malware for
smart malware analysis and detection”. Additionally, it compiles software used
in:
– “A text mining approach for analyzing and classifying malware families”.
– “Power-aware anomaly detection in smartphones”.
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8.3.4 Research Visits
We finally list the research visits performed during this PhD:
• Università degli Studi di Padova: I visited Dr. Mauro Conti between Septem-
ber and October 2013. As a result of this visit, we have published the fol-
lowing contribution “Detecting Targeted Smartphone Malware with Behavior-
Triggering Stochastic Models” in ESORICS 2014. We are currently working on
extending our proposal.
• Università degli Studi di Roma Tre: I visited Dr. Roberto Di Pietro between
September and December 2012. Resulting from this visit, we have published
“Thwarting Obfuscated Malware via Differential Fault Analysis” in IEEE Com-
puter 2014, and submitted “Alterdroid: Differential Fault Analysis of Obfus-
cated Malware Behavior ” to an IEEE Transactions 2014. We are currently
working on other proposals.
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C All possible components of an app, page 136
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Fi Set of apps belonging to the same family i , page 107
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P ′ App resulting after the sequential application of fault injections over P (see also
Ψ(P )), page 140
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M Markov chain, page 211
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P An app seen as a collection of components, page 136
t Time taken to perform a task, page 160
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